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ABSTRACT 
This thesis reports on the first study into the role of self-conscious emotions, namely pride, 
shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment, in social work practice. Employing a qualitative 
case study research design, involving the safeguarding service of one local authority, 
ethnographic constructionist grounded theory methods were used to develop a conceptual 
understanding of these emotional experiences in the practice of the social workers involved. 
Integrating data from 246.5 hours of observations, 99 diary entries, 33 assessments written by 
the social workers, 19 interviews, and 329 pages of documents relating to the organisation, this 
study analyses the context for these emotional experiences within the case study site, how they 
were experienced, and their influence on the social workers’ practice. It argues that these 
emotional experiences are inherently part of practice, influencing what the social workers did and 
how they did it, which could be manipulated by others to regulate the social workers’ identities 
so that they acted in institutionally ‘appropriate’ ways. While some social workers felt proud to 
act in such a manner in some contexts, often resulting in a difficult experience for the parents, 
most social workers felt constrained, believing they were no longer doing social work, and in 
some contexts sought to resist the institutional expectations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
If I ask you to consider a time that you felt proud, ashamed, guilty, or embarrassed, the likelihood 
is that you will be able to recall such occasions. You may also recall how pleasant or distressing 
such experiences were or how they altered your perception of yourself. If I ask you to think of a 
time where you have been praised, shamed, humiliated, or embarrassed by someone else, the 
likelihood is that you will also be able to recall such situations. You may also remember how these 
experiences have altered how you now act in similar situations. Certainly, such emotional 
experiences have been theorised and identified within psychological and sociological research 
findings to be a common experience, at least for those who speak English (e.g. Cooley, 1902; 
Lynd, 1958; Goffman, 1959; Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 1988; Tangney and Dearing, 2002). Such 
experiences have generally come to be referred to as ‘self-conscious emotions’ (Tracy et al., 
2007), as the focus of one’s consciousness in such emotional experiences is the ‘self’, although it 
is probably more accurate to say it is the ‘self’ in relation to ‘others’ (Goffman, 1959; Lewis, 
1971). We, perhaps, all have a desire to present ourselves in a way that makes us feel good and 
encourages us to be included and accepted as a friend, a lover, or team member. While at the 
same time we, perhaps, all have a desire to present ourselves in a way that avoids feeling bad 
about ourselves and avoids being socially rejected and isolated. Indeed, to these ends, the theory 
and research suggests that self-conscious emotional experiences play a significant role in what 
people do and how they do it (e.g. Cooley, 1902; Lynd, 1958; Goffman, 1959; Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 
1988; Tangney and Dearing, 2002).  
In my own experience of being a social worker, I was aware that, on occasion, I felt such 
emotions, while my experience of being a lecturer of post qualifying social work has indicated to 
me such experiences may be commonplace for social workers. But what influence, if any, did such 
emotional experiences have on my own, or others’, practice? What role do these self-conscious 
emotions play in practice? To explore this issue, I undertook a scoping review to examine the 
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nature and extent of the research evidence specifically for these experiences in social work 
practice (Gibson, 2016). While there were no studies which specifically investigated the role self-
conscious emotions played in practice, and only three studies explicitly identified such 
experiences, there were a wide range of studies which implied their presence. Without a specific 
focus, however, the role they played and the influence they had on what social workers did and 
how they did it was lost. This study, therefore, seeks to fill this gap by specifically investigating the 
role these emotional experiences have in one area of social work practice, namely child 
protection work. In seeking to provide an answer to this overall aim, three questions are 
considered: (1) what is the context for self-conscious emotions in child protection social work; (2) 
how are these emotions experienced; and (3) what is their influence on practice? This 
introduction provides a brief overview of the philosophical foundations for this study and an 
outline of the chapters that follow. 
PRAGMATISM AS A FOUNDATION FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH 
The foundation for this study is pragmatism. For pragmatists, reality is not ‘out-there’, ready and 
available for discovery. Instead, it is considered to be in a state of indeterminacy, from which a 
person is able to conceive determinate objects and familiar patterns through experience (Peirce, 
1878). It is through active engagement with our environment that we come to develop 
experiential knowledge in the form of statements or theories which can be used as instruments 
or tools to cope in our environment (James, 1907). Experience and action, or practice, is of 
central importance in pragmatic thought. Consequently, it is the practical effects of objects, ideas, 
and theories that are considered to constitute their meaning (Peirce, 1878). We come to know 
what a ‘rock’ is not only because of how it looks and feels but also because of what it does. Our 
idea of what a rock is, or, indeed, a colour, a sound, etc. is a practical accomplishment of our 
experience, not only to make sense of our experience but also to be able to act in our 
environment. Such knowledge enables us to continuously adapt our actions in response to 
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perpetually evolving situations allowing us to change the environment to satisfy our practical 
needs. Our actions can, therefore, be considered to be affected by the environment as much as 
the environment can be considered to affect our actions. As Mead (1908) said, “the individual 
and environment – the situation – mutually determine each other" (p.315).  
Because of its indeterminate nature, it is possible to conceive the world in many different ways. 
Our conceptions are, however, mutually constituted in the context of community (Peirce, 1877). 
It is through community that we can come to understand our experience, and consider what we 
believe to be true, through shared meanings, beliefs, and frames of reference. Furthermore, such 
meanings can only be created and embedded within a community through language. And as 
Rorty (1989) argues, it is our language that enables us to create descriptions of the world and it is 
only these descriptions that can be considered true or false (Rorty, 1989). Our reality is, 
therefore, constructed through a specific cultural and linguistic context, which creates a range of 
different social worlds, brought into being by different communities that provide different ways 
of being and distinguish one group from another (Shalin, 1986). An individual may question and 
even disagree with the shared meanings and understandings of their community, but they still 
have to act in relation to them; they cannot be ignored.  
This pragmatic perspective has certain implications for social research. Firstly, given that a 
person’s understanding of the world is developed within a specific context, any perspective of 
reality is not only social but also historical. Wright Mills (1959) argues, therefore, that another’s 
reality can only be understood through a sociological analysis. Secondly, as the world can only be 
understood through a particular cultural and linguistic context, Dewey (1929a) argued that there 
are no fixed points from which to observe reality and there can be no universal and context-free 
claims to truth. Knowledge is useful in a particular situation or it is not (Dewey, 1929b). All 
knowledge, including that derived from research, can always be refined, revised, or rejected in 
light of future inquiry and experience and, therefore, should always be considered fallible. And 
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thirdly, that as we are in an eternal relational state with our ever evolving environment, the sharp 
dichotomies between thought and experience, mind and body, fact and value, etc. break down 
(Dewey, 1929b; Rorty, 1979). So while Dewey (1929a) argued that there is no way to access ‘raw 
experience’, Emirbayer and Maynard (2010) argue that pragmatic research requires a holistic 
approach to study human experience.  
CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
Given the implications of pragmatism, this study first sets out to define what is meant by the 
terms pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment in chapter one. The dominant theories 
of these self-conscious emotions are considered and critiqued drawing on contemporary 
pragmatic thinkers in the field of emotion theory and research. Rather than consider these 
emotions to have been developed through evolution and are, therefore, universal, existing in the 
mind, which can be ‘triggered’ by certain conditions or events. They are argued to be social and 
psychological constructs that are experienced as a unified conscious field, constituted by internal 
thoughts, bodily sensations, and actions, together with external situations, events, and meanings 
(Barrett, 2006a). In other words, they are patterned responses that tell us something about our 
relationship to our environment (Burkitt, 2014). Such constructs are developed within a specific 
cultural and linguistic context that enables those within that context to understand and 
communicate their experience. Different cultures provide different ways of organising and 
labelling their experiences because they have different ways of interacting with their social world.  
The terms pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment can be considered to be 
meaningful experiences to those who speak English, which tell us something about how we view 
ourselves and our relationship to others.  
Given that pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment, have both social and 
psychological components, most empirical inquiries into such experiences are rooted in the field 
of social psychology. A pragmatic study into such emotions, however, necessarily starts from the 
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outside in, i.e. starting with the social and cultural context and studying how this affects 
individuals, rather than the inside out, i.e. starting with an individual and studying how they 
respond to social stimuli. This study can, therefore, be considered to be a study in sociological 
social psychology, rather than a study in psychological social psychology (House, 1977; 
DeLamater, 2006). From this perspective, to consider the role that these emotions play in child 
protection social work practice, we first have to understand the context in which this practice 
takes place. This necessarily requires a sociohistorical analysis of child protection practice in 
England, where this research was undertaken, to identify and understand the meaning and 
purpose of the actions to those who perform them. Chapter two, therefore, provides an analysis 
of the social work profession, locating child protection work within it, drawing on the sociology of 
the professions (Larson, 1979; Macdonald, 1995; Power, 1997) and the more recent field of 
institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). It is through this latter body of work that an 
initial analysis of the role that these self-conscious emotions have played in the development of 
child protection social work practice can be explored. Indeed, using Creed et al.’s (2014) 
framework as a useful starting point, the development of social work as a profession can be 
considered in response to the societal changes that altered what was considered shameful and 
praiseworthy behaviour for social workers. While the social workers developed a sense of shame 
in line with these boundaries, which guided their behaviour in institutionally prescribed ways, this 
was supported by praising social workers if they adhered to these boundaries and shaming social 
workers if they transgressed them. Such an analysis provides a way of understanding how self-
conscious emotions were involved in disrupting some actions, while also being involved in 
creating and maintaining others, to form what we know as child protection social work practice 
today.  
To understand social workers’ self-conscious emotional experiences and how these influence 
what they do and how they act, it is necessary to gain an in-depth understanding of the social 
workers’ thoughts, feelings, and actions, in the context of their social situation. Flyvbjerg (2006) 
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argues that a case study provides a useful approach for such an aim, particularly considering 
there are no exemplars within social work to date relating to this topic. Chapter three, therefore, 
outlines the case study design and methodology, which involved two child protection teams, in 
one local authority. Ethnographic methods were used to study social workers in-situ for one to 
two days a week for a period of six months, to understand what they did, how they did it, why 
they did it, how they experienced and solved-problems in their real world context, with me 
developing relationships with the research participants to learn about their problems, feelings, 
and thoughts (Shalin, 1986; Emirbayer and Maynard, 2010). I also sought to distinguish between 
what the groups were doing and what they thought they were doing (Lindeman, 1924), together 
with the role different concepts had on their practice. Methods from constructivist grounded 
theory (Charmaz, 2006) were used to inform the ongoing data collection and data analysis to 
develop a conceptual understanding of the participants’ experience and actions.  
Chapter four reports on the findings of how the established arrangements for the child protection 
service within the local authority were disrupted by politicians and the media in response to 
economic and societal changes, which altered what was considered shameful and praiseworthy 
behaviour for such organisations. Supported by a regulator, which had publically shamed other 
organisations for failing to comply with this new set of expectations, leaders and senior managers 
within the local authority sought to refashion their child protection service to avoid being shamed 
and gain organisational legitimacy. To achieve this, the boundaries of what was considered 
shameful and praiseworthy behaviour for the social workers working in the child protection 
service had to be altered. Chapter five, therefore, provides an analysis for how these were 
changed and maintained to create an ideal-typical child protection practitioner, i.e. an 
institutional representation of a safeguarding social worker, which was used by the leaders and 
managers to evaluate the actions of the social workers. While the leaders and the managers 
provided a new interpretive framework for the social workers, and praised and rewarded practice 
that conformed to its boundaries, failure to comply with these new institutional meanings and 
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expectations provided legitimacy to leaders and managers to use shame and humiliation to 
reassert the institutional prescriptions. The leaders and managers could, therefore, be considered 
to be regulating the identity of the social workers, refashioning them in the image of the 
institutional representation. 
The social workers, however, did not necessarily identify with this new way of working and at 
times resisted the institutional processes of identity regulation. Chapter six provides a conceptual 
framework by which the social workers came to identify with, or resist, this ideal-typical form of 
practice. In some situations, some social workers could be seen to willingly identify with it and, 
therefore, enacted the institutional representation, resulting in feelings of pride and acceptance. 
Some, however, could be considered to reluctantly comply with the institutional expectations to 
avoid being shamed, resulting in feelings of shame and guilt for what they had done. While 
different, both could be considered as identification with the institutional representation as both 
provided what the organisation required and chapter seven details this analysis. In contrast, a 
social worker may not have felt able to comply and sought ways to resist what they were being 
asked to do through compromising the institutional expectations by working to the minimum 
standard, which ensured they avoided being shamed. This freed up some of the social workers’ 
time, which they could spend on tasks that they could feel proud of. Furthermore, a social worker 
could be seen to exert greater levels of resistance to defy the institutional expectations to 
practise in a manner that they felt proud of, yet, due to the anxiety of being shamed or 
humiliated as a consequence, concealed such acts. And further still, social workers could be seen 
to exert even greater levels of resistance, seeking to influence, control, or defy those who sought 
to exert the institutional expectations. While they risked the distinct possibility of being shamed 
or humiliated, they at least avoided doing something they felt they could not live with. Together, 
these forms of action could be considered to constitute resistance to the institutional processes 
of identity regulation and chapter eight provides this analysis.  
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Chapter nine considers the data specifically in relation to the research questions to provide a 
summary of the context for self-conscious emotions within the teams, how these were 
experienced by the social workers, and what influence they had on their practise. This study 
concludes that these emotions had a controlling influence on what the social workers did and 
how they did it. By manipulating the social and cultural context in which the social workers 
operated, the boundaries for what were considered shameful and praiseworthy had been altered 
so that, generally, the social workers performed in an institutionally acceptable manner. The 
consequence of this, however, was that, generally, the social workers felt constrained to perform 
tasks that they did not consider to be social work, and there were many occasions where the 
parents were left feeling dehumanised and the social workers feeling disillusioned. While this 
study provides only a snapshot of practice within one organisation, it provides the first exemplar 
of the specific role of pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment within the field of 
social work, providing knowledge which can be used for, and developed within, future research. 
From the perspective provided by the analysis in this thesis, chapter ten concludes by considering 
what this study contributes to both research and practice, providing some suggestions for how 
we may begin to change social work organisations and the institution of child protection social 
work more generally.   
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CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUALISING SELF-CONSCIOUS 
EMOTIONS 
Pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment are commonly used emotion terms to 
describe a complex array of situations, thoughts, and feelings resulting from our perception of 
ourselves in relation to others. They have, however, been difficult to classify. They have been 
termed ‘social emotions’ (Scheff, 2000), ‘self-referential emotions’ (Zinck, 2008), ‘self-evaluative 
emotions’ (Shaffer, 2009), and ‘moral emotions’ (Tangney et al., 2007). More commonly, 
however, these emotional experiences have been grouped under the term ‘self-conscious 
emotions’ (Tracy et al., 2007). This connotes the emotional experiences resulting from a person’s 
consciousness of the ‘self’ in the moment, embedded within one’s social situation and, therefore, 
often relates to one’s relationship between the ‘self’ and others, whether real or imagined. This 
chapter provides an analysis of what is meant by the specific terms that constitute this group of 
experiences. Firstly, it outlines the current theories on these emotions; secondly, it provides a 
constructionist account of what an emotion is; and thirdly, it defines what is meant when 
someone says “I feel shame” (or pride etc.). This analysis provides the theoretical foundation for 
these experiences used throughout this study.  
THEORIES OF SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS 
While shame has been theorised and studied for well over a century (e.g. Darwin, 1872; Freud, 
1905)/1962), it was arguably the psychotherapist and research psychologist Lewis’ (1971) analysis 
of shame and guilt in transcripts of therapy sessions that has provided the foundation for many 
subsequent theorists and researchers. Lewis treats shame and guilt as discrete emotions, with 
embarrassment and humiliation being considered as variants of shame. Her focus was on how 
certain appraisals resulted in these emotions, arguing that shame resulted from a negative 
evaluation of the self in contrast to guilt, which resulted from a negative evaluation of a specific 
behaviour. With Lewis incorporating some of the sociological ideas of shame through the work of 
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Lynd (1958), however, she placed the social context as equally significant as psychological 
processes in experiences of shame. She, therefore, believed that one could feel shame because 
one did not live up to personal ideals, but one could also feel shame because one felt rejected or 
devalued as a result of not living up to the expectations of others.  
Lewis’ theory provides the foundation for Tangney and colleagues’ work (see Tangney and 
Dearing, 2002), who arguably provide the dominant theory for self-conscious emotions in 
psychology. Again, their argument is that shame, guilt, and embarrassment are discrete 
emotions, evoked by specific appraisals. They propose that shame and guilt are evoked as a result 
of moral transgressions, with an individual experiencing shame when they believe the self is the 
reason for their moral failure or lapse, which results in a desire to hide, escape, or strike back. In 
contrast, they consider that an individual experiences guilt when they believe their behaviour is 
the reason for their moral failure, which results in a desire to confess, apologise, or repair. Such a 
perspective argues that for a person to experience shame they would need to evaluate 
themselves negatively, rather than it resulting from a negative evaluation by another (Tangney et 
al., 2007). Such a view is supported by others within psychology, for example Gausel and Leach 
(2011), who argue that the emotion resulting from a negative evaluation by others is not actually 
shame at all, but rather another discrete emotion they term rejection. Contrary to such views, 
however, studies which have asked people about their experiences have identified that they have 
felt shame due to both non-moral issues (such as doing badly in an exam or having an epileptic 
fit) and as a result of feeling negatively evaluated by others (such as feeling rejected) (e.g. Brown, 
2006; Skårderud, 2007; Turner and Husman, 2008; Chase and Walker, 2012; Leeming and Boyle, 
2013).  
Lewis’ theory also provides the foundation for Scheff’s work (2000), which arguably provides the 
dominant theory for self-conscious emotions in sociology. Scheff provides an essentialist account 
of shame, incorporating Lewis’ ideas into those of Tomkins (1962, 1963). Tomkins proposed that 
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humans have only nine distinct “affects”, which are biological, genetically transmitted 
mechanisms that are hard-wired within every human’s brain: interest-excitement, enjoyment-joy, 
surprise-startle, distress-anguish, anger-rage, fear-terror, dissmell1-disgust and shame-
humiliation, where the first term is the mild manifestation of the affect and the second the more 
intense manifestation. He argues that these affects can be triggered to create a biologically 
based, and therefore universal, pattern of sensations and behaviours. For Tomkins, these affects 
provide the foundation of emotions, which he considered to be the experience of an affect along 
with a set of past memories associated with that feeling. Taking Tomkins’ idea of biological 
affects, Scheff argues that shame relates to the ‘bond affect’, where threats to a social bond 
results in shame (Scheff, 2003) and secure social bonds result in pride (Scheff, 1990, 1997). 
Scheff’s theory relegates the psychological processes relating to the perception of whether a 
person has been able to live up to one’s standards, resulting in pride (e.g. Tracy and Robins, 
2007), or not, resulting in shame (e.g. Tangney and Dearing, 2002), to promote the social 
processes. Contrary to some of the psychological theories, for Scheff, shame simply relates to 
rejection and pride to connection. Rather than such a perspective being exclusively sociological, 
however, the same arguments have been used by some psychologists (see Elison, 2005). 
Furthermore, such a perspective contrasts with more traditional sociological accounts of shame 
which relate to threats to one’s identity (e.g. Lynd, 1958; Goffman, 1956, 1959, 1963). 
Furthermore, theorising shame to be a biologically hardwired affect, results in the argument that 
guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment, along with a whole range of other related words, such as 
inferior, incompetent etc., are simply different intensities of the same emotion (Scheff, 2000, 
2003). Further still, Scheff argues that any threat to a social bond, no matter how slight, results in 
an experience of shame; or vice versa for pride. For Scheff, therefore, a person would feel shame 
because someone else seemed mildly irritated at them. Equally, at the other end of the spectrum, 
for Scheff, a person would feel shame because their partner had a terminal illness. Both are 
                                                          
1
 A reaction to a bad smell 
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threats to the social bond but, arguably, the resulting experiences of both of these situations 
would not be described as shame by many.  
There are, of course, many other theories for the self-conscious emotions providing debate 
regarding what these emotions are and how to research them. As indicated in the discussion 
above, there is debate as to whether the experiences of shame, guilt, humiliation, and 
embarrassment can be differentiated. On the one hand, these emotional experiences cannot be 
easily classified as similar experiences. For example, the experience from tripping up in front of 
others or snorting while laughing feels very different to being ridiculed by a senior manager at 
work in front of others in terms other than simply in intensity. Indeed, embarrassment often 
results in fleeting and humorous experiences (Miller, 1996), while humiliation may result in an 
enduring sensation of anger and rage with a desire for revenge, even if only within one’s 
imagination (Klein, 1991). While on the other hand, it is difficult to find the criteria to 
differentiate between them. For example, making a mistake at work and being reprimanded as a 
consequence may result in shame, guilt, humiliation, and/or embarrassment. Indeed, Crozier’s 
(2014) review of the evidence failed to identify the criteria by which one could differentiate 
shame from embarrassment. Research has, therefore, sought to find the ‘true nature’ of these 
emotions by determining the criteria by which these emotions can be identified and 
differentiated. The foundation for most theoretical approaches seeking to achieve this, however, 
can be seen to theorise emotions as somehow existing in the mind, independent of a human 
perceiver. This allows the researcher to be the final arbiter of a person’s experience as they 
believe they have knowledge of the essential ‘criteria’ to identify another’s emotions accurately. 
This enables  Scheff, and others, such as Lewis and Tangney, to argue that people can experience 
shame without knowing it, leading to the argument that emotions can be repressed or 
unacknowledged. The approach taken here, however, is that such a perspective does not provide 
a useful account for the complexity of emotional life.  
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A CONSTRUCTIONIST PERSPECTIVE OF EMOTION 
These theories, like the majority of theories of emotion, are founded on the idea that emotions 
exist in the mind as ‘natural-kinds’ (e.g. Ekman and Friesen, 1971; Izard, 1971; for a review see 
Ortony and Turner, 1990). This foundation can be thought of as analogous to the theory of 
primary colours. This theory posits that there exists a set of primary, or basic, colours in nature 
which cannot be made up of any other colour. These colours then form the basis of all other 
colours in nature by mixing them together in different combinations to form secondary or tertiary 
colours. Similarly, the primary, or basic, emotions are considered to be irreducible and can be 
triggered together to form combinations of emotions that make up different experiences that can 
be considered secondary emotions. Such a view is commonly shared within sociology, for 
example, Kemper (1987) argues that shame is a secondary emotion socially constructed from the 
primary emotion of anger, and guilt the secondary emotion constructed from the primary 
emotion of fear. While Turner and Stets (2006a) take a different perspective and argue that 
shame and guilt are socially constructed, principally, from the primary emotion of sadness. While 
these latter theories are ostensibly social constructionist, they are grounded in essentialist ideas 
of emotions as ‘natural-kinds’.  
Barrett’s comprehensive review of the empirical evidence, however, concluded there is little 
evidence to support this perspective (Barrett, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c; Barrett and Wager, 2006). 
This finding led Barrett to propose the “emotion paradox” that “people are compelled by their 
own experiences to believe that emotions exist as natural-kind entities, yet a century of research 
has not produced a strong evidentiary basis for this belief. To date, there is no clear, 
unambiguous criterion for indicating the presence of anger or sadness or fear” (Barrett 2006a, 
p.27). What Barrett’s review did support was that the basis for emotional life could be considered 
to stem from whether a person experiences the environment as pleasant or unpleasant, i.e. 
valence, with a degree of sympathetic and parasympathetic activation, i.e. arousal. Together, 
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these two dimensions can be considered as a circumplex, which Russell (2003) terms the ‘core 
affect’ (see figure 1.1). Russell (2003) and Barrett (2006a) argue that we are permanently in an 
ever changing core affective state which provides information about the person in the 
environment, with awareness of this affective state resulting in a ‘feeling’. Russell and Barrett 
(1999) argue that while it is possible to communicate one’s affective state with words, it can exist 
without being labelled and can therefore function unconsciously. And while changes in the core 
affect can be non-cognitive, such as via hormones, hunger, pharmacological agents, changes 
mainly result from the continual and automatic process of evaluating situations for their personal 
value and relevance (Bargh and Ferguson, 2000; Barrett, 2006a).  
Figure 1.1: The core affect (Russell, 2003, p.148) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The affective state, however, cannot be considered to be an emotion or even an emotional 
experience. Indeed, feeling tired, for example, has not traditionally been considered to be an 
emotional experience. Furthermore, the emotional experiences of what the English language 
refers to as anger, fear, or shame may all be considered to possess the same core affective 
characteristics, being unpleasant high-activation states, yet we are still able to distinguish 
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between these experiences. Sociologists have argued that what we mean by emotions is a 
combination of situational cues, physiological changes, expressive gestures, and an emotion label 
(Gordon, 1981; Thoits, 1989). And psychologists have argued that it is a combination of the core 
affect, changes in somatosensory sensations, behaviour, and cognition (Russell, 2003; Barrett 
2006a). From such perspectives, what is clear is that while the core affective state provides the 
biological foundation for the bodily sensations, what we experience as an emotion also involves a 
range of psychological, social, and cultural factors, which combine to provide a unified conscious 
experience (Barsalou, 2009; Burkitt, 2014). To say one feels an emotion, such a shame, one is 
communicating that the situation fits a socially agreed upon set of knowable features such as 
specific situations, thoughts, and feelings (Wierzbicka, 1992). 
While we can consider an emotion to involve biological and psychological processes, an 
emotional experience is founded within ongoing social interactions. Such interactions are 
embedded within the relationships of the individuals and the institutions that constitute their 
society. The cultural beliefs and rules, therefore, form as much a part of the experience as the 
immediate interaction (Boiger and Mesquita, 2012). We all learn to emote, however, much like 
we learn a language, not from direct teaching, but from imitation and trial and error immersed 
within a particular culture (Averill, 2012). There are, therefore, individual differences in the 
understanding, expression, or performance, of an emotion. Indeed, Parkinson (2012) argues that 
emotional experiences can change within a person’s lifetime (ontogenesis) and within the history 
of a culture (sociogenesis). It is necessary, therefore, to consider emotion through the inter-
relationship between the individual and the collective, where there is no beginning and no end to 
the ongoing social system (see figure 1.2). Individual’s attitudes, beliefs, and emotional 
experiences are constructed by those of the collective, which is, in turn, constructed by the 
individual.  
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Figure 1.2: The recursive relationship between the individual and the collective 
 
At the collective level we can consider an emotion as a social representation (Moscovici, 1961, 
1981, 2001): a set of circumstances, situations, meanings, feelings, thoughts, and behaviours 
which are shared among the members of a specific social group “for the purpose of behaving and 
communicating” (Moscovici, 1963, p.251). By collectively elaborating on personal experiences, 
over time, societies are able to construct a shared, but not consensual, way of understanding and 
communicating about their emotional lives, which includes categories of experience, such as 
shame, and the typical content of those categories, such as the circumstances, situations, 
meanings, feelings, thoughts, and behaviours (Barrett, 2006a). As a result of the socialisation 
process (e.g. Elias, 1978), an individual internalises these social representations, which become 
the basis for emotional life. Deviations in individual understanding of a particular term can occur, 
however, as a result of inconsistencies in communication within different groups of the same 
culture and/or because of personal experiences that provides additional personal meaning to the 
term (Moscovici, 1961). Nevertheless, individuals within a society still hold sufficient shared 
meaning to be able to understand what is meant when a person uses a specific label or term, 
such as shame or pride in English.  
The collective 
The individual 
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We develop knowledge, however, through experiencing and acting in the physical world (Burkitt, 
2014). As the neuroscientist Damasio (1994) argues, it is difficult to separate the mind from the 
body. Or as the field of situated cognition argues, it is difficult to separate the person from the 
environment (Dewey, 1938; Lave and Wenger, 1991; Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Rowlands, 2010). 
The social representation can, therefore, be seen to provide the blueprint for individuals to 
develop knowledge that is both embodied, involving the mind and body, and embedded, within 
specific social and cultural contexts (Rosaldo, 1984; Csordas, 1994; Barsalou, 1999; Zwaan, 2004; 
Rowlands, 2010). At the individual level, therefore, we can consider an emotion to be the 
experience of an embodied representation either through enactment, within the continually 
evolving interaction between the person and their environment (Dewey, 1929a; Gergen, 1994; 
Burkitt, 2014), or simulation, in the imagination of the individual (Barsalou, 1999; Barrett and 
Russell, 2015). Enactment and simulation can be considered to be a result of an effortful process 
of reflecting on one’s interaction with the world, or it can be automated and habitual. From this 
perspective, an emotion cannot be considered a thing, but rather a scenario that can be thought 
of much like a script (Abelson, 1981; Tomkins, 1987; Russell, 1991; Gergen, 1994), with a 
beginning, middle, and end, made up of causes, beliefs, feelings, physiological changes, desires, 
actions, and expressions that occur in sequence. Russell (1991) outlines a script for anger to 
illustrate this point (see table 1.1).  
Table 1.1: A possible script for anger (Russell, 1991, p.39) 
Step  Subevent 
1  The person is offended. The offense is intentional and harmful. 
The person is innocent. An injustice has been done. 
2  The person glares and scowls at the offender. 
3  The person feels internal tension and agitation, as if heat and pressure were rapidly mounting 
inside. He feels his heart pounding and his muscles tightening. 
4  The person desires retribution. 
5  The person loses control and strikes out, harming the offender. 
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As Wittgenstein and Anscombe (1958) argued, however, we cannot adequately express our 
experiences with words, and so all theories are perhaps inadequate to fully capture the complex 
nature of specific emotional experiences. Indeed, it may be impossible to convey an embodied 
representation and the script for anger above is perhaps better understood as one possible way 
of conveying the social representation for anger. Furthermore, not all of the features of a script 
are necessary for someone to have an experience of that emotion but the more features that are 
present, the closer the resemblance and the more appropriate the script label. Some emotional 
scenarios may closely resemble a person’s script, which Russell (2003) calls an emotional episode, 
or it may loosely follow the script, which Russell (2003) calls a prototypical emotional episode. 
Despite its limitations, the script concept arguably provides a useful way to conceive of what we 
mean by a specific emotion label, which enables a person to understand and communicate their 
experience. To say one ‘feels’ an emotion, such as shame, for example, is to mean that they have 
had an experience of their embodied representation of that term. So given this perspective what 
do we mean by using the terms pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment? Rather 
than discount historical research and past and present theories of these terms that are founded 
in the idea of ‘basic’ emotions, however, collectively these theories can be considered to provide 
evidence for a loose agreement between speakers of the English language as to what we mean 
when we use these terms.  
DEFINING THE EMOTION CONCEPTS  
How we come to understand who we are, where we belong, what we should do, and how good 
or bad we are at different tasks, is through our interactions with other people. A child may be 
praised for being attractive by their parents and teachers and consequently develop an identity of 
being an attractive person. Through interaction with a range of others in different situations, a 
person can come to develop a set of identities that provide meaning for who that person is in 
relation to others in these different situations (McCall and Simmons, 1978; Stryker, 1980; Tajfel, 
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1981). These internalised meanings, attitudes, and expectations are then stored as a complex 
concept of who that person is, i.e. the self-concept. This set of ideas of who they are can then be 
used to interact with themselves and with others. The ‘self’, therefore, is inherently linked to 
others; they are two sides of the same coin (see figure 1.2). While Cooley argued (1902) that the 
“imagined judgement” of another “moves us to pride or shame” (p.152),  to reduce these 
experiences to issues either of the self or social bonds, is, perhaps, to deny our relational nature. 
We may be focused on one or the other in the moment, yet a judgement on one’s ‘self’, or 
identities, can also lead us to consider the state of one’s social bonds, and vice versa. Self-
conscious emotional experiences can, therefore, be considered through this self-social system.  
SHAME 
Shame is perhaps the most widely researched and theorised emotion term. The potential potency 
of the displeasureable feelings related to this term can be seen in Brown’s (2006) grounded 
theory study on shame involving 215 women in the USA. Participants described the feeling of 
shame as “devastating, noxious, consuming, excruciating, filleted, small, separate from others, 
rejected, diminished, and the worst feeling ever” (Brown, 2006, p.45). Such a description is 
consistent with other qualitative studies relating to experiences of shame (e.g. Skårderud, 2007; 
Turner and Husman, 2008; Chase and Walker, 2012; Leeming and Boyle, 2013). Collectively, 
speakers of the English language seem to understand that to say one feels shame is to mean that 
they feel a painful, bodily sensation. Linked to these bodily sensations are a set of other 
attributes, which can be identified by reviewing a range of views that span different theoretical 
positions (see Table 1.2). Notwithstanding the ontological debates within emotion theory as 
discussed above, the general themes which shame can be considered to be associated with can 
be identified from these theories as: (1) a negative evaluation of the self, which could be by either 
the person themselves or someone else; (2) that this negative evaluation is as a result of the 
person failing to live up to a standard. This standard, however, has to be important to the person. 
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For example, to tell someone they are not very good at drawing would be unlikely to result in 
shame if the person didn’t think they were very good at drawing. Thus the standard can be 
considered an identity standard; (3) the person believes they are responsible for having failed to 
live up to this standard (e.g. Ferguson et al., 2007); and (4) the person believes this threatens the 
status or quality of their relationship to the other(s). While such a construction of shame accounts 
for both identity and social bonds and, therefore, how one can feel ashamed of themselves or be 
shamed by someone else, given the issues of constructing shame around threats to social bonds 
as discussed above, issues of identity are of central importance.   
Table 1.2: Theories of shame 
Author Discipline Definition 
Cooley (1902) Sociologist The feeling resulting from a perception that the self is not 
verified in the minds of others 
Goffman (1956) Sociologist 
(dramaturgical theory) 
The feeling resulting from responsibility for failed projected 
claims about one’s identity 
Lynd (1958) Sociologist The feeling of responsibility for one’s inferiority 
Lewis (1971) Psychologist 
(psychoanalysis) 
The feeling from a negative self-evaluation 
Kemper (1978) Sociologist (power and 
status theory) 
The experience when one claims or receives more status 
than he deserves 
Sabini & Silver 
(1997) 
Psychologists The feeling from a flaw in one’s character being revealed 
Scheff (2000) Sociologist The feeling from a threat to the social bond 
Tangney and 
Dearing (2002) 
Psychologists The feeling from a negative self-evaluation due to a moral 
failure or transgression 
Tracy & Robins 
(2004) 
Psychologists (Cognitive 
attribution theory) 
Negative feelings about the stable, global self 
Elison (2005) Psychologist 
(Affect Theory) 
The feeling from an appropriate devaluation of the self by 
another 
Ferguson et al. 
(2007) 
Psychologists The feeling from being held responsible for a threat to one’s 
identity 
Turner (2009) 
and Burke and 
Stets (2009) 
Sociologists (Symbolic 
interactionism) 
The feeling from failing to meet expectations or negative 
sanctions as a result of salient identities 
While these definitions of shame do not include the behavioural responses associated with such 
an experience, just as emotion theory has always linked emotions to actions (e.g. Aristotle and 
Bywater, 1894), so has shame theory sought to consider the behaviours associated with 
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experiences of shame. Indeed, just as essentialist accounts of emotions have argued that fear 
leads to fleeing and therefore protects the self in a physical sense, essentialist accounts of shame 
have argued that it leads to hiding, which protects the self in a social sense (e.g. Tangney and 
Dearing, 2002). Reviews of such direct causation models of emotion and action, however, have 
failed to find strong evidence to support such views (e.g. Schwarz and Clore, 1996; Baumeister et 
al., 2007). Indeed, while shame has been considered to lead to avoidance behaviours such as 
withdrawing from social situations, hiding from others, and attempting to escape from the 
experience through the use of alcohol, drugs, or self-harm (for reviews, see Gilbert and Andrews, 
1998; Tangney and Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 2007), it has more recently been considered to 
lead to approach behaviours such as seeking to repair any perceived damage done or seeking to 
improve themselves and their behaviour (e.g. de Hooge et al., 2010; Gausel and Brown, 2012; 
Shepherd et al., 2013; Lickel et al., 2014; Tangney et al., 2014; Berndsen and Gausel, 2015). It is 
perhaps more useful to consider the role emotional experiences play in individual behavioural 
responses within the context of the person’s historical experiences, how they imagine the future, 
and therefore what they think they need to do in the current situation (Emirbayer and Mische, 
1998; Baumeister et al., 2007). For example, a person who has many historical experiences of 
being criticised may perceive criticism from their boss differently to someone who has not. The 
person with greater experience of criticism may imagine the future as one in which they will be 
criticised further, while the other person may not. The person who imagines they will be criticised 
further may display avoidance behaviours, while the other person may display approach 
behaviours. Both may state they experienced shame from the criticism but the behavioural 
responses can only be understood through how they conceptualised the situation (Barrett et al., 
2014). 
Notwithstanding the complexity of individual behavioural responses in the context of emotional 
experiences, we can still consider the typical behavioural responses associated with experiences 
of shame as part of the shared understanding and communicative intentions of those who speak 
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English. As discussed above, to use the word shame is to communicate using a shared 
understanding of what that word means. Indeed, qualitative studies which ask participants about 
their responses to experiences of shame identify a link with a desire to hide (Brown, 2006; 
Skårderud, 2007; Turner and Husman, 2008; Chase and Walker, 2012; Leeming and Boyle, 2013), 
which is consistent with the traditional theories of shame (see Gilbert and Andrews, 1998; 
Tangney and Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 2007). While it may be that those who classify their 
experience as shame may not display such avoidance behaviours, arguably at least, we 
understand it to mean this. Putting this together with the other components typically associated 
with shame, we can provide a possible script for shame that provides the social representation 
for the term (see table 1.3). Of course, there may be other ways of representing the script, a 
person’s embodied representation may differ from this, and, as discussed above, a person does 
not necessarily have to experience all of these components to state they have experienced 
shame.  
Table 1.3: A cultural script for shame  
Step  Subevent 
1  The person holds an identity standard  
A situation occurs whereby the person is perceived to have not met this standard 
2  The person feels responsible for not meeting this standard 
The person feels inadequate/inferior 
3  The person believes this threatens the status of their relationship with others 
The person feels devalued/rejected  
4  The person starts to feel hot. Their heart begins to race.  
5  The person wants to hide or disappear  
GUILT 
Guilt is arguably the second most researched and theorised emotion term, often being 
considered in comparison to shame. Similarly to shame, qualitative studies of experiences of guilt 
indicate that it is a displeasureable affective state, often with highly activated bodily sensations, 
such as increased heart rate and feeling hot (e.g. Lewis, 1971; Silfver, 2007; Karlsson and Sjöberg, 
2009; Behrendt and Ben-Ari, 2012). While people often use the terms shame and guilt together 
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or, indeed, to refer to the same emotional experience, there is arguably sufficient evidence to 
suggest that what we mean by these two terms is indeed different. Table 1.4 brings together a 
range of different theoretical positions on guilt from which the general themes for a prototypical 
experience of guilt can be identified. While the focus in a prototypical experience of shame is on 
the ‘self’, the focus in an experience of guilt is on (1) one’s behaviour; (2) which is seen to have 
transgressed a moral boundary; (3) which adversely affects another person. Indeed, a person 
would typically feel responsible for disadvantaging another, as they could ‘be’ guilty in the eyes of 
another’s evaluation but not ‘feel’ guilty if they did not accept their actions were responsible. 
Consequently, experiences of guilt have been found to relate more to the person taking the 
perspective of the other than in experiences of shame (e.g. Leith and Baumeister, 1998). 
Furthermore, typically (4) the person would feel bad about the impact their actions have had, as a 
person may not feel guilty if their intention was to harm or disadvantage another. Therefore, 
while usually the term shame indicates that a person feels a threat to their identity, the term guilt 
does not typically indicate such threats. For example, one may feel guilty after seeing a stranger 
being hurt because they did not do what they believed they could have done to prevent it 
happening. While this may be inconsistent with an identity standard, it is not necessarily a threat 
to their identity or their relationships. The focus is on how the person’s action or inaction 
adversely affected another.  
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Table 1.4: Theories of guilt 
Author  Discipline Definition 
Lynd (1958)  Sociologist The feeling from a specific act of wrongdoing 
Lewis (1971) Psychologist 
(psychoanalysis) 
The feeling from a negative evaluation of a specific behaviour 
Kemper (1978)  Sociologist (power and 
status theory) 
The feeling resulting from using excessive power against 
another 
Baumeister et al. 
(1994) 
Psychologists The feeling from hurting, neglecting, or disappointing others or 
when the person benefits unfairly in relation to others at their 
expense 
Sabini and Silver 
(1997) 
Psychologists The feelings relating to transgressions 
Tangney and 
Dearing (2002)  
Psychologists The feeling from a negative evaluation of a specific behaviour 
Tracy and Robins 
(2004) 
Psychologists (Cognitive 
attribution theory) 
Negative feelings about a specific behaviour or action taken by 
the self 
Elison (2005) Psychologist 
(Affect Theory) 
The feeling of personal responsibility for an offense or 
wrongdoing 
Turner and Stets 
(2006b)  
Sociologists (Symbolic 
interactionism) 
The feeling from a perception that one has violated a moral 
code 
Ferguson et al. 
(2007) 
Psychologists The feeling from a self-perception of responsibility for an 
untoward outcome or state of affairs which disadvantages the 
‘self’ or ‘other’  
Most theories of guilt identified above emphasise the approach type behaviours that come along 
with an experience of guilt. Indeed, the typical qualitative findings have identified that such 
experiences leads a person to want to make amends, reparations, or apologise (e.g. Lewis, 1971; 
Baumeister et al., 1995; Silfver, 2007; Karlsson and Sjöberg, 2009; Behrendt and Ben-Ari, 2012). 
There are some studies, however, which also identify avoidance type behaviours following 
experiencing guilt, such as attempting to avoid others or avoid talking about the situation (e.g. 
Freedman et al., 1967; Ferguson, 1991; Baumeister and Wotman, 1992). Similarly to the 
discussion with shame and behavioural responses above, it is necessary to consider the 
individual’s perception and their social, cultural, and historical context to understand the person’s 
behaviour. So while it is perhaps not useful to consider guilt, or indeed any emotion, as 
necessarily producing a specific set of behaviours, it is arguably useful to consider what 
behaviours we may, collectively, associate with the term guilt so we can understand and 
communicate this emotional experience. Putting the dominant view, that guilt leads to approach 
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type behaviours, together with the other components typically associated with guilt, we can 
provide a possible script for guilt that provides the social representation for the term (see table 
1.5).  
Table 1.5: A cultural script for guilt  
Step  Subevent 
1  A person is aware of a societally held moral standard 
Through their action or inaction, the person transgresses this moral boundary 
2  The person believes another has been disadvantaged in some way 
 The person is concerned about the consequences for the other person 
3  The person believes that their action or inaction has been responsible for this situation 
 The person feels bad  
4  The person starts to feel hot. Their heart begins to race.  
5  The person wishes to make amends 
 
EMBARRASSMENT 
Despite Goffman’s seminal work, there has perhaps been less attention paid to embarrassment 
within the theory and research, particularly within sociology (Lizard and Collett, 2013). Studies on 
embarrassment suggest it relates to surprising, trivial accidents, which engender humour, smiles, 
and jokes with a need for a public audience, whether real or imagined (Miller and Tangney, 1994; 
Tangney et al., 1996). While some argue that embarrassment stems from the perception of a 
negative evaluation from another, which threatens one’s social bonds (e.g. Elison, 2005). Others 
argue that embarrassment can equally stem from the perception of a positive evaluation, such as 
being praised, which arguably strengthens one’s social bonds (Tracy and Robins, 2004). Despite 
these seemingly contrasting experiences, we use the term embarrassment to indicate that there 
is something similar about them.  
Table 1.6 provides a range of views on embarrassment from which the common themes 
associated with such an experience can be identified. While an evaluation by the ‘other’ is 
considered necessary in an experience of embarrassment, the focus is on how the ‘self’ is 
perceived by the ‘other’ against certain standards the person holds for themselves. Arguably one 
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would not feel embarrassed if one did not believe the standard to be important. For example, a 
person may feel embarrassed if they accidentally burped in public only if they felt this is 
something they should not do. Embarrassment can therefore be considered to relate to (1) a 
person’s identity standard; (2) a discrepancy between their presentation and this standard. This 
discrepancy, however, does not necessarily threaten one’s identity more generally. For example, 
one can feel embarrassed and not feel that there is something wrong with that identity, which 
may be more typical of an experience of shame; and (3) a belief that this discrepancy is, or at 
least could be, perceptible by another.  
Table 1.6: Theories of embarrassment 
Author  Discipline Definition 
Goffman (1956) Sociologist 
(dramaturgical 
theory) 
The feeling in situations where one has multiple roles to fulfil in a 
social interaction but the multiple ‘selves’ used to fulfil these roles 
conflict 
Miller (1996) Psychologist A signal that some aspect of the self or one’s behaviour is amiss 
Sabini and 
Silver (1997) 
Psychologists The feeling from other’s perceiving a flaw in one’s character 
Tracy and 
Robins (2004) 
Psychologists 
(Cognitive 
attribution theory) 
The feeling resulting from becoming aware of a discrepancy 
between public aspects of the self, such as one's appearance, and 
others' evaluations 
Elison (2005) Psychologist 
(Affect Theory) 
The feeling from an appropriate public devaluation 
The typical behaviours considered to be associated with an experience categorised as 
embarrassment are blushing (Miller, 1996; Buss, 2001), giggling and laughter (Miller and Tangney, 
1994; Buss, 2001), smiling (Buss, 1980; Lewis, 1992), looking at the other then looking away, and 
nervous self-touching (Lewis, 1992; Miller, 1996). For some, such avoidance behaviours have also 
been closely linked to experiences of shame (see Crozier, 2014). Rather than seeking the essential 
nature of such experiences, the constructionist view is that these behaviours can be categorised 
together with the above criteria to provide the experience that we refer to as embarrassment. 
One may not need to blush or laugh following a public mispresentation of the self to feel 
embarrassed. Yet speakers of the English language understand this is typical of such experiences. 
Together, the social representation of embarrassment can be presented as a script in table 1.7 
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Table 1.7: A cultural script for embarrassment  
Step  Subevent 
1 The person holds an identity standard  
A situation occurs whereby the person’s presentation is inconsistent with this standard  
The person does not believe this threatens their identity more generally 
2 The person believes others can perceive this discrepancy  
3 The person starts to feel hot and blushes 
4 The person seeks relief and hides or makes a joke 
 
HUMILIATION 
Humiliation is perhaps the least well researched and theorised emotion term within this family of 
emotional experiences, particularly within sociology. While empirical investigations into 
humiliation associate it with a sense of unfair treatment, public exposure, anger at others, and a 
desire for revenge (Jackson, 2000; Elison and Harter, 2007; Combs et al., 2010), table 1.8 provides 
a list of theoretical perspectives of humiliation from which the themes can be identified to 
construct what we mean by the term. Similarly to embarrassment, humiliation is generally 
considered to relate to how one perceives themselves in relation to others. Unlike 
embarrassment, however, it is much more related to the purposeful actions of the other to 
devalue them in a social context. It is considered to be like shame, therefore, in that it relates to a 
threat to one’s identity; that is, it relates to who one is rather than what one does (Klein, 1991). 
Unlike shame, however, it is not considered to relate to the person believing this threat to their 
identity has validity. Overall, humiliation can be considered to relate to (1) a person’s identity; (2) 
that someone else rejects or invalidates; (3) which is done publically; (4) and intentionally; and (5) 
where the person does not believe there is a valid reason for this devaluation.  
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Table 1.8: Theories of humiliation 
Author Discipline Definition 
Silver et al. 
(1986) 
Psychologists The feeling from the other undermining one’s sense of identity 
Klein (1991) Psychologist The experience of some form of ridicule, scorn, contempt, or other 
degrading treatment at the hands of others 
Hartling and 
Luchetta 
(1999)  
Psychologists The feeling from one's identity being demeaned or devalued 
Elison (2005) Psychologist 
(Affect Theory) 
The feeling from an appropriate public devaluation and usually the 
hostile intent of others 
Gilbert (2007)  Psychologist The feeling of anger at others for devaluing the self in situations 
where there are no grounds for assuming responsibility for such 
devaluation 
Smith (2008) Sociologist A process of degradation, the feeling of being pushed downwards 
within the social hierarchy of respectability and worth and expulsion 
or exclusion from ‘proper’ society 
Torres and 
Bergner (2012) 
Psychologists The feeling from public denial, and rejection, of a claim for a particular 
social status by someone with the power to deny or reject such a 
claim 
Empirical investigations have identified that experiences labelled humiliation can result in 
avoidance behaviours through feelings of powerlessness and hopelessness (Ginges and Atran, 
2008; Fernandez et al., 2015). The typical motivation within humiliating experiences, however, 
has been that of approach behaviours (Elison and Harter, 2007; Thomaes et al., 2011; Torres and 
Bergner, 2012). Usually, the term humiliation is associated with the person feeling angry and 
enraged with a desire for revenge. Such typical associations with the term can be included as part 
of the social representation of humiliation, which can be outlined as a script in table 1.9.  
Table 1.9: A cultural script for humiliation  
Step  Subevent 
1  The person holds an identity standard  
 This identity is publically rejected or invalidated by another 
2  The person believes the other’s actions are intentional and unjust or unfair  
The person feels devalued and degraded 
3  They feel their heart pound and muscles tense 
4  The person desires retribution  
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PRIDE 
In contrast to shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment, pride is often viewed as a 
pleasurable self-conscious emotion. Indeed, many theorists simply consider pride to be the 
opposite of shame (e.g. Cooley, 1902; Scheff, 2014). Opposing the debates within shame theory, 
theorists, whether sociologists or psychologists, consider pride to relate to evaluations of the 
‘self’, whether by the ‘self’ or an ‘other’, which indicates a positive evaluation that promotes and 
maintains the person’s status and social worth (e.g. Mascolo and Fischer, 1995; Lewis, 1992; 
Turner, 2009; Scheff, 2014). At the same time, however, pride has also been considered an 
undesirable experience, as demonstrated in the proverb ‘pride comes before a fall’ (Tracy and 
Robins, 2007). Such cultural messages tell us that while pride may be experienced positively, it 
can blind us to the evaluations of others who may perceive us as arrogant, misguided, or 
somewhat deluded about ourselves. Furthermore, Oveis et al. (2010) argues that the focus on 
one’s self or achievements can inhibit the person’s ability to take the perspective of the other. 
It has mainly been within the field of psychology which has sought to provide a theory from this 
perspective. Tracy and Robins (2004, 2007) suggest that while we may use the term pride to 
describe our pleasurable experiences about the ‘self’, we can consider there to be two different 
types of experience, one which can be described as authentic pride and one as hubristic pride. 
They argue that pride can be seen not just as opposite to shame but also to guilt. Authentic pride 
is thought to be like guilt in that it relates to a focus on one’s behaviour, while hubristic pride is 
thought to be like shame in that it relates to a focus on the self. Within psychology, guilt and 
authentic pride are considered healthy, pro-social emotions, while shame and hubristic pride are 
considered unhealthy, anti-social emotions (Tangney and Dearing, 2002; Tracy and Robins, 2004, 
2007). Such perspectives, however, treat these terms as emotions as natural-kinds, enabling their 
‘true’ nature to be identified. As discussed above, such a perspective is not necessarily a useful 
one. Indeed, while guilt cannot simply be considered to contrast with shame on the basis of the 
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negative evaluation being attributed to one’s ‘self’ or one’s behaviour (e.g. Elison, 2005; Scheff, 
2000), pride cannot simply be split into two along similar lines. People rarely, if at all, say “I feel 
hubris”, which questions whether it can be considered to be a category of emotional experience. 
Hubris is a term more often reserved as a judgement about someone else, much like the term 
arrogant. It is perhaps more useful to say, therefore, that we feel pride, which can be interpreted 
as hubristic in certain contexts.  
Table 1.10 provides a range of perspectives on pride from which themes can be identified that 
relate to an experience of pride. While some simply state that it relates to secure social bonds 
(e.g. Scheff, 2014), others simply state it relates to living up to one’s own standards (e.g. Tangney 
and Dearing, 2002). Similarly to the discussion on shame above, however, the complexity of 
experiences of pride can be demonstrated within the following examples. A politician may feel 
proud of introducing certain reforms believing they are morally right despite them being deeply 
unpopular and subject to widespread criticism. A person may feel proud of their behaviour which 
results in them being sent to prison. A person may feel proud of having an argument with their 
romantic partner instead of staying silent. Such examples demonstrate that while we can feel 
proud of meeting the expectations of others, strengthening and securing our social status, we can 
equally feel proud of actions that result in threats to our social bonds. In considering pride 
experiences, it is perhaps necessary to consider the inter-relationship between the self and their 
social bonds. One can feel proud of living up to the expectations of others only if these 
expectations are incorporated into an identity-standard. Pride can, therefore, be considered to 
relate to (1) a positive evaluation of the self, which could be by either the person themselves or 
someone else; (2) which is as a result of the person living up to an identity-standard; (3) the 
person is considered to be responsible for living up to this standard; and (4) the person believes 
this verifies their identity and/or the quality of their relationships to the others. 
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Table 1.10: Theories of pride 
Author Discipline Definition 
Cooley (1902) Sociologist The experience of the self being verified in the minds of 
others 
Mascolo and 
Fischer (1995) 
Psychologists The experience of believing that they are responsible for a 
socially valued outcome or that they are a socially valued 
person  
Lawler (2001) Sociologist (exchange 
theory) 
The experience of exchange successes being attributed to the 
self 
Tangney and 
Dearing (2002) 
Psychologists The experience from a positive self-evaluation  
Tracy and Robins 
(2004) 
Psychologists The experience of having lived up to some actual or ideal self-
representation  
Turner (2009) Sociologist The experience of receiving positive sanctions from others 
and/or meets expectations about what did and should occur 
Scheff (2014) Sociologist (symbolic 
interactionist) 
The experience of a secure bond 
Pride has been considered to encourage people to behave in a manner consistent with their 
identity standards and social expectations, as it has been considered to enhance their sense of 
self-worth, self-esteem, and self-authenticity, while also maintaining or even improving their 
position in the social group (Cooley, 1902; Mascolo and Fischer, 1995; Tracy and Robins, 2007; 
Scheff, 2014). While pride has generally been associated with approach type behaviours, as 
discussed, these behaviours have been considered to be both pro-social and anti-social 
depending on the perspective of the person evaluating the situation. No matter the perspective, 
however, experiences of pride have typically been considered to be linked to such behavioural 
responses as an expanded and upright posture, head tilted slightly upward, a small smile, and 
arms raised above the head or hands on the hips (Tracy and Robins, 2004, 2007). Equally, these 
experiences have been considered to include telling others of one’s achievements (Kovecses, 
1990). Such actions can be considered to be a part of what we understand to mean by the term 
pride and can therefore be included in the social representation of pride in table 1.11. 
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Table 1.11: A cultural script for pride  
Step  Subevent 
1  The person holds an identity standard  
A situation occurs whereby the person is perceived to have met this standard 
2  The person feels responsible for meeting this standard 
The person feels pleased 
3  The person believes this strengthens the status of their relationship with others 
The person feels important 
4  They start to smile and straighten their posture pushing their chest out 
5  The person wants to tell others about the situation  
 
SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: A SUMMARY 
The test of any emotion concept is whether it is able to offer a plausible explanation of emotional 
life. It has been argued here that a constructionist account provides the most useful conception 
of emotional experiences. While we are permanently in a biological affective state, fluctuations in 
this state are mostly as a consequence of how we perceive and construe the self in the 
environment. One’s sociocultural context provides the means to structure our emotional 
experiences through a shared set of concepts. We are therefore able to understand a situation, 
who we are within it, how to evaluate ourselves, and how we are being, or would be, evaluated 
by others within a given situation, along with the bodily sensations associated to these specific 
situations. As Dimaggio and Markus (2010) suggest, people think, act, and feel in culture specific 
ways. The terms pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment, as well as other emotion 
terms, can be considered to be labels for shared cultural scripts, i.e. social representations, which 
enable speakers of the English language to understand and communicate their experience. 
Despite individual differences, a person is able to use their embodied knowledge of these cultural 
scripts, i.e. embodied representations, to conceptualise the self-in-situation to make sense of the 
experience.  
Once a person has developed knowledge of these emotion labels, they are able to use this 
knowledge not just to understand their emotional experience in the moment but also 
33 
 
retrospectively. For example, one can become ashamed of what one has done sometimes years 
after the event. Furthermore, in deciding on how to act, a person can consider the possibility of 
experiencing self-conscious emotions in their imagined future and act accordingly. Further still, 
such embodied representations enable a person to understand wider socioemotional processes 
and, therefore, to feel vicarious or group-based shame, pride, etc. For example, one may feel a 
threat to their identity as a result of another’s behaviour if this other person is seen to represent 
them somehow, such as by sharing a social identity. Such a situation may share sufficient 
characteristics with their embodied representation of shame for them to say they feel ashamed 
of the other person (e.g. Lickel et al., 2005). Our embodied representations can therefore be 
considered to play a role in how we understand our present, our past, and our future, which leads 
us to particular views and feelings about ourselves and our social relationships. Given these 
definitions, we can now outline the field of child protection social work to begin to consider these 
experiences in the context of practice. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE ROLE OF SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS IN 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILD PROTECTION SOCIAL WORK 
PRACTICE  
While there is no unified approach to the study of practice, Schatzki (2001) argues that it can be 
considered to be arrays of human activity. In other words, it is what people do. Yet what social 
workers do, and how they do it, has always been contested (Humphries, 1997; Moriarty et al., 
2015). This chapter, therefore, seeks to provide a sociohistorical analysis of child protection social 
work practice and the role that self-conscious emotions have played in the creation, 
maintenance, and disruption of the arrays of activity that social workers have done in their 
attempts to protect children from harm. The institution of social work, and child protection 
practice within it, is therefore the focus of this discussion. After outlining a framework to inform 
this analysis, a brief discussion on the foundations for the institution of social work and the 
creation of child protection as a formalised practice within this institution is provided. Following 
this, an analysis is outlined of how these institutional arrangements have been disrupted and 
reformulated to create modern child protection social work practice and the forces which support 
it. 
SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS IN INSTITUTIONAL WORK 
Freidson (1970) defines a profession as “an occupation which has assumed a dominant position in 
a division of labour, so that it gains control over the determination of the substance of its own 
work” (p.xvii). To achieve this, he argues that an occupational group has to be privileged by the 
power of the state and, therefore, needs, at least initially, to be sponsored by those who hold 
such power. Gaining legitimacy for a particular domain and social acceptance amongst those with 
power is, therefore, necessary. Freidson (1970) argues that this is achieved by developing a 
cognitive basis, i.e. a body of knowledge and techniques which professionals apply in their work, 
and a normative basis, i.e. a service orientation and set of ethics, for the occupation, which 
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enables it to establish the boundaries for both their occupational domain and the membership to 
this domain. Or as Larson (1979) states, legitimacy is founded on a system of education and 
credentialing. The emerging profession is then able to gain autonomy and establish a position of 
social prestige independent of the original sponsors (Macdonald, 1995). Following Freidson, 
Larson (1979) argues that a profession attempts to constitute and control a market for their 
expertise, so the professionals are able to translate one set of resources, i.e. knowledge and skills, 
into another, i.e. social and economic rewards; a process she calls the “professional project” 
(p.18). Such action to organise and proceduralise a set of standardised interaction sequences that 
seeks to control the production, dissemination, and use of a particular knowledge base is referred 
by Jepperson (1991) as institutionalisation.  
The field of neoinstitutionalism (see DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) provides a useful foundation 
from which to understand the rise of a profession. Building on a range of ideas from cognitive 
psychology, cultural studies, phenomenology, and ethnomethodology, neoinstitutionalists 
conceive institutionalisation to occur in the environment of organisations, often at the field level 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Silverman, 1971; Garfinkel, 1974; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 
1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Scott, 1983). The emphasis can be crudely 
perceived to be on cultural and constitutive processes, routines and schemas, legitimacy 
processes, and formal structures (Scott, 2014). Within this context, Lawrence et al. (2009) argue 
that we cannot understand the action of institutional actors, like social workers, without 
understanding the templates for action provided by the institution and the regulative 
mechanisms which enforce those templates. Yet, they also argue, we cannot understand an 
institution, like social work, without understanding how the action of the institutional actors 
affects those templates and regulative mechanisms. It is a recursive relationship as represented in 
figure 1.2. What we know as social work today can be understood through this perspective, 
considering the purposive action aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions, or 
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what  Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) refer to as “institutional work”, that has established social 
work as a legitimate institution which continues to evolve and adapt.   
Creed et al. (2014) have sought to consider the role of shame in institutional work, which 
provides a useful starting point for this study. Drawing on Foucault’s (1990) notion of power as an 
effect of social relationships, i.e. it is relational, distributed, and often invisible within a social 
group, Lawrence (2008) argues that this power serves to establish a specific social reality that 
comes to be considered objective by those within it. In other words, we come to understand what 
is normal, and what is not, within a certain group from our interactions. Power, therefore, can be 
considered to be systemic, in that it can be ever-present and all-encompassing, and disciplinary, 
in that it has the effect of establishing conformity to established understandings within the 
community. Creed et al. (2014) argue that the shared rules that constitute shameful behaviour 
within an established group, which come to be taken for granted as objectively correct and 
natural, can be considered as systemic shame. Such an analysis could equally be extended to 
include systemic pride: the shared rules that constitute praiseworthy behaviour. The notion of 
systemic shame and pride provides a useful way of considering how the threat or promise of 
being shamed or praised “penetrate community members’ identity constructions as they strive to 
meet conditions for ongoing membership through enacting praiseworthy rather than shameful 
ways of being” (Creed et al., 2014, p.282). Systemic shame and pride can, therefore, be 
considered to provide the foundations for the construction of a particular identity.  
Of course, systemic shame and pride could only have an effect on how a person behaved if they 
were aware of it. Creed et al. (2014), therefore, argue that individuals learn the conditions for 
being shamed (or praised) within the context of interactions within the group. They argue that 
with such knowledge, individuals can assess the potential to be shamed (or praised) by others in a 
given situation, which can be considered a form of intersubjective surveillance. Furthermore, 
such intersubjective surveillance can be considered to underpin a person’s self-regulation, as they 
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manage their actions to account for the possibility of being praised or shamed. Creed et al. (2014) 
consider these components, i.e. one’s capacity for self-conscious emotions, one’s knowledge of 
the conditions for such experiences within the group, one’s intersubjective surveillance, and 
one’s self-regulation, to constitute one’s sense of shame (and pride). It is through one’s sense of 
shame that theorists, such as Goffman (1963) and Scheff (2000), can claim that shame (or pride) 
plays an important role in the production of social order and social control, as people actively 
attempt to avoid being shamed, thereby complying to social expectations, norms, and ideals.  
While a sense of shame ensures that most social transgressions are avoided, where 
transgressions occur, and are noticed, others within the social group may seek to use shame as a 
mechanism to induce compliance to the community’s expectations, which Creed et al. (2014) 
term episodic shaming. Of course, this could be equally applied to pride through the notion of 
episodic praising. A person, or a number of people, who have cognitive, emotional, and/or moral 
commitments to existing institutional arrangements, which Creed et al. refer to as institutional 
guardians, can police the boundaries of acceptable behaviour through attempts to make 
someone feel shame or pride, thereby coercing compliance (Creed et al., 2014). While Lawrence 
(2008) considers such action a form of agentic power, Creed et al. (2014) assert that the use of 
such power is purposeful and strategic. Given the discussion in the previous chapter, however, a 
person may feel guilt, humiliation, or embarrassment as a result of such actions, rather than 
shame, or indeed an experience that could be categorised as a number of these. Given these 
arguments, episodic praising can be considered action by a person that induces pride in another, 
while episodic shaming can be considered action by a person that induces shame, guilt, 
humiliation, or embarrassment in another. Such action may be intended to elicit conformity and 
reassert institutional prescriptions, yet Creed et al. (2014) argue that such action may have 
unintended consequences, as a person may re-assess the value of the institutional arrangements 
or the relationships they have within it. Consequently, self-conscious emotions can be considered 
to, potentially, play a significant role in the creation and maintenance of institutions, as well as 
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the disruption and re-creation of them. These concepts are summarised in table 2.1 and it is from 
this perspective that we can begin to consider the role these experiences have played in the 
development of child protection social work practice.  
Table 2.1: Self-conscious emotions in institutional processes 
 Positively valenced experience 
 
Negatively valenced experience 
Systemic power 
 
Systemic pride Systemic shame 
Self-consciousness Sense of pride 
 
Sense of shame 
Agentic power Episodic praising 
 
Episodic shaming 
The felt experience Pride 
 
Shame, Humiliation, Guilt, 
Embarrassment 
 
CREATING AND INSTITUTIONALISING CHILD PROTECTION PRACTICE 
The foundations of modern social work began in the eighteenth century and stemmed from 
changes in social attitudes towards the suffering and the poor (Young and Ashton, 1967). With 
greater acceptance of the need for help and support, social work became a praiseworthy activity 
and charity and voluntary organisations began to increase their administration of poverty relief, 
some began to work directly with individuals, and others sought collective action to improve the 
lives of the poor (Woodroofe, 1962; Young and Ashton, 1967). Furthermore, as the middle and 
upper classes began to be concerned about the abuse of children among the working classes, 
some people began to police the streets and inspect the homes of the poor for suspected cruelty 
to children (Ferguson, 2011). Consequently, these ‘inspectors’ became colloquially known as the 
‘cruelty men’ (NSPCC, 1912). By the turn of the nineteenth century, a cognitive and normative 
base for work with the poor, the sick, the elderly, the protection of children, the care for orphans, 
and those suffering mental ill-health had been established (Woodroofe, 1962).  
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While all social workers were seen to help and support people, for conservatives, social workers 
supported the established social order, while for radicals and progressives, social workers 
challenged the dominant ideology of the time (Young and Ashton, 1967). With the changing 
societal attitudes, pre and post Second World War, perceptions of social work as a necessary, 
legitimate, and socially acceptable form of work increased, gaining social and legal support for its 
practices within the emerging welfare state (Payne, 2005). With the proliferation of separate and 
specialised personal services which employed social workers (Donnison, 1969), dissatisfaction 
grew at the lack of coordination and overlapping of services, and a committee was appointed in 
1965 to review the organisation and responsibilities of local authority services. The resulting 
Seebohm report (1968) advocated for a shift in practice from focusing on the individual and their 
problems, to the community, its needs, and rights (Donnison, 1969); a perspective more closely 
associated to social work’s progressive and radical roots.  
Seebohm’s (1968) main argument was for the need for a single local government department, 
with social work at its heart, to deliver a community based, family service, available to all (Payne, 
2005). This was enacted through the Local Authority Social Services Act of 1970, creating a new 
social work practice, one that worked with all social problems, from the young to the old, which 
required a new generic social worker and a new generic qualification, which the expanding 
University sector provided (Payne, 2005). Within this new arrangement, child protection practice 
was the responsibility of all social workers, and a shared view had become established that the 
practices of the cruelty men were now shameful and any work with families should be founded 
on a relationship-based, therapeutically-informed, partnership approach (Ferguson, 2011). 
Indeed, the police were considered to play a marginal role in cases of child abuse, if they were 
considered to have a role at all (Baher et al., 1976). Parton (2014) argues that the end of the 
1960s marked the high point of optimism, confidence, and pride in the profession. Indeed, Adams 
(1998) states that the new arrangements for social work services were administered as a 
professional bureaucracy that respected professional expertise and provided social workers a 
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high degree of discretion. Other than for exercising statutory powers, such as applying for a Court 
order, Munro (2004) states that there was very little paperwork and what records were kept were 
used to improve professional practice through supervision. Furthermore, the new central 
Government inspectorate was designed to provide a “promotional, consultative and advisory” 
function to the new departments (Seebohm Report, 1968, p.185).  
The creation of these new arrangements, however, created new challenges. Satyamurti’s (1981) 
ethnographic study of children’s social work services prior to, and following, the reorganisation 
demonstrates the significant changes in their work role, responsibilities, clientele, agency policies 
and procedures, and she highlights the uneasy relationship between the social workers and the 
new administrators. While Payne (2005) argues that some local authorities sought to undermine 
the vision of social work provided in the Seebohm report, such as by not appointing a director of 
the new department with social work experience or qualifications, Parton (1991) argues that 
much of what was considered good social work in the children’s departments was disappearing in 
the new departments, as social workers sought to manage the high demand for limited resources. 
Certainly Satyamurti’s (1981) study indicates a hardening of attitude towards those considered 
difficult or undeserving. While these issues may have caused doubt and uncertainty, trust and 
confidence in the profession was more seriously damaged through a number of different factors.  
DISRUPTING CHILD PROTECTION PRACTICE 
The 1970s saw changes in social and political attitudes that arguably stemmed from the economic 
crisis that saw the British economy suffer as a result of the 1973 oil crisis, a budget deficit, a 
currency crisis, and industrial unrest, which local authorities and social workers became heavily 
involved in (Payne, 2005). Henkel (1991) argues that, for some in the Conservative party at least, 
questions arose about the sustainability of the welfare state and whether it hampered economic 
growth. Furthermore, many in the Conservative party developed a belief that the welfare state 
was self-serving and unresponsive to those it served (Munro, 2004). And further still, Power 
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(1997) argues that many presumed that hierarchical bureaucracies, such as the new social work 
service, were inherently inefficient, which, it was argued, could be replaced with the principles of 
the more efficient market. Such attitudes were fuelled by perceived personal and system failures 
within the profession. A series of studies throughout the 1960s and 1970s threatened social 
work’s theoretical foundations, which was mainly based in psychoanalytic theory (Yellolly, 1980). 
These studies failed to find that the methods used by social workers were effective and in some 
cases even made things worse (Fischer, 1976). Furthermore, Fischer (1976) concluded that 
professionally trained social workers were no more effective than non-trained social workers, 
leading some to criticise the evidence base of social work and attack the pretensions of its 
training (e.g. Brewer and Lait, 1980).  
The death of Maria Colwell at the hands of her step-father in 1973, after being placed back with 
her mother and step-father on a supervision order to the local authority, further contributed to 
erosion of trust in the profession. The subsequent inquiry gained widespread media attention and 
public concern (Parton, 2014), leading to criticism of the social worker and the profession. The 
experience of Maria’s social worker of being cross examined for twenty five hours and requiring 
police protection as she went in and out of the hearing (Greenland, 1986) could be considered to 
be an example of episodic shaming as it publically threatened her identity as a competent and 
ethical social worker. The failings of Maria’s social worker, however, were not considered to be 
an isolated case and the profession was shamed through public criticism by politicians and in the 
press (Parton, 1991). Bailey (1977) considers such criticism to be akin to a myth, i.e. “an 
oversimplified representation of a more complex reality” (p.7). Bailey (1977) argues that in 
attempts to promote and preserve one’s own views, contrary views are derided, creating what 
Wallace (1993) refers to as a discourse of derision. The death of Maria Colwell provided the 
opportunity to construct a discourse of derision around the profession, which shamed the 
relationship-based, support function of social work practice, through the creation of a myth that 
such practice was inadequate, inappropriate, and dangerous. A clear message was provided that 
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social workers needed to use their authority to intervene in the lives of families to prevent such 
tragedies ever happening again (Ferguson, 2011; Parton, 2014; Warner, 2015). Arguably, such 
messages provided a new set of boundaries for the systemic shame and pride in operation within 
child protection social work and social workers were placed under unprecedented levels of 
scrutiny to ensure they adhered to these boundaries. Externally, Greenland (1986) argued that 
“hostility towards social workers, fuelled by the press… became an occupational hazard following 
the inquiry into the death of Maria Colwell” (p.164). While internally, Payne (2005) argues that 
extensive administrative procedures were set up to monitor the work of social workers, including 
multiagency child protection conferences and a register to keep a record of children considered 
to be at risk of non-accidental injuries. The erosion of trust and confidence in social work, distrust 
of hierarchical bureaucracies, and a lack of commitment to the welfare state saw the new 
Conservative Government in 1979 bring in reforms to public services with the intention of making 
them more efficient and effective (Munro, 2004). 
There were attempts to challenge the myths that constituted the discourse of derision that had 
developed around social work. Indeed, the Barclay Report (1982), commissioned by the 
Government to address what was seen as a growing crisis in social work, opened with “too much 
is generally expected of social workers. We load upon them unrealistic expectations and we then 
complain when they do not live up to them” (p.vii). Many more inquiries into the deaths of 
children as a result of abuse by their parents, however, followed that of Maria Colwell and 
perpetuated the discourse of derision. Indeed, there was continued public criticism of social 
workers as being overly optimistic and having failed to protect children by doing too little too late 
(Parton, 1991). Arguably, with this new systemic shame now in operation, supported by a 
discourse of derision and policed by episodic shaming within the press, practice was refocused to 
avoid being shamed and the surveillance and social control functions of social work practice were 
prioritised. Indeed, while Harris argued in 1987 that such pressures could lead to defensive 
practice, that same year 121 children in Cleveland were removed from their homes due to 
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concerns they had been sexually abused (Parton, 2014). Concerns about the practices of the 
social workers, such as removing children from their homes in the middle of the night, were 
criticised within the media and an inquiry was set up (Butler-Sloss, 1988), which concluded that 
most of the medical diagnoses were incorrect and the children should not have been removed. 
This time the social workers, and the profession, were episodically shamed through public 
criticism for a perceived overreaction and inappropriate use of statutory powers. Indeed, some 
politicians shamed social workers by likening their work to that of the SS (the Nazi’s Schutzstaffel, 
which translates as the ‘protection squadron’), which was subsequently amplified within the 
media (Parton, 1991). Such criticisms of not doing enough or doing too much fed into the wider 
debates of the day relating to the role of the state in family life, leading to the Children Act 1989, 
which sought to re-establish confidence in the profession and the public service by balancing the 
need to provide family support with that of child protection work (Parton, 1991). While this new 
piece of legislation and subsequent reforms emphasised the need to provide support and to 
negotiate and develop partnerships with parents, Ferguson (2011) argues that “the impact of 
child deaths and the pressure to avoid making mistakes and blame led to the work being 
dominated by child protection concerns” (p.35). In other words, the systemic shame embedded 
within the institution of social work undermined the intentions of these new reforms by 
reconstructing social workers’ sense of shame and pride, which directed their actions towards 
avoiding the possibility of further shaming.   
Power (1997) argues that where Governments’ lack trust in a service, forms of checking are 
developed to ensure that professionals are doing what they were ‘supposed’ to be doing. By 
making organisations, and therefore the individuals within it, account for what they do, 
Governments could ensure professionals were ‘accountable’ to those who funded the service. 
Inspections were not seen, however, as the mechanism to ensure accountability. In the 1970s and 
1980s, inspections were used to provide advice and guidance to the professional services and 
Gilroy (2004) states that there was reluctance in some Government departments to increase the 
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powers of the inspectorate for fear it would provoke defensive reactions in practice. Instead, the 
Audit Commission was established in 1982 to fulfil this function, with a principal aim to be the 
driving force in the improvements of public services (Munro, 2004). Rather than use the methods 
of the inspections and review the work of individuals, however, audits reviewed the work of the 
organisation as a whole. The objectives for practice, standards of good practice, and indicators of 
good performance were defined so that the auditors could use these standards to make a 
judgement about the organisation. This imposed a standardisation on social work the likes the 
profession had never seen before, which Munro (2004) states were based on “a number of 
theoretical assumptions that have no clear authority from empirical research or professional 
consensus” (p.1083). Nevertheless, the judgement of the auditors was trusted, despite questions 
about the process and results of such judgements, elevating the audit process to the status of 
highest importance (Power, 1997). Legitimacy as an organisation, and therefore pride in one’s 
profession, required a positive judgement. As Dezalay and Sugarman (1995) have argued, the rise 
of auditing has meant that the sociology of regulation and the sociology of the professions are 
now inseparable. 
For organisations to be able to provide the evidence the auditors needed, they had to implement 
new policies, procedures, and internal monitoring, recording, and data management systems in 
order to control what its employees did. Power (1997) argues that through a process of regulating 
and policing these structures, the auditors control the control systems inside organisations, 
resulting in organisations being “constructed around the audit process itself” (p.51). Such moves 
deliberately sought to challenge the organisational power and discretion of the professionals that 
had developed over the post-war period to provide the Government more control of what 
professionals did and how they did it (Power, 1997). Under the guise of creating greater 
effectiveness, efficiency, and value for money, local authorities were encouraged throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, through the audit process, to move away from the generic model of social work 
services to provide more specialist services, which saw the proliferation of teams which worked 
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exclusively with children and their families and those who worked with vulnerable adults (Parton, 
1996; Munro, 2004). Furthermore, the local authorities were encouraged to separate the 
commissioning from the delivery of services. Parton (1996) argues that through this process, “no 
longer are social workers constituted as caseworkers drawing on their therapeutic skills in human 
relationships, but as care managers” (p.12), monitoring and reviewing the packages of care they 
have put in place.  
The work of the inspectors took on the methods of auditing and began to change from one of 
inspecting the professional practice of social work, to auditing the management, organisation, 
and delivery of the services (Gilroy, 2004). Indeed, Power (1997) argues that inspections have 
simply become audits with the power for independent escalation. Dimaggio and Powell (1983) 
refer to such a process as institutional isomorphism, as one set of organisations seek to resemble 
others in their attempts to gain legitimacy and social acceptance. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
work of the Audit Commission and the inspectorate began to overlap and they began undertaking 
joint inspections from 1996 (Gilroy, 2004). Munro (2004) argues that these developments only 
intensified under the new Labour Government elected in 1997. ‘Performance’, ‘outputs’, and 
‘outcomes’ were further quantified to drive and measure improvement through audit and 
inspection, which produced for the first time, a grade for the local authority, a league table, and 
the possibility of being placed in ‘special measures’. Such measures could be seen to formalise 
and embed the systemic shame and pride for social work, as those within and outside the 
organisation now knew the boundaries for shameful or praiseworthy behaviour, which 
legitimised episodic shaming and praising of organisations that were considered to conform, or 
not, to these boundaries. Rather than improve the efficiency and effectiveness of professional 
services, however, Sieber (1981) argues that such measures can create a ‘fatal remedy’ through 
the construction of a dysfunctional system set up to satisfy the auditing system rather than the 
people it was intended to serve; a process Power (1997) refers to as colonisation. While such 
methods were criticised by some (e.g. Cutler and Waine, 2003) and the Audit Commission (2002) 
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identified that social workers were leaving the profession because of bureaucracy, paperwork, 
targets, lack of autonomy, and unmanageable workloads, such methods had come to be seen as 
the most effective way to ensure the best value for money was provided to the state (Gilroy, 
2004).  
The effect of these changes in child protection social work practice was, perhaps, best 
exemplified in the case of Victoria Climbié, who was known to social services at the time of her 
death in 2000. To Victoria’s social worker, the case was not out of the ordinary and her practice 
was as diligent as any other case (Taylor, 2007). The subsequent inquiry, led by an ex-chief 
inspector, identified an authoritarian management style and an ethos of meeting targets, 
statistics, and getting cases through the system rather than considering what the child and family 
needed (Laming, 2003). Rather than the system in which practice operated being a legitimate 
target for criticism, instead, the blame was placed on the organisation for not having 
implemented their statutory responsibilities appropriately or providing effective leadership and 
the social worker for her poor practice (Laming, 2003). With greater demand for professional 
accountability, we can perhaps suggest that the process of episodic shaming had reached new 
proportions at this stage. Under significant criticism within the press, supported by a discourse of 
derision, the local authority placed a large proportion of the blame on Victoria’s social worker 
who was not only sacked but also placed on the Protection of Children Act (POCA) list, preventing 
her from ever working with children again (Fairweather, 2008). The social work regulator, the 
General Social Care Council (GSCC), later refused to register Victoria’s social worker on the 
grounds of incompetence. Victoria’s social worker explained the personal impact of such public 
shaming when she disclosed that she frequently considered suicide, was admitted to hospital for 
psychiatric care, and stated “I hated myself so much” (Fairweather, 2008, n.p.). 
The Government’s response to the scandal and subsequent inquiry was similar to that of previous 
Government responses to widely publicised child deaths, which was to implement major reforms 
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to ensure that such a thing could never happen again (Parton, 2014). The resulting Children Act 
2004 sought to encourage partnership between, and “sharpen accountability” (Parton, 2014, 
p.50) of, all agencies that came into contact with children. This involved significant organisational 
changes, including the dismantling of the generic local authority social work service set up after 
the Seebohm Report to create a new local authority department for children’s services. New 
administrative requirements were made to make it easier to retrieve information through the use 
of technology, which served to increase the level of control over what the social workers did and 
how they did it by forcing them to follow a specific workflow of documents, within a specific 
timeframe, embedded within a computer system (White et al., 2010). Indeed, Wastell et al.’s 
(2010) ethnographic study identified practice revolving around the computer system in an 
atmosphere of performance management, with highly formalised rules and procedures, an 
empowered management system, and diminished professional discretion. The amount of time 
social workers had to spend on the computer significantly increased as a result (Baginsky et al., 
2010; White et al., 2010).  
Despite the intention of these reforms, Peter Connelly died in 2007 from abuse, in the same local 
authority Victoria Climbié had, while subject to a child protection plan. The case had conformed 
to all of the statutory requirements, policies, and procedures, and two months after Peter had 
died the local authority was graded as good by the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted), the 
new inspectorate for children’s services. Inevitably, the political and media outrage criticised not 
only the individual workers, the local authority, and child protection practice across the country, 
but also the inspection process itself (Parton, 2014; Warner, 2015). As Ed Balls, the responsible 
Government minister, stated, “once it moved into the debate about the integrity of the 
inspection process… I had no choice… I had to manage that situation” (Balls, 2014, n.p.). So while 
Peter’s social worker and her team manager were sacked by the local authority following a 
Serious Case Review (SCR), which stated there had been a lack of authoritative child protection 
practice, the head of the children’s services was removed from her post live on television by Ed 
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Balls following the publication of the revised inspection report he had commissioned, which now 
graded the service as inadequate (Parton, 2014). As the inspection process had become symbolic 
of the Government’s ability to provide good quality services (Power, 1997), the Government 
sought to shame the individual worker, the head of the service, and arguably the institution of 
social work, rather than the system they had created and the inspectorate that supported it.  
CREATING A NEW CHILD PROTECTION PRACTICE 
Parton (2014) argues that the death of Peter Connelly marked a watershed in child protection 
practice and policy. While the Government set up the Social Work Task Force in 2008, which 
countered the discourse of derision by reaffirming the importance of the profession and setting 
out a vision for an improved system. The death of Peter Connelly damaged the Labour 
Government’s reputation for managing public services, which combined with the financial crash 
of 2007/8 which had damaged its reputation for managing financial services, and a Conservative 
led coalition Government came to power in 2010 committed to reforming the system in the 
context of austerity (Parton, 2014). The newly commissioned review of child protection (Munro, 
2010, 2011a, 2011b) criticised the overreliance on procedure, guidance, and targets, and argued 
for a more child centred system based on relationship-based practice. Arguably, the work of the 
Munro review and the Social Work Reform Board redefined the systemic pride in operation 
within the field, providing clear boundaries for praiseworthy behaviour, reminiscent of 
Seebohm’s vision. While such work informed the subsequent changes, with frontline practitioners 
seeing a relaxing of timescales and less rigidity in the paperwork they had to complete, these new 
changes encouraged an authoritarian form of practice perceived to be absent in the case of Peter 
Connelly.  
Under the auspices of transparency, all SCRs were required to be made public, which, while 
explicitly not about apportioning blame to individuals, served to highlight the most serious 
mistakes in child protection, arguably heightening the sense of shame of all those in the field. 
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Furthermore, the inspection regime was reformed, introducing unannounced inspections, while 
making it more difficult to attain the higher categories in a new grading system: Inadequate, 
Requires Improvement, Good, and Outstanding (Ofsted, 2015). Being graded as Inadequate, or 
even Requires Improvement, could be considered a threat to the identity of the organisation and 
those who work within it. Indeed, Perryman’s (2007) study of teachers’ experiences of 
inspections identifies they exert a panoptic and disciplinary force precisely because they lead to 
“fear, panic and loss of self” (p.177). In other words, the inspection becomes symbolic of the 
systemic shame and pride in operation, which heightens one’s sense of shame during periods of 
increased scrutiny, knowing that one could be shamed for failing to conform to legitimised 
practices. The introduction of unannounced inspections, by this stage only undertaken by Ofsted, 
only served to place all local authorities under an atmosphere of continuous inspection 
(Perryman, 2007).  Furthermore, the language of partnership, inherent to the Seebohm vision and 
embedded in the Children Act 1989 and subsequent statutory guidance, was absent from the 
renewed statutory guidance, and in its place the idea that social workers should “rescue children 
from chaotic, neglectful, and abusive homes” (HM Government, 2013, p.22); language more 
familiar to the cruelty men of the late 1890s/early 1900s. While Devine and Parker (2015) 
examined the referral and assessment data across England over the last 22 years and identified 
an increase of 311 per cent in referrals and 302 per cent in assessments since the introduction of 
the Children Act 1989, they failed to find an increase in the detection of child abuse. Despite this, 
there has been a significant rise in (1) the number of children subject to child protection plans, (2) 
the number of children placed in local authority care, which is now the highest it has been since 
1985 (Vickerstaff, 2014), and (3) the number of children placed for adoption (Parton, 2014). 
Indeed, observing the changes in practice, the President of the Family Division, Judge Munby, 
recently noted: 
“until the late 1960s, the typical adoption was of an illegitimate child born to a single mother who, 
however reluctantly, consented to the adoption of her child. Non-consensual adoption was 
comparatively rare... The result of various changes in the system of public childcare, culminating in 
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the implementation in October 1991 of the 1989 Act, has led in recent decades to a 
correspondingly dramatic increase in the number of non-consensual adoptions. The typical 
adoption today is of a child who has been made the subject of a care order under the 1989 Act and 
where parental consent has been dispensed with” (Re N (Children) (Adoption: Jurisdiction) [2015] 
EWCA Civ 1112, para. 16).  
Such changes in policy and practice and these recent trends has led Featherstone et al. (2014a) to 
argue that these reforms have sought to reconstruct child protection social work practice through 
a “focus on using the law, removing children decisively and getting them placed for adoption 
early” (Featherstone et al., 2014a, p.1736).  
CHILD PROTECTION SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE: A SUMMARY 
Social work was born out of the desire to help those in need. Who has been thought to be in 
need, what has been considered help, and how best to provide this help has, however, been 
shaped by the dominant attitudes, values, and opinions of the time. These collective attitudes 
and opinions, and the structures that support them, can be considered to have created a cultural, 
or systemic, force that has ensured that what is considered praiseworthy and shameful behaviour 
is known (Creed et al., 2014). Social work practices have been created and maintained within 
these systemic forces because they achieved, and continue to achieve, cultural legitimacy and 
social acceptance (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). Other forms of practice have become 
delegitimised as a consequence of the changing attitudes and norms (Oliver, 1992).  
Until 1970, child protection social work consisted of a social worker seeking to develop a 
therapeutic relationship with the parents, with the social worker providing practical help, 
counselling, and group work to effect change within the family (Parton, 1996). It would have been 
considered inappropriate to have someone else provide the help and support the social worker 
considered the family needed. Furthermore, there was a high degree of trust in the practitioners 
and their organisations, with social workers undertaking little administration other than as an aid 
to improve their practice. Dissent of these institutional arrangements existed but remained a 
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minority view (Payne, 2005). Since the 1970s, however, the practices, knowledge, and skills base 
of the profession has been challenged and criticised, with individual workers and organisations 
being subject to increasing levels of public shaming and humiliation (Warner, 2015). Increased 
levels of administrative control have been put in place by politicians to restrict and direct the 
actions of social workers to be more in line with what they consider to be praiseworthy 
behaviour. These arrangements are policed by auditors/inspectors who can be considered to use 
episodic shaming of organisations to instil a sense of shame in both institutional actors, i.e. the 
social workers, and institutional guardians, i.e. those who manage the organisations, to comply 
with these arrangements (Creed et al., 2014).  
Child protection social workers are more likely to be seen today undertaking assessments, 
inputting data into a computer, and making referrals to others to undertake practical help, 
counselling, or group work to effect change (Parton, 1996). Their work is subject to more 
monitoring than previously through scrutiny by their manager and senior managers, child 
protection conference chairs, independent reviewing officers, and children’s Guardians, which all 
require greater levels of administration to evidence their work. There has also been a significant 
change towards a more authoritarian form of social work that would have been considered 
shameful in the 1960s. Yet, despite the criticism (e.g. Featherstone et al., 2014a), it can be a 
source of praise for a social worker to remove a child from their parents without parental consent 
and place them for adoption (Narey, 2011). Such changes in practice arguably suggest 
fundamental changes in organisational and individual identity.  
This analysis has argued that shame and pride can be considered to have disrupted old identities 
and created and maintained new ones. It has argued that the systemic shame and pride that 
operates within the field has provided the background for organisational and individual action 
within the institution of social work. These systemic forces have provided legitimacy for episodic 
shaming and praising of certain actions, which instils a sense of shame and pride within 
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institutional actors to conform to the boundaries of the new identity. What this analysis does not 
tell us though, is how external forces reconstruct the systemic shame and pride within an 
organisation, how this new systemic force contributes to the process of delegitimising established 
organisational practices and embeds new ones, or what the impact of these processes on the 
experiences of those subject to these new forces are. It is the exploration of these that will enable 
us to answer the question of what role do self-conscious emotions play in child protection social 
work practice. 
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CHAPTER 3: STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
As discussed in the introduction, pragmatism calls for a focus on experience in relation to 
contexts, language, and how people solve problems (Emirbayer and Maynard, 2010). This 
necessarily involves collecting data about the lived experience in real-world contexts, which in 
this case is of self-conscious emotions in the context of child protection social work practice. To 
explore this topic, however, it is important to understand the context for these emotional 
experiences; how they are experienced within this context; and how these experiences influence 
the way social workers practice within this context. While it is possible to design a study in a 
number of ways to investigate such questions, a number of scholars argue that case study 
research provides a flexible approach that is able to collect multiple sources of evidence in real-
world contexts suitable for answering such questions (e.g. Stake, 1995; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Thomas, 
2016). Following such arguments, this study has been designed as a case study and this chapter, 
firstly, defines the case and the rationale for this definition; secondly, outlines the approach and 
methods used to collect the data; before finally outlining the approach and methods used to 
analyse the data to develop an analytical narrative.   
DEFINING THE CASE 
Thomas (2010) argues the purpose of case study research is to produce “exemplary knowledge” 
(p.576), i.e. knowledge of an example understood within the context of the researcher’s own 
experience. He argues that an example is used not because it is representative or typical of 
anything, but rather because it provides a specific representation within a specific context. The 
meanings within exemplary knowledge are then “malleable and interpretable in the context of 
varieties of experience. The case study thus offers an example from which one’s experience… 
enables one to gather insight or understand a problem” (Thomas, 2010, p.578). Or as Eysenck 
(1976) put it, “sometimes we simply have to keep our eyes open and look carefully at individual 
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cases—not in the hope of proving anything, but rather in the hope of learning something” (p.9). 
Given the distinct lack of research on the role of self-conscious emotions in child protection social 
work practice (Gibson, 2016) this study simply aims to learn something about child protection 
practice and self-conscious emotions. A case study is not a research method (Simons, 2009), 
however, rather it is what Thomas (2011) refers to as a “design frame” (p.512) that may 
incorporate a number of methods. Indeed, he defines case studies as “analyses of persons, 
events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, institutions, or other systems that are studied 
holistically by one or more methods” (Thomas, 2011, p.513). While Wieviorka (1992) argues that 
a case study requires a “theoretical, scientific basis” (p.159), which for this case study is the role 
of the self-conscious emotions in child protection social work practice, he also argues that a case 
requires a “practical, historical unity” (p.159), or what Ragin (1992) refers to as the “boundaries 
around places and time periods” (p.5).  
As this study is interested in the practice of the social workers, the primary focus of this case 
study is the action of the social workers in their efforts to undertake child protection work (Mead, 
1934; Shalin, 1986; Charmaz, 2006; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). Given the inspectorial 
arrangements as described in chapter two, the grading provided by Ofsted tells us something 
about the perceived quality of the institutional arrangements of that particular organisation. To 
keep a focus on the role of self-conscious emotions in what is considered legitimate and socially 
acceptable child protection practice, any organisation with an ‘inadequate’ inspection grading 
was excluded as a possible site. On grounds of practicality, i.e. my ability to visit the case study 
site, the Principal Social Worker (PSW) of an English local authority, referred to as ‘the Council’ 
within this study, which had just received a ‘good’ rating by Ofsted was contacted and the 
management of the child protection service agreed to be involved. This study can therefore be 
considered to be a “key case” (Thomas, 2016), as it can be considered to be an exemplary case of 
child protection social work practice through which the role of self-conscious emotions can be 
considered. Ethnographic methods were considered appropriate to get close to the experience of 
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the social workers and record the actions of the practitioners in context. Indeed, Charmaz (2006) 
argues that “the goal of much ethnography is to gain an insider's depiction of the studied world” 
(p.21). The world in this study, however, is emotional experience and I therefore sought to move 
beyond description of the setting to provide an insight into the internal states and experiences of 
the social workers both through the data collection methods and my interpretation of these data. 
Thus, this study was explanatory in nature, seeking to provide a conceptual understanding of the 
interrelationships between these emotions and practice through exploring how and why the 
social workers did what they did (Thomas, 2016). Charmaz (2006) argues that constructivist 
grounded theory, developed in the pragmatic tradition (Mills et al., 2006; Bryant, 2009; Strübing, 
2013), provides the methods to “move ethnographic research toward theoretical development by 
raising description to abstract categories and theoretical interpretation” (p.23). Grounded theory 
ethnography, therefore, provided the means to construct a framework of ideas to answer the 
research questions (see below) and the resulting framework is offered as an instrument for 
improving practice through supporting and facilitating the understanding of practice (Stake, 
1995). 
Two child protection teams were chosen, known as specialist safeguarding units within the 
Council, at both the request of the management and for ethical considerations. While the 
management wanted the research to have a broader coverage of practice within their Council 
than a focus on one team would have provided, by reporting on the findings as one team, greater 
anonymity for the participants has been ensured (see below). The teams were selected on the 
basis of which team agreed to participate. I sent information about the research to the PSW who 
passed it on to the child protection teams. Two teams invited me to discuss it further at their 
team meetings. All those in both teams agreed to participate following these meetings. A team 
consisted of one team manager, two senior practitioners, five social workers, and two newly 
qualified social workers (NQSW). While the teams did not strictly adhere to this prescription, and 
there were some changes throughout my time within the teams, these are not reported to 
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ensure anonymity to participants. Overall, there were 19 social workers and 2 team managers 
involved in the study. Experience ranged from less than one year to 24 years, age ranged from 24 
years to 63 years, there was one male and the rest were female, and there was one Black-
Caribbean social worker and the rest were White-British. As the child protection service within 
the Council provided an example of what was considered good child protection social work 
practice at the time, this service provided the boundaries for the overall case. The teams, and the 
individuals within the teams, fitted into this service and were therefore considered to be nested 
within this wider case (Thomas, 2016), as illustrated in figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1: Diagrammatic representation of the case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data were collected for each team separately, stored separately, and analysed separately (see 
below). While there were differences between the teams, such as gender and ethnicity for some 
members, and one team was situated within the main Council building with the head of the 
service and the Councillors nearby, while the other was some distance away, there were also 
many similarities. Indeed, both teams performed the same function within the service and were 
subject to the same policies, procedures, pressures, and expectations, all of the social workers 
were female, and they were both fully staffed, stable teams. While I acknowledge that the 
differences between the teams played a role in the experiences of the individuals within the 
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teams, these differences were less significant when analysing these data for the purposes of 
answering the research questions. Indeed, comparing the codes, categories, and memos (see 
below) constructed from the data for each team presented a very similar picture. The data for 
each team were therefore amalgamated so that the individuals were treated as nested within the 
wider case irrespective of which team they worked in. This has served two purposes. Firstly, it has 
provided a more focused analysis for the purposes of answering the research questions and, 
secondly, it provides an additional layer of anonymity to the individuals as they cannot be 
identified by which team they worked in. To ensure anonymity, any identifying details relating to 
the individual or the team has been removed throughout the reporting of the findings  
  
In seeking to gain an insiders perspective of what it was like to undertake child protection social 
work within this service I observed those within the teams for one to two days per week over a 
six month period. I started and finished the day at the same time as the social workers, which was 
usually from 8.30am until 5.30pm, although this sometimes went on until later. This provided a 
boundaried timeframe, i.e. a snapshot (Thomas, 2016), through which to observe practice within 
the service. To place this perspective in context, however, I also sought data relating to the 
history of the service, the teams, and the individuals. This provided a retrospective element to 
the study (Thomas, 2011). Using Thomas’ (2011) typology for case studies which outlines the 
subject, purpose, approach, and process, this case study can be defined as shown in table 3.1. 
Furthermore, given these boundaries to the case study, the research questions can be adapted 
accordingly: 
 Main Question: What role do self-conscious emotions play in child protection social work 
practice within the Council? 
 Sub-Question 1: What is the context for self-conscious emotional experiences in child 
protection social work practice within the Council as represented by the two teams involved? 
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 Sub-Question 2: How are self-conscious emotions experienced in the context of child 
protection social work practice within the Council as represented by the two teams involved? 
 Sub-Question 3: How do self-conscious emotions influence the way social workers practice 
within the Council as represented by the two teams involved?  
Table 3.1: Defining the case 
Subject A Key Case  The child protection service within the Council is an exemplar of what is 
considered good child protection social work practice 
Purpose Instrumental  
 
This case study is an instrument to facilitate the understanding of child 
protection social work practice 
Explanatory It seeks to develop a tentative and context-specific explanation of the 
role that self-conscious emotions play in child protection social work 
practice 
Approach Theory Building 
 
This case study seeks to develop a conceptual framework to explain the 
role that self-conscious emotions play in practice 
Interpretive It is assumed that the social world is complex, indivisible, and should be 
studied in its completeness. It is assumed that there are multiple 
realities; meaning is indeterminate; facts and values are inextricably 
linked; truth is provisional; and social life is processual (Charmaz, 2006). 
My role in the construction of the resulting theory through interpretation 
of the meanings and actions of others is acknowledged 
Process Single, nested, 
case study 
The child protection service within the Council is considered a single 
case, with individual social workers nested within this wider case 
Snapshot with 
retrospective 
elements 
The case provides an illustration of the practice within the teams over a 6 
month period contextualised through retrospective data 
 
DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
DOCUMENTARY DATA RELATING TO THE WIDER SERVICE 
Data were collected on the child protection service within the Council to gain a historical 
perspective of the service and to understand the current arrangements. All publically available 
Council documents that related to the child protection service were collected that dated from 
2005 onwards. This included policy documents, minutes of meetings, reports from committee 
meetings, reports from the lead Councillor, Chief Executive of the Council, and head of the 
service, briefings for internal and external audiences, as well as current policies and procedures, 
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employee structures, and intended service aims and outcomes. Audit/inspection reports that 
related to the child protection service in the Council were also collected from 2005 onwards. 
These data were available on publically available databases related to the Council or the 
inspectorate, while some were collected during field visits. Together, these documents totalled 
329 pages.   
OBSERVATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS IN-SITU 
Principally, however, data were collected from me sitting with the social workers in the team 
room and observing what they did, how they did it, their facial expressions, body language, and 
general presentation. I observed the environment and the social situations in which they were 
engaged. I asked them what they were doing and both why they were doing it and why they were 
doing it the way they did. I asked them about how they were feeling while they were doing it as 
well as asking about how they perceived themselves or how they thought they were being 
perceived in these moments. I listened to their conversations, their use of language, gestures, 
and tone. I enquired about the background to their conversations and how they perceived 
themselves or how they thought they were being perceived in the situation they were referring 
to. I would go with the social workers when they went to talk to their manager, to meetings, on 
home visits, to schools, or to the Court. This was either on an ad hoc basis, with me being invited 
by a social worker as they were leaving, or through me organising to attend with them at the start 
of the day. Such organisation ensured that I was able to collect data that related to all 
components of the work they had to undertake. My position as an overt researcher in the field, 
with minimal involvement in the observed situations, and where I would not normally be part of 
such situations, is considered by Gold (1958) as one of an observer-as-participant. What I 
observed can be summarised in table 3.2. Fieldnotes were taken throughout the day according to 
advice provided by Emerson et al. (1995) in a note book that I carried around with me. These 
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notes were then typed up when I got home that same night. In total, I conducted 246.5 hours of 
observations across the two teams.   
Table 3.2: Breakdown of observations 
Observations with no client contact  
Observation/interaction/discussion 
(observations, discussions with colleagues, discussions with managers, 
discussions in the kitchen, social talk, case talk in corridors, walks to office, 
telephone calls, talks in car, reading emails, reading reports, walks to town etc.) 
324 discrete interactions
2
 
 
 
Social worker discussion with team manager 37 discrete interactions
2
 
Supervision 5 in total
3
 
Legal Gateway Meeting 4 in total
3
 
Team Meeting 3 in total
3
 
Strategy Meeting 1 in total
3
 
  
Observations with client contact 
Home visit 18 in total
3
 
Office visit 5 in total
3
 
Child in Need meeting 3 in total
3
 
Child Protection Conference 4 in total
3
 
Core Group Meeting 8 in total
3
 
Hospital visit 1 in total
3
 
Public Law Outline meeting 1 in total
3
 
Court Hearing 1 in total
3
 
 
DIARY ENTRIES 
To gain a more specific focus on the participants’ internal self-conscious emotional experiences I 
designed a semi-structured log, i.e. a diary sheet (see appendix 1), that was given to each 
member of the team at the end of the day to complete and give back to me before they left the 
office. Not everyone was in the office at the end of the day, so the number of diary entries I 
received each day varied. Furthermore, some participants were more willing than others to 
complete the logs. The diary sheet was designed along constructionist lines, as described in 
chapter one. Participants were provided with two logs, one for positively valenced self-conscious 
                                                          
2
 These are recorded in discrete interactions as they occurred fluidly in and around the office; they did not 
occur as discrete episodes such as in the case of a meeting 
3
 These are recorded as episodes, which had a beginning and an end with a number of interactions in 
between  
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experiences (asking participants to “describe any situation which made you feel good about 
yourself today”) and one for negatively valenced experiences (asking them to “describe any 
situation which made you feel bad about yourself today”). From these situations, the participants 
were asked to describe what they were thinking at the time along with any bodily sensations they 
felt. Following Scherer’s (2005) methodology on collecting data on emotions, participants were 
then asked to write down what word or words they would use to describe how they felt in that 
situation and then to choose which word or words most closely corresponded to their experience 
from a list of commonly used terms for self-conscious emotions. While this list included the terms 
under study (pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment), given the debates regarding 
these experiences as discussed in chapter one, further terms were also provided from these 
debates to explore their wider experience (acceptance, valued, and important were included 
from Scheff’s (2014) theory on pride; mortified was included from Cooley’s (1902) theory on 
shame; rejection was included from Scheff’s (2000) theory on shame; anxiety was included from 
Scheff (2000), Lewis (1971), and Tangney and Dearing’s (2002) theories on shame; and anger was 
included from Lewis’ (1971) theory on shame). Finally, the diary sheet asked participants how 
these thoughts and feelings influenced what they said or did at the time and how this may have 
changed things for them in the future.  
Each diary entry was typed up on to a computer that same night. In total, I collected 99 diary 
entries. A breakdown of the diary entries by term is provided in figure 3.3. Together, these logs 
provided data with greater detail on the internal experiences of specific situations which I could 
combine with my observations and discussions with the social workers to build a more 
comprehensive picture of the role of self-conscious emotions in their practice. Asking the social 
workers to complete the diary entries at the end of the day, and to focus on only one positively 
valenced and one negatively valenced experience, rather than to complete a diary entry straight 
after a relevant experience as suggested by some (e.g. Reis and Gable, 2000; Bolger et al., 2003) 
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was considered the most practical approach to take. It gathered data close enough to the actual 
experiences without being too obstructive to their work.   
Table 3.3: Breakdown of diary entries4  
Positively Valenced Experiences Negatively Valenced Experiences 
Term Total Term Total 
Pride 29 Anxiety 15 
Acceptance 19 Guilt 15 
Valued 17 Shame 7 
Relief
5
 9 Embarrassment 6 
Important 3 Rejection 5 
Anxiety 3 Humiliation 3 
Anger 2 Mortified 3 
Embarrassment 2 Anger 6 
Rejected
6
 1 Valued
7
 2 
Guilt
8
 1 Important
9
 2 
 
DOCUMENTARY DATA RELATING TO INDIVIDUAL PRACTICE 
While observations of practice, discussions, and diary entries about their experience of practice 
provided data in respect of what they did and how they did it, any written work produced as part 
of their practice remained hidden from such methods. I therefore sought to collect a sample and 
asked each participant to provide me with two pieces of their written work. As I had no 
knowledge of the content of this work, I asked them to decide which documents they wanted to 
supply. Most of the social workers took their time to think about which piece of work to give me 
and some commented that they were proud of the work they eventually decided upon. 
Interestingly, a number of the assessments and reports provided related to the cases that I had 
knowledge of through my observations and discussions. This provided an added element to the 
analysis through comparison between my observations, discussions, logs, and then how the case 
                                                          
4
 Most logs were categorised by participants using multiple terms, e.g. a person could feel important and 
guilty at the same time  
5
 Relief was not included in the forced choice list but was written by participants in the free text section 
6
 This was recorded as a positive experience being felt alongside acceptance, valued, and embarrassment  
7
 This was recorded as a negative experience being felt alongside anxiety (1 entry) and mortified (1 entry) 
8
 This was recorded as a positive experience being felt alongside pride and valued 
9
 This was recorded as a negative experience being felt alongside guilt (2 entries) 
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had been formally presented (see below). A breakdown of the documents that were collected is 
provided in Figure 3.4.  
Table 3.4: A breakdown of the documents collected  
Assessment Type Number 
Review Child Protection Conference Report 10 
Initial Child Protection Conference Report 7 
Section 17 Assessment 7 
Section 47/Core Assessment 6 
Parenting Assessment 1 
Initial Visit Form 1 
Temporary Approval of Connected Person as a Foster Carer 1 
Total 33 
 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
I collected the data and began to analyse it as the research progressed (see below). From my 
initial analyses I developed a semi-structured interview schedule which looked at the three areas 
which had become most pertinent in answering the research questions, namely: (1) how they 
perceived themselves and their practice within the context of the Council; (2) their experience 
and perception of the context in which they practised; and (3) specific examples of practice 
where self-conscious emotions were salient (see appendix 2). Seventeen social workers10 and two 
team managers were interviewed. Each interview was conducted in an interview room within a 
Council building. Interviews lasted between 55 and 100 minutes and were recorded on a digital 
recording device, transferred to a computer, and transcribed verbatim. The chronology of how 
the data were collected is provided in appendix 3.  
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Any research that seeks to collect data in relation to such experiences as shame provides ethical 
issues in relation to observing, discussing, and recording such highly personal experiences from 
                                                          
10
 Two social workers stated that they could not find the time to be interviewed due to their workload  
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the possibility of participants re-experiencing such feelings in the retelling of them or in 
experiencing what Levin (1967) calls secondary shame, i.e. the shame about feeling shame. The 
participants, therefore, not only had to be well informed of the research but also to feel 
comfortable with me as the researcher. I therefore took time with each team to explain the 
purpose and outcome of the study. I provided an information sheet, sent to them by the PSW, in 
the first instance (see appendix 4). I then met with the teams to provide more detailed 
information about the research (see appendix 5), explained it further and answered any 
questions before they signed a consent form (see appendix 6). The social workers were made 
aware that they could withdraw their consent for specific incidents, or even entirely, from the 
research at any point during the time I was collecting data and some social workers did indeed 
request that some incidents or discussions were not included. A further consent form was 
provided for the semi-structured interviews (see appendix 7). My discussions and the interview 
with the social workers required me to make the participants feel comfortable in discussing their 
experiences with me, which included developing trust that I would not judge, criticise, or shame 
them and that their comments would remain anonymous. The interview guide was provided to 
the participants a number of days prior to the interview so they could familiarise themselves with 
the questions and content. This was intended to allow them more control over their responses in 
the interview and reduce any potential psychological harm the discussion could create had they 
not known about the material beforehand. I made sure I was aware of the support that was 
available to them should they need it and in the event a number of the social workers did indeed 
ask for more support. I was, therefore, able to refer them to the Council’s confidential emotional 
support service, which was not advertised and no one seemed to be aware of.  
Child protection work necessarily involves highly sensitive issues as it operates within the 
intimate spaces of family life (Ferguson, 2011) and relates to highly personal information. All 
information has, therefore, been kept strictly secure and anonymous. Observations including 
parents, carers, or children were only undertaken following a discussion with the social worker as 
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to the capacity of the parent/carer to consent to me observing the session. The social worker 
then spoke to them about the research before the session and provided them with an 
information sheet (see appendix 8). If they agreed to me observing I then spoke to them 
immediately prior to the session on their own to explain the research further, answer any 
questions, and confirm they were in agreement that they were happy for me to observe. I then 
talked them through a consent form which they signed (see appendix 9). Some parents declined 
to be involved and I did not observe or record any information that related to them. Children 
were only seen in the presence of their legal parent/carer who had agreed that I could observe 
the session. Occasionally, I went with the social worker to speak to the child(ren) on their own in 
the family home if the parent/carer and the child(ren) agreed to this. In some situations there 
were others involved in the observed situations. Where these were other professionals, the social 
worker spoke to them first and then I spoke to them and provided them with the information 
sheet (appendix 8). If anyone objected to my presence I did not observe the situation. Mostly, 
however, these were other Council employees who worked in the buildings of the teams. They 
were made aware of the research at the start of the data collection period when I was given a 
tour of the buildings and I explained my role to them and the possibility of them becoming an 
indirect participant in the research, i.e. they could be part of the situation but would not be the 
focus. I provided them with a research information sheet (appendix 8) and informed them that 
they could let me know at any point if they did not want to be involved or if they did not want 
specific situations to be included. Ethical approval was granted through the University of 
Birmingham ethical review panel and the research was approved by the Council’s research 
governance process.  
DATA ANALYSIS 
Charmaz (2006) states that an ethnographic grounded theory strategy is to “seek data, describe 
observed events, answer fundamental questions about what is happening, then develop 
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theoretical categories to understand it” (p.25). A case study, however, provides boundaries to 
such a strategy that would not ordinarily be present in a grounded theory study (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967). Furthermore, the focus of the study was established prior to the collection of 
data, which guided the collection of data and ongoing analysis that would not ordinarily be 
consistent with grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Further still, a ‘classical’ grounded 
theory study would have perhaps continued the process of data collection/analysis further than I 
have here. Notwithstanding such inconsistencies, case study researchers have found grounded 
theory methods extremely useful to case study research (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989). Following 
Eisenhardt’s (1989) arguments and Charmaz’s (2006) advice, I have used such methods to 
organise the data collection and analysis within this case study. The aim of this process was to 
start with what Blumer (1969) calls, sensitising concepts, i.e. theoretical ideas about the research 
topic, and to move on from these to construct an analysis grounded in the data. When I began 
visiting the teams I had little in the way of direction for my observations and discussions other 
than my initial research topic and a few sensitising concepts. I therefore wrote large quantities of 
feldnotes. By visiting the teams on one or two days a week, however, I had time between visits to 
study the data, write memos, and read relevant literature to inform my understanding of the 
data.  
Following Charmaz’s (2006) advice, the ethnographic data was initially coded line by line in a 
Word11 document using a gerund that best represented the action within that line. As Glaser 
(1978) argues, coding in such a manner helps the researcher to stick to the data and detect 
processes. Rather than code the diary data in gerunds, however, any word or words that best 
described the content of each line was used. Within the documents I had collected, any data that 
related to the development of the child protection service were extracted and also coded in this 
manner. The initial coding of the data guided what data to collect in subsequent observations and 
discussions allowing me to identify patterns and significant processes, to compare experiences 
                                                          
11
 All analysis was undertaken in Microsoft Word documents 
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within and between individuals, and to find similarities and differences (Charmaz, 2006); what 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) refer to as the constant comparative method. As the analysis/data 
collection progressed, more data could be compared to more data and the most significant codes, 
i.e. those which made the most analytical sense to understand the actions of the social workers, 
could then be used to categorise the data; a process Charmaz (2006) calls focused coding. Data 
could then be compared to these codes enabling further refining. As I learnt more about the 
emotional experiences of the social workers in their specific context, I found it useful to 
categorise the data using a further set of codes so that I had an overall category, subcategories, 
and initial codes.  
Memos were written throughout the data collection and analysis process (Charmaz, 2006) and 
helped consider the possible theoretical explanations for the data, develop hypotheses, test 
these hypotheses in the field, and come to the most plausible explanation; a process Peirce 
(1903) termed abduction. I wrote memos to help me formulate ideas about the data. I used them 
to make comparisons between data, codes, subcategories, categories, and concepts. I wrote 
memos in the back of my notebook when I had a spare moment while with the teams, on my 
phone when an idea came to me and I was not near my notebook or my computer, and while I 
was studying the data, coding, or reading the wider literature. At first I wrote memos to consider 
the codes and guide my observations and discussions. They also helped keep a focus on the role 
of self-conscious emotional experiences in practice by enabling me to continually ask the data 
questions about these experiences in this context. As I began to construct the categories, the 
memos aided my collection of relevant data through, what Glaser and Strauss (1967) refer to as, 
theoretical sampling, i.e. seeking data to develop the emerging theory. As Dey (2013) argues, 
categories are constructions with fuzzy boundaries and it is not always easy to categorise data. 
Theoretical sampling enabled me to define the categories, outline the properties of the 
categories, specify the conditions under which the categories arose, were maintained, and 
changed, and describe their consequences (Charmaz, 2006). The memo writing was able to bring 
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the fieldnotes, diary entries, documents, and interviews into an integrated analysis. All memos 
were typed up and stored on a computer for later retrieval and sorting. I did not aim for 
theoretical saturation, however, as is the aim in classical grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967), but rather what Dey (1999) terms “theoretical sufficiency” (p.257). Following Charmaz’s 
(2006) advice on gaining sufficiently rich data for constructing a theory grounded in the data, I 
stopped collecting data when: I believed that I had enough background data about persons, 
processes, and settings to understand and portray the contexts of the study; I had gained detailed 
descriptions of a range of all of the participants’ views and actions; I had confidence in my 
interpretation of what lay beneath the surface of these views and actions; and I was able to 
develop analytical categories and make comparisons between them to generate and inform my 
ideas in answering the research questions.  
The final stage of the process was to sort, compare, and integrate the memos through theoretical 
sorting (Glaser, 1998; Charmaz, 2006). The memos were considered in relation to a range of 
theoretical codes that had become pertinent either through the data collection and analysis 
phase or in the sorting of the memos. The theoretical codes were identified from my own 
background knowledge, the reading I undertook throughout the data collection/analysis, or 
discussions with my supervisors. Glaser’s (1978, 1998, 2005) theoretical codes were considered 
for their fit with the data and the developing analysis, most notably: ‘the 6 Cs’12; the ‘type 
family’13; the ‘strategy family’14; the ‘identity-self family’15; the ‘means-goal family’16; the ‘cultural 
family’17; the ‘consensus family’18; the ‘mainline family’19; and the ‘unit family’20. Creed et al.’s 
                                                          
12
 causes, contingencies, consequences, contexts, covariance, conditions 
13
 ideal type, constructed type 
14
 strategies, tactics, mechanisms, techniques, dealing with, handling, arrangements, managed goals, 
means 
15
 self-image, self-concept, self-worth, self-evaluation, identity, social worth, transformations of self, 
conversions of identity 
16
 end, purpose, goal, anticipated consequences, product 
17
 norms, values, beliefs, sentiments 
18
 agreement, cooperation, definitions of the situation, opinion, conformity, conflict, perception, non-
conformity, mutual expectation 
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(2014) categories of systemic shame (and pride), a sense of shame (and pride), episodic shaming 
(and praising), and the felt experience were found to be useful theoretical codes. So too were 
Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006) categories for institutional work, i.e. creating21, maintaining22, 
and disrupting institutions23. As were Oliver’s (1991) strategic responses to institutional 
processes, i.e. acquiesce24, compromise25, avoid26, defy27, and manipulate28. Finally, Alvesson and 
Willmott’s (2002) categories for identity regulation were also considered useful theoretical 
codes29. The memos were sorted (and resorted) by using tables and diagrams according to 
different theoretical codes to create the best possible balance between the studied experience, 
the categories I had constructed, and my theoretical ideas about them (Charmaz, 2006). Sorting 
the memos enabled the integration of these categories into a conceptual framework. While the 
core of this study has always been about self-conscious emotional experiences, these codes have 
helped to construct a coherent analytical story, grounded in the data, about their role in child 
protection social work practice within the Council. 
LIMITATIONS  
As a new male figure within an all-female team, and one with experience of practising and 
teaching child protection social work, I acknowledge that my presence altered the dynamics 
within the teams. Observing and asking questions about their work while they undertook it, and 
                                                                                                                                                                               
19
 social control, socialization, social organization, social mobility, stratification, social institutions, social 
interaction 
20
 collective, group, organization, situation, context, behavioural pattern, family positional units i.e. status, 
role, role relationship 
21
 defining, constructing identities, changing normative associations, constructing normative networks, 
mimicry, theorizing, educating 
22
 enabling work, policing, deterring, valourizing and demonizing, mythologizing, embedding and routinizing 
23
 disconnecting sanctions, disassociating moral foundations, undermining assumptions and belief 
24
 habit, imitate, comply 
25
 balance, pacify, bargain 
26
 conceal, buffer, escape 
27
 dismiss, challenge, attack 
28
 co-opt, influence, control 
29
 defining the person directly, defining a person by defining others, providing a specific vocabulary of 
motives, explicating morals and values, knowledge and skills, group categorization and affiliation, 
hierarchical location, establishing and clarifying a distinct set of rules of the game, defining the context 
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asking participants to construct textual data, inevitably altered some of what they did and how 
they did it. The data can, therefore, be considered to have been contextually co-constructed 
(Charmaz, 2006). In order to minimise the effect I had on their practice, I sought to develop 
positive relationships with each team member to allay any anxieties about the research process 
and outcomes and to make myself a familiar figure within the teams. I therefore spent two to 
three days a week, over a number of weeks, exclusively in one team at the start of the data 
collection period to normalise my presence and activities and then repeated this in the other 
team. The majority of those in the teams told me that they wanted to tell me about what it was 
like to do their work and a number of the social workers commented to me early on that they had 
accepted me as a social member of their team, albeit temporarily, and involved me in social 
activities such as going out for lunch or the work Christmas party. I also acknowledge that by 
asking questions about how they were feeling could change how they perceived the current, or 
even future, situations. Indeed, I was told by a number of the social workers that over the time I 
was with the teams they had started to think more deeply about how they felt and that they 
found it therapeutic talking to me. Rather than seeing this as a limitation, however, I considered 
this to be a benefit to the study as the participants provided a richer, more reflexive, account of 
the role of their self-conscious experiences in their practice.  
While all efforts went into gaining as holistic a picture as possible into the role of self-conscious 
emotions in the practice of those within the teams, the resulting picture has been limited by the 
amount of time I spent in the field and the types of situations I observed. Not only were the 
situations I was able to observe limited by the amount of time I could spend with the teams but 
they were also limited by the social workers themselves who invited/agreed to me observing 
certain situations and not others. Clearly, the more time I spent in the field, the more diverse 
situations I could have observed and the more corroborating data I could have collected for the 
evolving and ongoing analysis. Furthermore, being an observer-as-participant (Gold, 1958), with 
no formal role in the situations I was observing, made some situations inappropriate for me to be 
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present within, which a complete participant role (Gold, 1958) would have gained legitimate and 
appropriate access to. Such limitations are acknowledged. Furthermore, while I have sought to 
collect data which provides as close a representation of the emotional experiences of the 
participants as possible, given practical considerations, the resulting data and analysis can only be 
understood within the context of my interactions and interpretations within the teams, within 
the Council, at that specific time (Thomas, 2010). Indeed, it is an ontological commitment within 
this study that the resulting theory is interpretive, contingent, and tentative (James, 1907; 
Dewey, 1929a; Mead, 1934; Rorty, 1979).  
THE STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY: A SUMMARY 
Given the pragmatic foundations of this study, I have argued that to answer the question of what 
role self-conscious emotions play in child protection social work practice a qualitative case study 
research design provides a useful mechanism. Indeed, as emotions are highly context dependent 
(Burkitt, 2014), it is necessary to bring evidence together from a wide variety of sources to 
understand the internal experience of the individual in the context of their current situation and 
historical experiences. Case study research is arguably, therefore, highly suitable for answering 
questions that relate to understanding the context for self-conscious emotions, how they are 
experienced, and their influence on the practice of social workers. In following Thomas’ (2010) 
arguments, I have sought to develop ‘exemplary knowledge’ through abduction, gained and 
offered through constructing a conceptual framework (Charmaz, 2006), which is able to answer 
these research questions. By way of making clear the rationale for both the research design and 
the approach and process for how this was achieved, I have sought to define the case and outline 
the methods used to collect and analyse the data. This has not been in an attempt to 
demonstrate some form of validity or reliability to the research, as this is not the aim of a study of 
one particular case (Thomas, 2016) or culture (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982), rather to 
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demonstrate the credibility of my interpretation and analysis. The following chapters provide this 
interpretation.  
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CHAPTER 4: CREATING THE RIGHT ORGANISATION 
“I want the Council to become one of the best performing local authorities in the country”  
The above statement made to local Councillors by the leader of the Council in 2007 (Council 
meeting minutes) provides a clear indication of the standard being set for the Council by its 
leaders. With changing circumstances, pressures, and contexts, both within and outside of the 
Council, however, achieving and maintaining such a standard becomes a never ending process of 
change and renewal. This chapter provides an analysis of the data relating to the development of 
the child protection service within the Council so that it was able to present an image of itself 
consistent with its organisational identity-standards. It will, therefore, provide an analysis of the 
organisational identity and how the child protection service became a threat to this identity 
requiring institutional work to disrupt the established arrangements to create and embed new 
ones. Self-conscious emotions can be considered to be at the heart of this process. Indeed, they 
can be considered to provide the boundaries through which the new arrangements were 
conceived, guiding the leaders in the development and establishment of this new service. Most 
importantly they can be considered to be at the heart of how the boundaries for membership of 
this new service were defined, how the normative associations were changed, i.e. administrative 
practice became central to performance, while administrative and interventionist practice 
became ethical, and how the rule systems that provided status were constructed to support 
these changes. Together these can be seen to create a service that was considered socially 
acceptable to audiences within and outside of the Council, which contributed to the Council being 
able to achieve its stated aim of being one of the best performing local authorities in the country.   
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THE COUNCIL’S ORGANISATIONAL IDENTITY 
As discussed in chapter two, the death of Victoria Climbié could be considered to have reaffirmed 
the boundary that it was shameful for a child that was involved with a local authority to be killed 
by their carers (Warner, 2015). The introduction of the Children Act 2004 could be considered to 
not only provide the statutory framework to prevent such incidents but also the societal 
expectation (Parton, 2014). Full compliance with the 2004 Act was not required, however, until 
2008. While the Council sought to implement changes to comply with this Act, the central 
message from leaders and senior managers of children’s services within the Council from 2005 
was that they were providing high quality services to children and young people and were 
performing better than many local authorities. Indeed, the leader of the Council stated in 2007 
that “The good news is that the information paints a very positive picture. It tells us that we are 
improving our performance faster than other Councils” (Council meeting minutes). While the 
Cabinet Member for Children and Young People reported to the local Councillors on their plan for 
services to children in 2008 that “We are already beginning to see some positive outcomes as a 
result of our Children’s Plan” (Council meeting minutes) 
Such proclamations can be considered to be attempts by the leadership team to provide a 
positive image of the Council and instil a feeling of pride. A similar image was presented to me by 
the social workers, with Donna’s statement in her interview that “I know [the Council] is one of 
the best authorities to work for” being a typical sentiment. Such a view was supported by social 
workers with experience of other local authorities, as Mandy explained: 
“I’ve had a taste of two different local authorities and this local authority you have the freedom to 
social work and make decisions rather than be micro-managed” (interview) 
Such beliefs are consistent with Albert and Whetten’s (1985) notion of an “organisational 
identity”, which they defined as the collective understanding by members of the organisation of 
its central and enduring attributes and that which distinguish it from other organisations. From 
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such a perspective, we can consider the Council’s positive identity claims to have been routinely 
verified by Ofsted who generally graded them as providing good services to children and young 
people. The resulting legitimised organisational identity was then used to reinforce a positive 
image of the organisation, both internally and externally. Press releases were provided to the 
media and the Director used these judgements in reports to local councillors and communications 
with frontline staff as evidence that they were “making a real difference to children and families” 
(Council meeting minutes). Such validated and legitimised claims created and supported a shared 
belief that the Council was doing a good job and was a good place to work, which enabled social 
workers to feel proud of working there, as demonstrated by Linda’s statement:  
“when I was in [a neighbouring local authority] I didn’t have a pride because what I was seeing 
was, I was embarrassed about the service that the families had received, so no the, you know, if I’d 
have had to stay, if I hadn’t been rescued, cos that’s how I feel, yeah I am proud to be a social 
worker” (interview) 
The neighbouring local authority had a poor organisational reputation within the Council, which 
Whetten and Mackey (2002) consider to be a reflection of the organisational identity, and Linda’s 
suggestion that the neighbouring local authority provided poor services to children and families 
prevented her from being able to feel proud of herself as a social worker. This was in contrast to 
the Council’s positive reputation, as shown by Lucy’s comments: 
“To me the reputation of [the Council] has always been very good but I come from [a] University 
where [the Council] was thought of as a good local authority” (interview) 
For Linda, moving to work for the Council felt like being rescued as she was now able to feel 
proud about what she did as she was able to verify her identity as a social worker. Indeed, the 
positive organisational identity was demonstrated by Carol, a senior practitioner with 14 years of 
experience: 
“I've always stayed with [the Council].  I like the authority.  I've nothing to compare it to but I 
haven't left because I like the authority” (interview) 
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Given such sentiments, we can suggest that the central and enduring beliefs about the Council 
were that it provided high quality services to children and families, kept children safe, and was 
therefore a good place to work, distinguishing it from other local authorities, which were inferior 
in comparison. Yet despite this positive organisational identity, the Director wrote to local 
councillors in 2010 stating that “doing nothing or staying as we are currently is not a viable 
option” arguing “that there needs to be a new paradigm to improve outcomes for [the Council]’s 
children and young people” (Council meeting minutes). A proposal was made to the councillors 
for a “transformation and radical reshaping of existing provision” (Council meeting minutes). Two 
separate arguments were presented by the Director and the senior managers to the local 
Councillors and Council employees for the rationale for these changes. The first was that there 
was a need to “improve services for children, young people and families” while the second was 
that there was a need to “achieve financial savings” (Select Committee meeting minutes).  
To understand this radical plan for the redesign of the service it is useful to consider the Council 
as an institutionally plural organisation (Kraatz and Block, 2008) in that it has more than one 
ascribed identity and more than one societally sanctioned purpose. The significant roles of the 
Council, relevant to this study, were as an administrator of public policy together with providing 
professional social work services. Different institutional constituencies were interested and 
invested in different activities of the organisation providing different meanings about what the 
organisation is and does. These different roles, with their different goals and sets of values 
embedded into their practices, can be considered to be different organisational identities 
(Cheney, 1991), similarly to the notion of an individual having multiple identities (James, 1892; 
Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934). Many within the Council had central and enduring beliefs that the 
Council was effective at administering public policy, while many had central and enduring beliefs 
that the Council performs good social work practice and provides good services to children and 
families. The different identities may influence one another but they can be considered to be 
separate having different goals and being relevant to different constituencies, audiences, and 
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contexts. Furthermore, these identities can be considered as role identities (McCall and Simmons, 
1978), in that they identify what the organisation does, as well as social identities (Tajfel 1982), in 
that they identify what the Council is. However, to understand the Council’s rationale for change 
we must consider the organisation to have a further organisational identity, one that involves the 
organisation seeing itself as different from others (Burke and Stets, 2009); what we can call an 
‘organisation identity’.  
Taking Pratt and Foreman’s (2000) application of identity theory to organisations further, we can 
consider the ‘organisation identity’ to be a higher level identity than role and social identities 
(Burke and Stets, 2009). From such a perspective, lower level identities can be considered to set 
the specific goals that a certain set of constituents need to achieve, while the higher level 
identities, containing the abstract goal states such as values, beliefs, and ideals, impose certain 
goals on the lower level identities (Burke and Stets, 2009). Within the Council there was a belief 
that it was a high performing innovative local authority which did things differently. This 
influenced different constituencies to seek to be innovative, resulting in a number of projects 
which were promoted internally and externally as such. Considering the Council to have multiple 
identities organised in a hierarchy, we can see how they interacted in attempts to control its 
image and reputation to verify its identities, as represented in figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: Interaction between organisational identities, image, and reputation (adapted from 
Whetten and Mackey, 2002, p.401) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From 2005 to 2008, the structure and practices within the Council were able to provide a positive 
image and reputation, thereby verifying its identities. However, in 2008/9 significant changes 
were taking place in the circumstances and dominant discourses in both the fields of social work 
and public administration. These pressures provided the impetus for, what Oliver (1992) calls, 
“deinstitutionalisation”. These new conditions lay the foundations for the deterioration of the 
consensus within the Council around the value of the current arrangements which now posed a 
threat to the Council’s higher level organisation identity. In order to verify this identity, there 
needed to be a rejection of the old structures and practices and a forming of new ones in both 
the professional and public administration spheres. In response to these pressures the Council 
formed a new project in 2009, made up of a number of managers and frontline workers, with a 
view to a complete service redesign. This was coupled with a strategic board made up of local 
Councillors, chaired by the Cabinet Member for Children and Young People, to ensure that the 
project had “clear political ownership” (Council meeting minutes).  
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DISRUPTING AND CREATING A NEW PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY  
As discussed in chapter two, following the Court case into the death of Peter Connelly in 2008, 
the boundaries for the systemic shame in operation had been sharpened and there was now 
significant mounting social pressure on all local authorities to demonstrate that they were 
competent at protecting children. While the organisational arrangements in place in 2008 had 
been designed exactly to prevent such perceived system failures, this new systemic pressure cast 
doubt over whether the established arrangements were appropriate for the task of protecting 
children. Observing the episodic shaming of specific social workers and organisations nationally, 
the leaders and senior management team sensed the possibility of being shamed themselves and 
classified all their social workers as “an “at risk” staff group” (Council publication), supporting the 
perceived need to change the established arrangements.  
The beginnings of the disruption of the established organisational arrangements could be seen in 
November 2008, with the cabinet member for children and young people stating that “Integrated 
Service Delivery for Children’s Services is essential within [the Council]” and that coordination 
between services “needs to be taken a step further forward” (Council meeting minutes). A 
consultation was opened on a model for integrating and improving services. In 2010 the Director 
claimed that successful joining up of services had only been achieved at a senior management 
level and that these changes had not been translated into a more joined up service at the 
“frontline” (Council meeting minutes). This claim was then supported by feedback from service 
users that suggested “that the Council’s services needed to be more joined up at the point of 
delivery” (Council meeting minutes). At the same time, the Social Work Task Force and Munro 
review of child protection, while casting further doubt over the arrangements established from 
the reforms following the death of Victoria Climbié, defined and heightened the systemic pride in 
the field by reaffirming the importance of the profession and setting out a vision for an improved 
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system (Social Work Task Force, 2009; Munro, 2011b). The Director, therefore, stated that the 
new service needed to:  
“re-affirm the role of professional social work in safeguarding the most vulnerable children” 
(Council meeting minutes)  
The Director argued that this would be achieved through addressing the complexity of social 
problems with a “whole family” approach and stated that the new service would be informed by 
national research and the belief that services needed to be provided to families early. The project 
board worked with a national children’s charity to develop the vision and plan for the new service 
and Family Group Conferencing was included as a significant tool for intervention and support. In 
further appeal to the social work constituency it was argued that the teams would be 
“remodelled” providing “a manageable caseload supported by consistent reflective supervision” 
enabling social workers “to take responsibility for planned interventions” (Council meeting 
minutes). This would be achieved by returning to “patch” based services (see Barclay Report, 
1982), with teams being responsible for a specific area, and investing in family support services to 
work with families before they reach the “threshold” for social work services. Furthermore, the 
Signs of Safety Approach to child protection social work (Turnell and Edwards, 1999), an approach 
developed by social workers for social workers, was implemented in the safeguarding service. 
While the rationale for the new service was framed positively, the systemic shame that 
contributed to the disruption of the current arrangements was evident, being outlined by the 
Director as a risk to the Council:  
“A potential failure to intervene at an earlier stage would have very high risk consequences for the 
child (ren) involved, the reputation of the local authority and poor Ofsted inspection results. 
Whilst it is never possible to prevent all injuries inflicted upon children and young people by their 
carers, the local authority aims to minimise the likelihood of an avoidable child protection failure 
by ensuring that it has skilled, resourced and well-scrutinised robust services for children, young 
people and families” (Council meeting minutes) 
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Responsibility for the death of a child at the hands of their carers was clearly placed at the door of 
the local authority. From the Director’s perspective a child being harmed equated to a failure of 
the system, which jeopardised the legitimacy of the whole organisation.  
DISRUPTING AND CREATING A NEW PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IDENTITY  
Meanwhile, functional pressures in the economy, following the fallout of the financial crash of 
2007-8, created a new national political context of austerity. The first budget of the new 
Government in 2010 meant local authorities were facing a reduction in funding by about a third 
(HM Treasury, 2010) making it a political necessity that all local authorities reduced their 
spending. While the Council considered itself to be “well managed and financially sound” in 2007 
(Council meeting minutes), following this budget there was an admission that “there would be 
considerably less funding available to the Council over the next few years and that the Authority 
needed to take urgent action to deal with this” (Council meeting minutes). The new emphasis in 
the dominant discourse for public services provided a new context in which the public 
administration organisational identity claims were being made. Saving money had become a new 
identity-standard imposed upon the Council’s services for children and young people as any part 
of the local authority which did not achieve these standards would be perceived to be failing the 
local authority. This potentially negative image of the service would directly threaten its claims to 
be a well performing Council. Saving money was therefore perceived to be objectively correct and 
became a shared rule within the Council, defining the systemic shame for the public 
administration constituency. A failure to achieve financial savings was, therefore, identified as a 
“main risk” to the new service in the Director’s report to the councillors, which further reinforced 
the need for reform, as the Director argued: 
“In the long-term, [new service] will achieve financial savings as fewer cases will require 
intervention from costly specialist services” (Council meeting minutes) 
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Additionally, the election of the new Government placed further political pressure on local 
authorities to commission more of its services (Horton and Gay, 2011) and in line with its identity 
as an innovative organisation, the Council committed itself to becoming a “commissioning 
orientated organisation” (Council report). The Council, therefore, sought: 
“to develop a robust joint commissioning process and to strengthen the role of the Third Sector to 
deliver services on behalf of [the Council]” (Council meeting minutes) 
It was believed that this would achieve some financial savings and improve services but that it 
required a cultural shift to achieve this. This imposed standard on the new service provided clear 
boundaries for systemic shame and pride: saving money for the local authority and 
commissioning services were necessary, with a failure to achieve this constituting shameful 
behaviour. In line with the Council’s identity claim to be an innovative organisation, the Director 
and senior leadership team planned for the whole service to be commissioned out to a third party 
organisation. While such a move would be arguably controversial within the field of social work 
(Butler, 2014), it was not only sanctioned within the field of public administration but was a 
central theme in the dominant discourse for public services of the Government at the time 
(Horton and Gay, 2011; Department for Education, 2014). 
CREATING THE NEW SERVICE 
A significant amount of work was undertaken at an inter- and intra-organisational level to 
construct and promote the new service through consultations, briefings, and communication with 
a wide range of staff and partner organisations. Furthermore, a significant amount of work was 
undertaken at a political level through both defining and promoting the new service to local 
politicians and Government departments presenting an image of an innovative Council with a 
“new way of working” (Council meeting minutes). However, a few months before the start of the 
reorganisation Ofsted undertook an unannounced inspection which, as an acknowledged threat 
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to the Council’s reputation, heightened the sense of shame within the Council. As a team 
manager told me in her interview:   
“…the nightmare here is that you fail Ofsted.  If you were here at the time, you’d think everybody 
was going to have a heart attack…” (interview) 
The Council’s nightmare came true as Ofsted found the Council “to be failing children needing 
help and protection” (Ofsted report). The Council’s services to children and young people were 
graded as performing poorly, the lowest possible rating, not only on the basis of the 
unannounced visit but also as some areas for development had not been adequately addressed 
from earlier inspections. This episodic shaming of the Council by Ofsted led to a failed identity 
claim which was described as a “shock” by the Director (Director’s report). In attempts to provide 
a positive organisational image and mitigate any reputational damage, the positive comments 
within the Ofsted report were highlighted and used for internal communication and press 
releases. The message was that many of the services for children and young people were in fact 
good; the problem was the child protection service, a message which was received by all those 
working in that service, as the team manager goes on to say:  
“…the pressure, and it’s because of the safeguarding.  I get that.  We’re the problem but we’re the 
bit that keeps the children safe…” (interview) 
What started as episodic shaming by Ofsted led to episodic shaming by those within the Council 
of the child protection service. The fact that the team manager now perceived herself, and all 
those she worked with, to be the problem presented her with a threat to her identity as doing a 
really important job of protecting children. While the Council had identified the social workers as 
“at risk” and had sought to design a system to reaffirm their professional status, this action of 
organisational self-protection had the effect of spoiling the child protection identity within the 
Council (Goffman, 1963). Coupled with the possibility of being outsourced, the team manager felt 
her role was unvalued and unwanted, as she explained:  
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“I don’t think this Council here particularly want social workers and the risks that come with 
safeguarding and Children’s Services is like a weight round their neck, isn’t it?  It’s easy to build 
houses and roads and schools than have Child Protection in your building, isn’t it?” (interview) 
While systemic shame already operated within the child protection service, the nightmare 
scenario of failing an inspection served to further define and strengthen it within the Council. The 
new service was always intended to verify the Council’s identities and for these identities to be 
legitimised by the inspectorate. The only way to achieve verification and legitimisation would be 
to ensure that the Council could present a positive image of the new service to Ofsted, which 
included having addressed the issues they had highlighted together with providing them with the 
information they required for a positive evaluation. The Council’s political leadership and senior 
management team therefore decided to provide time and resource “specifically committed to 
address the issues identified by the inspection” (Director’s report to local councillors). The effect 
of this was for the public administration identity to become more important within the new 
service (McCall and Simmons, 1978; Stryker, 1980). In the hierarchy of identities within the 
Council, the public administration identity was now set as higher than the social work identity, as 
a team manager, reflecting on the new service, told me: 
“I think the loopholes have perhaps been tightened but in terms of children, I think I would say 
we’re probably less about children and more about performance and bureaucracy than we’ve ever 
been, although that’s probably not the general tone being expressed” (interview) 
CREATING THE NEW SAFEGUARDING SERVICE 
While there was a significant amount of practical and physical reorganisation to create the new 
service, it was constrained by the legal, social, and cultural forces already in place. Indeed, 
everyone in the new service was very conscious of their social and legal position in the wider 
social structure, as a team manager explained:  
“the fact is we do work in a hierarchy organisation and we’re part of public services.  And if the 
government says, you know, we want you to do X, Y and Z of assessments then we have to do it, 
we can’t negotiate, we can’t pick and choose” (interview) 
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Given this socio-legal position, the structure of the new service remained largely reflective of the 
historical settlement of the social work profession that had enabled it to gain legitimacy as a 
profession and provide status to its practitioners (Larson, 1979). Therefore, the new structure 
continued to resemble an administrative office with the social work teams working in a Council 
building, with desks, phones, and computers and with the teams working office hours. The social 
workers had frequent issues relating to the administrative structure of the service. There was 
insufficient parking meaning social workers had to park in car parks far from the office making it 
difficult when they had children, bags, or had to drop in for a short while and go out again. Some 
took to parking on the side streets but residents put letters on their cars asking them not to or 
even shouted at them not to park there. The computer system was a constant issue with social 
workers complaining it was difficult to use and often crashed. And despite having to undertake 
computer work requiring concentration, the environment was often noisy making it difficult to 
work in, as particularly demonstrated to me on one day:  
“All the social workers were in the team room and were working on their computers. Some were 
on the phone and some started talking and the volume was quite loud so [Linda] took some tissues 
and pushed them into her ears. She continued to work with large tissues sticking out of her ears” 
(fieldnotes) 
While those involved in the creation of the new safeguarding service were constrained by these 
wider forces they were able to alter some structures, disrupt practices considered inappropriate, 
and create and maintain new practices that would verify the Council’s identities. The first change 
was to define the context for practice (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2009) through reorganising all 
services for children and young people, which came under the responsibility of the Head of the 
new service, into four distinct service areas, each managed by a ”strategic lead”. Building on the 
current arrangements, one of these services was termed a “specialist” safeguarding service, 
which employed social workers to work with the families where there was the highest potential 
of a child being harmed. Subordinate to the strategic lead were area managers who were 
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responsible for the teams in their geographic area. And subordinate to the area managers were 
the safeguarding teams. 
LEADING THE NEW SAFEGUARDING SERVICE 
In Leadership in Administration, Selznick (1957) paints a picture of the leader as a politician, 
having to appeal to different interests, values, and ideals within the organisation as well as having 
to make deals, build coalitions, and take pragmatic action in order to effectively lead the 
organisation. Grounding his analysis in the pragmatism of Dewey and James, Selznick argued that 
the leader comes to identify with the organisation, becoming its steward, concerned with the 
integrity of the organisation’s identity. He considered the leader to be a person who comes to 
define the organisation’s missions and values, create the structures which embody these values, 
and adapt the organisation to changing circumstances. While Selznick’s argument related to the 
leader of a whole organisation, from the team managers’ and social workers’ perspective such 
ideas were applicable to the ‘strategic lead’ of the safeguarding service. Despite being 
subordinate to the Head of the new service, who in turn was subordinate to the Director, who in 
turn was subordinate to the Chief Executive, the leader was considered as the person at the top 
by those in the teams. Such an opinion was reinforced by the belief in the teams that if the 
Council didn’t get a good Ofsted judgement the leader would have to resign; a clear boundary for 
the systemic shame in operation personally for the leader. The leader was therefore perceived 
within the teams to not only be the architect but the guardian of the new arrangements.  
Selznick’s argument was that the leader’s role was to create and maintain the integrity of the 
organisation by satisfying the different constituencies’ needs, knitting together the different 
purposes, and creating a coherent structure. At times this meant creating practices that the social 
workers objected to, as demonstrated in a team meeting: 
“[The team manager] discussed a new ‘business process’ which was that a new referral from the 
[family support team] – known as a ‘step up’ – now had to be completed by the social worker 
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rather than the family support worker. [The team manager] referred to it as a “done deal” even 
though she said people have been “up in arms about it”. [Julie] says “we’re snowed under” and 
referred to the people who have implemented the new policy as “these idiots upstairs” having no 
clue about their work. [The team manager] replies by saying “we have to comply”. [Sally] says 
“everything comes to us” and [Julie] says “we just get dumped on”” (fieldnotes) 
There were also instances, however, where the leader made value commitments to the 
professional constituency, which Kraatz (2009) argues is designed to win over trust and sustain 
cooperation: 
“At the end of the day I go into the team manager’s office to say good bye and we have a 
conversation about how things are. She describes the situation like Sisyphus pushing a boulder up 
the hill only for it to roll back down again and so she has to push it back up again over and over. 
She said she was pleased [the strategic lead] has got some more funding from the Council which 
will pay for a team coordinator which will help her do her work, which she said would be ‘the 
worklist’ and supervision. She said this will give better quality supervision” (fieldnotes) 
Such actions indicate a moral obligation not only to the manager and the team, by easing the 
pressure of the workload, but also to the profession of social work, by improving the quality of 
supervision. The fact that she was seen to have obtained the money for this extra help from ‘the 
Council’ indicates that she was seen to be on ‘their’ side, rather than ‘the Council’s’, championing 
‘their’ interests. Haslam et al. (2011) argue that it is through being seen to be one of ‘us’, and to 
be doing things for ‘us’, that leaders gain influence and power within a social group. Indeed, both 
team managers accepted the legitimacy of the leader which eased the process of 
institutionalisation within the new service. While the leader’s identity was perceived by those 
within the teams to be intertwined with that of the safeguarding service, the team managers 
merely exercised power within the service without being identified with it. They were therefore 
involved in the ongoing institutionalisation process whether they liked it or not (Kraatz, 2009), 
hence the managers reply to the social workers protestations at the new business process above 
that they have to comply. Having faith in the leader provided an element of trust that decisions 
and changes that were being made were, in a wider sense, in the interests of those in the team. 
CONSTRUCTING AND EMBEDDING INTERVENTIONIST PRACTICE AS ETHICAL PRACTICE 
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The death of Peter Connelly was described by a team manager as having an immediate and direct 
impact on frontline practice:  
“you would have to really convince [the assistant director] if you needed a section 20 placement
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and he would really put you through your paces… you’d have to fight for it and people said there 
were occasions when they’d ask for a placement and it was refused, they wouldn’t do it.  When 
baby Peter happened all the senior managers reviewed all the child protection cases in late ’09, 
the difference immediately was certainly very obvious to me.  We’d send off an email think, “well 
yeah we do need a section 20, we might have a bit of a fight on our hands to get it”, placement 
agreement, two line email, placement agreed on every case that I dealt with” (interview) 
Following the death of Peter Connelly, the redefined systemic shame provided the Council with 
the message that their cultural practices associated with providing a child with accommodation 
(Section 20, Children Act 1989) were potentially unsafe. The moral foundations underpinning 
these practices were therefore undermined and a new moral foundation put in place that 
suggested that a safe organisation always provided accommodation to a child where there was 
any doubt about a child’s safety. The tension between this new practice and the values of the 
profession, related to keeping children within their families, was evident in a team manager’s 
comments:  
“…I think we were all of us from the highest levels down saying you want a placement, okay let’s 
do it, let’s protect this child.  Is that a good thing? No it isn’t because we’re not questioning, we’re 
not looking, I mean we’ve got the intensive prevention service that works to keep children out of 
care but I think our thresholds have come down” (interview) 
Despite the tension, the desire to avoid being shamed provided a stronger motivation in decision 
making, meaning the “threshold” for child protection intervention and for a child to come into 
the “looked after” system had been lowered. The leader sought to embed this new practice into 
the new safeguarding service through remaking the moral foundations for these practices, as a 
team manager told to me:   
“…what [the strategic lead] said about the increase of child protection plans surprised me 
somewhat because she said for years and years and years [the Council] were around 400, 420, 430 
                                                          
30
 Section 20 of the Children Act 1989 provides the local authority the power to accommodate a child in 
their area, with the consent of all those who hold parental responsibility  
89 
 
at any one time on CP [child protection] plans. It’s now over 600 so there’s been an increase there 
of 160, 170 something like that and it’s consistently now at that level.  And [the strategic lead]’s 
take on it I believe is we were always too low compared to comparator authorities and what’s 
happened is actually good, it’s positive because this is the number of children you should expect in 
an authority of our size to be on child protection plans.  I’m not sure about that” (interview) 
The old practices were now cast as dangerous arguing that they should have had more children 
subject to child protection plans all along and now they have more children on child protection 
plans the Council can be considered to be doing well. The conflict with the old social worker 
identity-standard left the team manager in some doubt about whether to believe this, although 
the effects were still evident in her team having the highest number of children on child 
protection plans in the Council. Inevitably the result of increasing numbers of children subject to 
child protection plans and a lowering of the threshold for children to be looked after by the 
Council led to increasing numbers of children in care. Having had the old practices associated with 
removing children undermined, the moral and cultural foundations for these practices 
disappeared within the new service, as a team manager stated:  
“…with children in care I can remember for years and years and years being told we’ve got to keep 
the LAC population down that’s why we had family support teams set up in 2004, that’s why we 
had ‘fast’ teams in 2007, “we’ve got to keep the LAC population down”.  They were having kittens 
at headquarters when it went above 600 for the first time and now it’s typically 969, 970, why I 
don’t know, I’m not in a position where I can analyse all the data...  Numbers of proceedings I’m 
not sure, is it a key factor? Maybe, maybe it is, I’m not sure but some of the language that was 
used in years gone by about we must reduce our LAC population, I don’t hear that language very 
much nowadays” (interview)  
CONSTRUCTING AND EMBEDDING ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AS ETHICAL PRACTICE 
Social workers with over ten years of practice made reference to past practices of recording in 
paper files and contrasted this with the current requirement that they record everything on the 
computer system. The Council had to ensure that it was keeping children safe and that it could 
provide evidence of any work with families to Ofsted, who may choose any case to audit within 
the Council. The primary method for evaluating practice by the Council’s management and Ofsted 
was through the recording on the computer system. Up to date and comprehensive recording of 
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all activities was required with failing to do this resulting in criticism and potential discipline. This 
systemic shame was embedded through the phrase “if it’s not written down, it didn’t happen”, 
which served to join the administrative practice of recording with the practice of social work. 
Being a good safeguarding social worker was doing things to keep children safe but if it wasn’t 
recorded then in effect they hadn’t done their job, as explained by Monica in her interview: 
“Monica: …if it’s not written down, it didn’t happen 
Me: what do you think of that statement? 
Monica: it’s true isn’t it? It’s a farce because… all my notes are all on my notepad etc. so I do just 
need to transfer it on to the computer, but… if you were in Court and it wasn’t 
evidenced in a case note then that’s it. When I was at Court for 2 days on that EDS 
[Emergency Duty Service] work, I knew then I’d asked mum about where dad was, I 
knew that I had but I hadn’t documented it and that I didn’t trust myself to say in Court, 
because I was being criticised for not asking where dad was when we were doing the 
PPO [Police Powers of Protection]… so I think that has changed the way that I practise… I 
just make sure that on a case note I put in as much information as possible” (interview) 
The threat of being shamed for not having undertaken the taken-for-granted practice of 
recording brought the phrase “if it’s not written down, it didn’t happen” to life, with Monica 
acting in Court as if she had not done what she believed she had. Further attempts were made by 
the leader to infuse the administrative work that the social workers were required to perform 
with long established and cherished social work practices, as explained by Amy:  
Amy: “when the new Working Together came out, and Single Assessment Framework, and I 
went on training… and [the strategic lead] said, in the training, “If you don’t do your 
paperwork, you don’t have empathy”. What the hell has paperwork got to do with your 
empathy? 
Me: What do you think of that? 
Amy: Well, she followed it by, “You don’t have empathy, so you shouldn’t be here, and leave”. I 
just thought, my initial thought was, “Fuck off”. Because paperwork is important, it’s very 
important, but it doesn’t mean you don’t have empathy, it means you don’t have time. I 
thought it was a disgusting statement, if I’m being quite frank. I thought it was disgusting” 
(interview) 
These attempts to remake the moral foundations for professional practice were resisted by Amy 
who saw these as separate components of the work. Given social work’s history, the moral 
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foundations for empathy were considered a core component of the identity of being a social 
worker. One could consider themselves to be an empathic social worker no matter how much 
work they had. In the old arrangements, the administrative work was not a direct threat to their 
identity as a social worker. While the moral foundations for the paperwork were accepted by 
social workers, it was not directly linked to their social worker identity. Empathy and paperwork 
were therefore not seen as belonging in the same category. By attempting to infuse the two 
together the amount of work a social worker had was now a direct threat to their identity as a 
social worker, as by not being able to do the paperwork they could be perceived as not being 
empathic. Despite Amy’s, and other social workers’, resistance, within these new arrangements, 
administrative practice had been re-set as a moral and cultural foundation for social work 
practice (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). 
CONSTRUCTING AND EMBEDDING ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AS PERFORMANCE 
Those who had been practising for over ten years frequently made comparisons between their 
experiences of practice some years ago and their experiences of practice today, as one team 
manager demonstrated in her interview: 
“I mean I can remember my first team manager, you’d go into his office, there’d be a pile of 
children’s files on the floor and he’d say, it was a common phrase in that office, “this case is on the 
floor”, and it meant it hadn’t been allocated, and he was saying his child protection cases come 
over from the child protection team, “I’m going to allocate it to [name] maybe in two weeks’ 
time”. Whoah hang on, if the child protection comes in here today I’ve got to give it to somebody 
immediately but the timescales don’t allow you to hang around” (interview) 
In the 1980s and 1990s it was not unusual to have unallocated child protection cases (see 
Secretary of State, 1993). This was argued by some to be safer than overloading social workers 
with cases, as they could do their job properly with a manageable caseload, with the unallocated 
cases being monitored by the team manager (e.g. Hearn, 1991). Such practice of having 
unallocated cases, however, has been criticised for leaving children in unsafe situations (Brandon 
et al., 2008)  and the inspectorial regime reports on the number of unallocated cases, which can 
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potentially lead to a negative judgement of the service (Ofsted, 2012). The Council therefore had 
a policy of having no unallocated cases. While the foundation for this policy was argued to me by 
the leader and senior managers to be a moral one, in that this was believed to make children 
safer, it also served to protect the organisation from being shamed by Ofsted. 
The normative association between the administrative practice of having all cases allocated to a 
social worker and the moral foundation that this was necessary to keep children safe was defined 
as “performance” for the team manager. A team manager would not be performing adequately if 
they did not adhere to the policy. Performance was monitored through regular ongoing audits 
with failure to comply with the policy resulting in criticism and potential discipline. This ensured 
that the team managers’ developed an understanding of the conditions for being shamed, 
thereby developing an appropriate sense of shame for the new context. We can consider this 
process one of aligning their sense of shame to the wider systemic shame, which ensured that the 
organisation’s priorities were attended to by ensuring they acted in a manner that avoided being 
shamed. With their sense of shame aligned, the need to allocate all cases immediately seemed 
objectively correct. The old practice of ensuring social workers had a manageable caseload and 
having unallocated cases was now something to be shocked by, while the new practice, which 
turned this on its head, went unquestioned, as shown by a team manager’s comments: 
“It’s a bit of a difficult balancing act because… I will say to people you’ve got too much work on but 
I also have to say “I know you’ve got too much work on and I’m very sorry about this but here’s 
some more” and that’s not nice because if we could organise things, which we can’t, completely 
rationally I’d be saying well you might be on duty but I know you’ve got far too much work on, I’ll 
do that occasionally but in general I can’t because I’ve got to allocate” (interview) 
The practice by the team managers was, therefore, to allocate any case that came into the team 
immediately. Often there was a discussion with the social worker about the case prior to the 
formal allocation through the computer system, but at times the formal allocation was done 
without the knowledge of the social workers, who later found out when they logged onto the 
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computer system. Social workers were provided with timescales to undertake the work allocated 
to them, which was defined as “performance” for the social workers, as Carol stated: 
“Carol:  we've obviously got to perform, haven't we...  You've been here long enough to know 
we've got the duty tracker and there's a requirement from the organisation that they're 
to be doing timely assessments.  It's all right, it's all relevant, it's something I agree, that 
everybody agrees, with 
Me: So when people talk about performance, what does that relate to? 
Carol: Well, I guess the indicators, what they're measuring you by.  It's the percentage of 
assessments that you do on time, how often you see children.  Are you seeing them all 
the time in a timely manner?  Are you giving reports out to parents?  It's all that that's 
being constantly collected and collated” (interview) 
As indicated by Carol, the social workers were keenly aware of the Council’s auditing practices 
and that their “performance” was being monitored. They were also aware that they would be 
criticised and potentially disciplined for not “performing” providing a boundary for the systemic 
shame in place for them. Nationally the timescales for undertaking a social work assessment have 
been changing from seven working days prior to 2010 (HM Government, 2006), to ten working 
days from 2010 to 2013 (Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2010), to forty five days 
from 2013 to today (HM Government, 2013). The Council had implemented a two tiered system 
of assessments depending on the complexity of the situation, with less complex situations being 
given twenty days and more complex situations being given forty days. With a boundary for the 
systemic shame in operation within the Council relating to meeting these timescales, being aware 
of these boundaries, together with a desire not to be shamed, the social workers aligned their 
sense of shame to them. The cultural practice of adhering to these timescales within the teams 
was, therefore, rarely questioned. What was questioned was the amount of work they had to do.  
DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES FOR MEMBERSHIP  
In what can be considered a parallel process (Searles, 1955), i.e. a reflection of the emotional 
experience of the leader onto the social workers, the pressure on the leader to gain a positive 
Ofsted judgement was placed onto the social workers. This was initially achieved by setting the 
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boundaries for membership to this new service (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). The leader did not 
want just anyone in the safeguarding service, she wanted people who could do what she 
considered to be the “basic requirements”, as a team manager explains: 
“I’ve found that if you do the basic requirements, as [the strategic lead] calls them, and ‘if you 
can’t do them please give in your P45’ … they tend to leave me alone more” (interview) 
The term “basic” serves to make these expectations seem reasonable and achievable. Indeed, any 
person unable to meet them could be cast as not being competent and therefore not belonging 
to the new service. Such actions are defined by Crowley (1999) as the politics of belonging, a form 
of “boundary maintenance” that is concerned with the boundaries that separate ‘us’ from ‘them’. 
Yuval-Davis (2006) argues that the central question in the politics of belonging is “what is 
required from a specific person for him/her to be entitled to belong, to be considered as 
belonging, to the collectivity” (p.209). In this case, it is being able to provide the organisation with 
evidence that it is meeting the standards they are measured against, as Christine tells me:  
“I’m doing a good job for the department if I’m ticking all the boxes. I’m doing a good job for [the 
team manager] if I’m keeping in all the timescales and that she can go through supervision and I’ve 
done everything she’s asked of me” (interview) 
Evidencing meeting these standards was most often an administrative exercise meaning a 
boundary for membership of the new service was having good administrative skills. The new 
service required this of every social worker to ensure that the new professional organisational 
identity would be verified and legitimised by Ofsted; an expectation explained by a team 
manager:  
“Team Manager:  I don’t think everybody should be exactly the same because we’re individual 
people and this dream that we’re going have 18 safeguarding units that perform 
exactly the same, the social workers are all exactly the same – it’s ridiculous.  
We’re all people and you bring yourself with you to work, don’t you? 
Me:  Is that the dream? 
Team Manager:  Consistent service – everything’s exactly the same standard by every single 
person.  That’s what they want” (interview) 
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Providing firm boundaries for membership based on what was argued to be reasonable and 
achievable standards provided all those involved in creating and maintaining the new service with 
a vocabulary of motives (Mills, 1940), which discounted the protestations of the social workers, 
as Faye told me:  
“all they’re concerned about is the statistics really, I think, and they just think that everything 
should be done on every case and then that’s not always realistic due to the workloads that we 
have and I don’t know to what extend that is taken into consideration? So I think they’re very 
black and white about it” (interview) 
The institutional work of defining the boundaries for membership provided a clear message to 
the social workers that a failure to meet the basic requirements would be grounds for criticism, 
discipline, and potential dismissal. This ensured that the social workers aligned their sense of 
shame to these new boundaries for the systemic shame within the Council.  
RECONSTRUCTING THE RULE SYSTEMS THAT PROVIDE STATUS  
The systemic pressures were felt by the social workers as coming from those with more status 
and power, as explained to me by a team manager as I sat in her office when she said, “they 
[social workers] are under a hierarchy and that they feel it from above”. Certainly the social 
workers were consciously aware of the power and status hierarchy that operated within the 
Council, as Linda stated:  
“there is a hierarchy in the local authority, the higher up you get, the more power you carry, the 
more important you are” (interview) 
However, the social workers were also aware of the informal status hierarchy that operated 
within the new service and the social workers learnt that the value system in which they were 
situated was based more on the administration of social work. The cultural practices within the 
teams were such that there was significant oversight of the administration of social work and very 
little oversight of the direct work with service users. Team managers not only had to read the 
paperwork the social workers produced but had to sign it off confirming it was of an acceptable 
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standard. Team managers observed very little direct contact between social workers and children 
and families and what contact they did observe was usually a situation in which they had a formal 
role, such as chairing a meeting. The result was that social workers did not think that their team 
manager knew about their direct practice, as Lucy explained:  
“she [team manager] doesn't get to see the day-to-day practice and the engagement with children 
or anything like that.  But what she does get to see is the written side of things” (interview) 
This was even more the case for more senior managers, as Amy told me:  
“I don’t think she [area manager] knows my practice, if I’m being completely honest… I think she 
knows about my paperwork practice, with regards to timescales. So I don’t think she knows the 
quality of my assessments, but she knows whether I get them in there on time… I think quality 
comes second and time comes first, and that shouldn’t be that way” (interview) 
Earning status within the teams and the possibility of promotion, a stated aim of many of the 
social workers, was therefore directly associated to the production of timely outputs to satisfy 
the administrative constituency of the organisation. These boundaries for action were then 
embedded within a system of monitoring the “performance” of each team through administrative 
devices known as the “duty tracker” and the “report card”. The “duty tracker” was a spreadsheet 
of all the cases in the team linked to the allocated social worker with information on whether 
they were within timescales or overdue. This information then went together with a range of 
other information from the computer system to make up the “report card”, as a team manager 
explained:  
“She said there is a team ‘report card’ which details all the information about the team. This is 
circulated to all team managers in [the Council] so everyone can see everyone else’s. The teams 
are ranked according to the data. It is colour coded, with things highlighted in red meaning it was 
considered bad, and has a commentary from the area manager on the team performance” 
(fieldnotes) 
The effect of the duty tracker and the report card was to provide a public league table which 
embedded the systemic shame and pride in each team. The social workers and team managers 
did not want to be at the bottom of the table, nor did they want a negative judgement from the 
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senior managers, and nor did they want to present a negative image of their team to the other 
teams. Equally, while not seen to be as important, the social workers and team managers could 
take some pride in being high in the table. The social workers and team managers’ sense of 
shame and pride was therefore heightened within this context making the timescales and 
paperwork a significant feature of the work, if not one of the most important aspects of the work, 
as demonstrated by Linda’s experience: 
“She said that she had had an email from [the team manager] which had told her to do less visits 
to families and do more paperwork. She said she was upset getting it. I asked her what the upset 
was about. She said “I work really hard at home to get my paperwork done” … She then shows me 
the ‘duty tracker’, a print out of all the cases in the team which has the statistics of how in date or 
out of date assessments are in relation to the timescale. Her name was against 2 children’s names 
which said ‘overdue’” (fieldnotes) 
In this case, the duty tracker was used as a surveillance device for the team manager so that 
Linda’s behaviour could be regulated to remain within the acceptable limits. Deciding to spend 
her time with the families at the expense of her paperwork received a message of disapproval 
from the team manager reducing her perceived status which could only be gained by refocusing 
her efforts on the paperwork. Such surveillance devices not only enabled effective policing of the 
boundaries of systemic shame and pride in the teams but also ensured that the social workers’ 
sense of shame and pride was aligned to these boundaries. The social workers now knew the 
consequences for transgressing these boundaries so could regulate their own behaviour, as 
demonstrated by Amy when she described how it felt to be close to having something out of 
timescale:  
“Amy: For me, I can go, “Yeah, I’ve got five assessments to do. Phew, I’ve got two days. It’s not 
gonna happen.” Done. And whilst making that decision, I’m like, “Fuck it. I don’t care,” 
and then after I’m thinking, “Shit, shit, shit, they’re seeing that, shit. Right, [Amy]’s name’s 
coming up”. Do you see what I mean? 
Me: Who’s they? 
Amy: [the strategic lead], [area manager], other teams, because of the bloody report card you 
get, which I think are absolutely ridiculous, that every other team manager sees. And, 
actually, that makes it dangerous, because teams become competitive with one another, 
as opposed to supporting one another. So when you go on training, “Oh, you’re from 
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[team manager]’s team. Oh, you’ve got such and such percent.” It makes people - because 
we are a well-performing team - it makes people, because of the duty tracker and the 
impact it has… So it brings, like, a professional jealousy to it, and it stops teams from 
helping one another” (interview) 
While Amy may feel a sense of shame when close to the boundary and so acts to avoid being 
shamed, she also feels a sense of pride for being in a well-performing team, something that is 
acknowledged by others in the Council. However, the rule systems that provide or remove status 
and the devices to support these rule systems were described by Linda as “managerial” and by 
Amy as “business-like”, indicating such practices were considered to originate from someone 
other than ‘us’. Together with the other changes of providing clear boundaries for membership 
and reconfiguring the status hierarchies within the new service, the boundaries for organisational 
action were firmly embedded into the new system. These changes were felt by the social workers 
as an anxiety that one could be shamed for not meeting this standard, as Carol suggests:  
“I do think they don't care.  You've got to do it. That's it.  You know the practice, you know the 
policy, you've got to do it.  But what do they care about why you can't do it?  I don't know.  And 
that's not a helpful feeling, really, because that doesn't do anything to reduce your anxiety” 
(interview) 
THE NEW SERVICE: AN OVERVIEW 
It was envisaged that the practices of the social workers within the new service, and the moral 
and cultural foundations for those practices, would be founded within traditional social work 
values and ideals. Indeed, these were argued to be vital to improving the services to children and 
young people. The national and local social, political, and functional pressures in place at the 
time, however, created a systemic force that posed an ever-present threat to the Council’s 
identity on the one hand and an ever-present possibility of attaining status, recognition, and 
reward if it performed to a particular standard on the other. Consequently, in order to avoid 
organisational shaming and attract praise, the logic of public administration dominated the 
definition of membership, the construction of the new rules systems that conferred status, and 
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the creation of status hierarchies, which had the practical effect of integrating the identities of 
social work and public administration (Pratt and Foreman, 2000). Consequently, not only was 
administrative practice perceived to be social work practice but it was ascribed a higher value. 
The result was that the new service was able to verify the Council’s identities, being graded as 
‘good’ in their next Ofsted inspection. The Director could now claim to the local councillors that: 
“The Local Authority has developed effective services to investigate and manage both referrals 
and established concerns about harm to individual children and young people” (Council meeting 
minutes) 
The senior managers and team managers praised their staff for achieving this result, as I observed 
in a team meeting:  
“The team manager then asks for a review of the year and opens this by praising everyone for 
their hard work over this period and stated that Ofsted had been in and they got a Good rating 
which was one of the best Ofsted have given all year” (fieldnotes) 
And the social workers could feel proud of the result as a consequence:  
“Me: How did it make you feel that [the Council] got good in the Ofsted inspection? 
Lucy: Proud.  I did feel proud” (interview) 
Yet despite this, the newly constructed service did not satisfy those within the teams. The new 
structures and practices undermined a commitment to the professional constituency to reduce 
social workers’ workload. The actual result was a significant increase in the workload, both 
through an increased number of children they were responsible for and the amount of 
administrative tasks that needed to be undertaken. Furthermore, those within the teams felt that 
they were set up to fail, as demonstrated to me in a discussion I was having with two team 
managers in one of their offices:  
“[A team manager] said the system is set up to try and avoid another Baby P but said that “we’re 
not here to prevent deaths”. [The other team manager] chipped in and said it is the same as 
blaming the police for the fact that there is crime… [the first team manager] stated that the 
stipulation in [the Council] is to visit a child subject to a child protection plan every 15 days which 
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is .01% of the time and so they don’t know what is going on 99.9% of the time so how are they 
supposed to prevent deaths” (fieldnotes) 
From the team manager’s perspective the role they were expected to perform was not only an 
impossible task but also contrary to their understanding of the role of a social worker as they 
understood it. Social work was considered to be about helping and supporting people while they 
were being asked to prevent deaths. From the team manager’s point of view the new system did 
not offer protection to the identified “at risk” staff group as they were being judged on grounds 
outside of their ability to control. Social workers’ therefore continued to feel at risk of being 
disciplined and potentially losing their career, as Jane, providing a typical sentiment, explained:  
“the child gets hurt or whatever it’s gonna be on my back… a child’s been hurt so it’s me, it’ll all 
come back on me… it would be a serious case review won’t it, it’d go straight to the very top, and 
nobody protects, nobody protects us… I could end up getting disciplined or, you know, sacked and 
that, that then would be the end of me career. Nobody cares, that’s it, you’re gone … I have to 
make doubly, triply sure that that child is adequately safe, more than adequately safeguarded, and 
to make sure that everybody’s, every things in place, everything, apart from sitting outside the 
house 24/7, which I can’t do” (interview) 
As Whetten and Mackey (2002) argue, as organisations grow and mature, “they become 
institutions in their own right” (p.398) and the newly constructed service could claim to be the 
right kind of institution, similar to Rorty’s notion (1989) of the right kind of human being. It was 
doing the right kind of things, in the right kind of ways, in the eyes of those with the power of 
definition. To achieve this, however, the right kind of organisation needed the right kind of 
professionals.  
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CHAPTER 5: CREATING THE RIGHT PROFESSIONALS 
While we all have a part of us that defines us as different from others, what is termed a ‘person 
identity’ in identity theory (Burke and Stets, 2009), we also have parts of us which define us as 
similar to others. Indeed, as the self is reflexive, in that it can take itself as an object (Mead, 
1934), one can categorise the self in relation to already established social categories, such as that 
of a social worker. People do not form their thoughts on what a social worker is and does in 
isolation, however, but are influenced by the beliefs, ideas, attitudes, and opinions of others. The 
idea of a ‘social worker’ can, therefore, be considered to be a collectively shared reification, i.e. a 
social representation (Moscovici, 1961, 1981, 2001). Categorising the self with such social 
representations (Breakwell, 2001; Duveen, 2001), i.e. identification, creates our identities 
(Stryker, 1980). Given the complex nature of social life, we may develop identities that define us 
as occupants of particular roles (role identities), or as members of particular groups (social 
identities) (Burke and Stets, 2009). Once formed, an identity can be understood as the set of 
meanings that one holds for each of these “internal positional designation[s]” (Stryker, 1980, 
p.60). As indicated in chapter one, these meanings and expectations associated to a particular 
identity are an important component of self-conscious emotions.  
While all those within the teams categorised themselves as social workers, the reorganisation of 
the service had re-categorised all those working in the new service as ‘safeguarding social 
workers’. Given the systemic shame and pride in operation within the Council as discussed in the 
previous chapter, a particular set of meanings and expectations, both explicit and implicit, had 
been constructed and associated to this new social category, creating an ‘institutional 
representation’ of a safeguarding social worker. This institutional representation can be 
considered both a role identity, in that it provided a set of meanings to guide how to carry out the 
task of doing safeguarding work (McCall and Simmons, 1978), and a social identity, in that it 
provided a set of characteristics that were considered necessary to undertake safeguarding work 
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(Hogg and Abrams, 1988). While Thoits and Virshup (1997) argue that the boundary between the 
two is a fuzzy one, as in real-world situations we are usually in a role and a social group at the 
same time, an analytic distinction could be made between the two depending upon the context 
and the primary focus of the social worker in that context. For example, the expectation for what 
a social worker should do (role identity) could often be distinguished from what characteristics 
the social workers were expected to possess (social identity). The effect of these institutionally 
constructed meanings and expectations was to provide institutional guardians with a standard to 
evaluate the social workers’ practice and regulate the social workers’ identities (Alvesson and 
Willmott, 2002). These processes not only ensured that the social workers learnt these meanings 
and expectations (Burke, 1980) but also, crucially for the institution, that they complied with 
them.  
This chapter provides an analysis of the role of self-conscious emotions in the process of creating 
and embedding the institutional representation into the identities of the social workers through 
regulating and policing their actions. Consequently, the service was able to ensure that the social 
workers practised in institutionally ‘appropriate’ ways within and across different situations. 
Firstly, this chapter considers how the aims and expectations of the institutional role-identity 
were created and used to regulate the identities of the social workers through inducing self-
conscious emotions; secondly, a similar analysis for the characteristics of the institutional social-
identity is provided; and finally, how self-conscious emotions were used to police and deter 
deviation from the institutional representation is outlined, which together, sought to create the 
‘right’ kind of practitioner. 
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CREATING AND REGULATING THE SAFEGUARDING SOCIAL WORK ROLE  
SETTING PROTECTING CHILDREN AS THE PRIMARY AIM 
Despite the wider meaning of the term ‘safeguarding’ (HM Government, 201331) the dominant 
discourse used for identity regulation was of the narrower concept of protecting children. The 
expectation within the Council was, therefore, that the safeguarding social workers protected 
children from maltreatment. This meant investigating any allegations and assessing the level of 
risk to a child’s safety. If there was no risk the case would be moved to the family support team. If 
a child was removed as a consequence of a Court Order then the case would be moved to the 
Court and Care Planning team. The effect was to refashion the role that these social workers 
performed, making a distinction between what they did and what other social workers did. They 
were the only ones to work with the families where there were risks to children while they 
remained at home. The social workers were, therefore, provided with the message that the focus 
of their work was on the more complex situations, identified in law as a child “suffering, or likely 
to suffer, significant harm” (Section 47(1b), Children Act 1989), as Donna explained: 
“We're not supposed to go in and just talk about the one issue that comes in on the referral.  
We're supposed to look at the whole situation.  And sometimes there is only one issue but more 
often than not with very complex families we're safeguarding at a significant harm level.  We're 
not local support team” (interview) 
The effect of this reclassification for those in the teams was that protecting children became the 
primary aim of their work, as demonstrated in the team room as the team manager was talking to 
a group of social workers:  
“[The team manager] refers to a couple of cases recently where they have wanted to remove the 
children but they haven’t been able to when it got into Court and she says “we might as well all 
give up” and quit their jobs and [Carla] says, “we’re not protecting children”, in an exasperated 
tone” (fieldnotes) 
                                                          
31
 This has since been updated but the 2013 version was the guidance in place at the time 
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The message from the team manager was clear: they were defined individually and collectively on 
their ability to protect children. To not do so, or to be prevented from doing so, equated to not 
doing, or being, a safeguarding social worker. The expectation that the role was to protect 
children was further supported through the making of specific stories of child deaths, mainly 
Peter Connelly, and generalised stories of harm to children, mainly through reference to SCRs, 
readily available, providing a reminder to the social workers of the link between the boundaries 
for shame and protecting children from being harmed. The safeguarding role, however, needs to 
be considered in relation to a web of counter-roles, both internally and externally to the Council. 
With the primary aim of their work being defined as protecting children, the senior management, 
as the primary internal counter-role to those in the teams, could define the meaning of keeping 
children safe, as demonstrated by one team manager’s experience: 
“I’d been to the adoption panel on a particular case and the lay member of the adoption panel had 
said, “why didn’t you remove these children earlier?”… That comment then made all its way to 
[the strategic lead] and she then told the [area] manager who said to me, “why aren’t you 
removing more children? I’m hearing that you’re not removing enough”, and I said, I was 
absolutely stunned by this and I said, “we remove more than any other team”… I made a very 
robust defence of this and I put together an email and said, these are the children we’ve removed 
in the last 12 months, loads of them, there’s no other team in the [West] of the County that’s 
removed anything like that number of children, you ought to know this stuff so please take 
account of this and don’t ask, I don’t think I said don’t ask me silly questions but I defended myself 
very strongly” (interview) 
The accusation that the team manager was not removing enough children can be considered to 
be an act of episodic shaming, as it was an accusation that she was not performing her role 
appropriately. Despite the team manager attempting to protect herself from the feeling that she 
was incompetent by defending her actions, a form of identity work intended to defend her 
identity as a competent manager, the senior managers had successfully promoted a particular 
interpretive framework that embedded the removal of children as a symbol of protecting 
children. Such an interpretive framework stemmed from the construction of interventionist 
practice as ethical practice as discussed in the previous chapter. The practical effect of such an 
interpretive framework, however, was to provide a regulatory function on the social workers’ 
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identities (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002), as all those within the teams learnt that not removing 
children considered to be at risk of harm provided legitimate grounds for being shamed. The 
social workers could be considered, therefore, to align their sense of shame to these boundaries 
and act in accordance with them. Consequently, the team manager’s attempt to prove she was 
competent rested on the argument that she had removed a sufficient number of children rather 
than defend the decision of not having removed others. This interpretive framework, with 
societal and organisational support, legitimated state intervention where there were risks to a 
child’s safety, which became a central feature of a successful role performance within the teams, 
as Jane explained:  
“you’re going into a child protection conference or you’re going into a Court arena, and I know it’s 
heart wrenching, you know, but we have to do these things and at the end of the day if you get 
what you need, you know, you’re doing a good job, like if you put an ICO [Interim Care Order] in 
place or a child on a child protection or a child’s had to be removed and placed in foster care, you 
know at the end of the day the child’s safe and that, that for me, that’s a good job” (interview) 
Setting the primary aim of the safeguarding role as protecting children, and associating this with 
specific procedures, had implications for the relationship between the social worker and the 
primary external counter-role, the parents and carers of the children. A successful role 
performance necessarily involved collecting information from many sources, although this was 
mainly from the parent/carer. This was considered an “assessment” or, where there were 
allegations of abuse, an “investigation”. Good investigation skills were therefore valorised, as 
Donna explained by stating “the reason [the team manager] wanted me as a social worker is 
because I'm so good and so investigative” (interview).  While the social workers all stated that 
they valued and sought to develop positive relationships with the people who used the service, 
given that protecting children was seen to involve difficult conversations, and at times having to 
remove children, developing a positive relationship was not always seen as possible or even 
desirable. Sometimes this was seen as a barrier to the aim of protecting children as it made it 
more difficult to find out certain information necessary to complete their assessments:  
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“[Monica] said also she works for EDS [Emergency Duty Service] and that she finds it easier to ask 
“cheeky” questions on EDS because you know you are not going to see them again. She said it is 
harder when you know the family as it can be more embarrassing asking them difficult questions” 
(fieldnotes) 
A relational distance to the parents and carers ensured that the safeguarding identity remained 
most salient and repressed the activation of other identities, such as a friend identity, that could 
result in feeling embarrassed when asking personal and difficult questions. In situations where 
the relationship between the social worker and family was strained, an interpretative framework 
was provided that normalised the absence of a positive relationship, as demonstrated by the 
following observation in the team room:  
“[Amy] tells [the team manager] she is going to see the mother with the alcohol problem later and 
[the team manager] says “we’re not paid to be liked but we like each other so it’s ok”” (fieldnotes) 
And in situations where there was outright hostility towards social workers from family members, 
the interpretive framework was extended to suggest that this was an expectation for a successful 
role performance, as shown by Donna’s comment that “[the area manager] said I must be a good 
social worker because [the father] wants to change his social worker” (interview). Such discursive 
practices can be considered as intentional action to alter, and ease, the emotional experience of 
the social workers engaged in child protection work. For the uninitiated, however, such messages 
could come as a shock, as demonstrated by Melanie’s experience:  
“I remember being a student and a social worker said to me, “you know, you’re not, you’re not 
doing your job until you get a complaint”. They actually said “you’re not doing your job properly 
until you get a complaint”!” (fieldnotes) 
The message the social workers received was that a successful identity performance of the 
safeguarding role required a neutral or negative relationship with a parent or carer. Developing a 
positive relationship was therefore grounds to question one’s competence, as Mandy explained:  
“I suppose I always worry when [parents] do like me because I’m not really meant to be liked and 
then I start thinking “am I doing this right?”” (interview) 
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It could be argued that such institutional messages had changed what was considered a relational 
profession, interested in building relationships in order to provide support and challenge to effect 
change, into a transactional profession, more interested in discrete transactions for the purposes 
of collecting information or ensuring agreed obligations had been met as laid out in some 
procedure or plan.  
SETTING RESPONSIBILITY AS A PRIMARY EXPECTATION 
Professional responsibility is, perhaps, a cornerstone of the modern professions with the 
meanings of professional responsibility in social work being provided by the regulator (Health and 
Care Professions Council, 2012) and the professional association (British Association of Social 
Workers, 2012). The social workers and team managers identified with being ethical and having a 
responsibility to the profession and those that used the service. Responsibility as a role 
expectation within the Council, however, can be considered to be distinct from these notions of 
professional responsibility. Being responsible in this context meant accepting responsibility for 
the work that was given to them. Despite the Council being held responsible as a collective by 
Ofsted for the work of individuals, the Council held individuals responsible for the work of the 
collective. Work was divided and allocated to specific individuals who could be held to account if 
the work was not completed. This expectation was embedded into the role at the birth of the 
new service, with a team manager explaining the effect of the reorganisation:   
“…within a week of the new system we were being flooded, we were getting 100 referrals a 
month… it was absolutely terrible you know people had caseloads of, [Donna] was on 88, 89, 
[Christine] was on 80, it was a nightmare, it was an absolute nightmare” (interview) 
While the team manager perceived this situation to be a result of the new system, and 
consequently felt no responsibility for the dire situation in which she found herself and her team 
in. The senior management, through an expectation for responsibility, considered it a failure by 
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the team manager and the social workers to perform their roles appropriately, as the team 
manager described: 
“I just thought “whoah” there’s a different perception here, I’m saying we’re struggling because 
our new system isn’t working, you’re saying we’re struggling because we’re struggling and the 
inclination is that maybe this team manager isn’t on top of it, isn’t equal to the task.  And it was 
never said explicitly but you can read between the lines, you’ve got to be very sensitive in this 
job… and when [the strategic lead] said once, “I lose sleep over the [West] team”, I thought I need 
to watch my step” (interview)  
From the team manager’s perspective, the message was that the responsibility for the work 
rested with the individuals and not the organisation, providing firm boundaries for the systemic 
shame within the teams. A failure to manage ‘their’ work was grounds for legitimate episodic 
shaming. By ensuring that this was known, the team managers realigned their sense of shame to 
these boundaries embedding the responsibility for cases into their role-identity. With a 
reputation for shaming social workers, the leader could then be used symbolically to further 
embed the expectation for responsibility into this identity, as demonstrated by Donna’s 
conversation with her team manager about outstanding work: 
“[Donna] said she has so many cases she can’t possibly get everything done and so it is the 
“organisation’s fault not mine”. She said she felt “panic” because “what about all the other things 
I’ve not done” and so she felt on her own. [The team manager] said that if [the strategic lead] 
were here she would ask very direct questions about what has been done and she would “erupt 
like a volcano” if things weren’t done” (fieldnotes) 
In a parallel process to the team manager’s experience, Donna defended herself against the 
accusation of incompetence by placing the responsibility for not having done her work onto the 
organisation, a form of identity work to defend her identity as a responsible and capable worker. 
Donna felt humiliated, however, by the team manager’s response, with Donna recording this 
experience as rejection, humiliation, embarrassment, and anger in her diary entry. Despite such 
feelings, however, such action served to embed the expectation that social workers ‘take’ 
responsibility for ‘their’ work into the safeguarding role-identity. A ‘good’ social worker accepts 
responsibility for the work given to them, as Julie’s experience demonstrated:  
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“the clerk asked her if she had written the report for the LAC [Looked After Child] review next 
Tuesday. She said she hadn’t and she was going in 5 minutes and so she will have to do it next 
Monday. I asked if this bothered her and she said “come Sunday I’ll be panicking”… I asked “what 
would happen if you didn’t get the reports done?” [Julie] said “you have to get it done” and then 
“you’ll be hauled over the coals”” (fieldnotes) 
Having firmly embedded the expectation into the safeguarding role, all those in the teams 
accepted the responsibility as their own. The social workers, therefore, routinely worked more 
than their contracted hours, often finishing late and still taking work home, with Linda one 
Saturday morning sending emails at 4.30am, Christine undertaking visits to families at 7am, and 
Donna summing the situation up as:  
“The expectation is that you work your arse off into the ground and you do it until your work's up 
to date.  And if your work isn't up to date, then sod you.  But nine to five it's not possible, or eight 
thirty to five, it isn't physically possible to do what's asked of us” (interview) 
SETTING COMPLIANCE AS A PRIMARY EXPECTATION 
Having embedded responsibility as a primary expectation, those performing the safeguarding role 
now needed to do their work in an ‘appropriate’ fashion. Scott (2014) argues that institutions are 
constituted through regulative and constitutive rules that provide a ‘right’ way of doing things. 
Those within the teams therefore had to ensure that they did things in the right way, as explained 
to me by a team manager:  
“I feel it strongly there’s a big change and it’s, and I say ‘accountability’ because that’s how I feel, 
you know, if I do something wrong, they’d sack me. I don’t feel secure in this job anymore… I don’t 
know if it’s come from the government or what but this pressure that you’re always being looked 
at to be sure you’re doing it good enough, you know” (interview) 
The boundaries for the systemic shame within the safeguarding service can therefore also be 
considered to relate to compliance to these rules, with failure to comply being legitimate grounds 
for episodic shaming. With knowledge of these boundaries, those within the teams sought to 
comply to avoid being shamed and to seek social acceptance, as a team manager told me:  
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“I certainly thought I’m under the microscope and I need to be seen to be complying with what’s 
going on. So when new ideas come up… I just thought yeah we need to try everything here, you 
want a duty tracker bring it on, let’s have a look at it, I don’t think it was going to make any 
difference really but I wasn’t going to say that. So yeah I looked at new ideas and I welcomed them 
and I think sometimes when you’re seen to do that that pleases people who are making the 
decisions” (interview) 
Having internalised the expectation for compliance the team manager then relays this 
institutional message to the social workers, as demonstrated by one team manager telling Donna 
in supervision, “we have to do what those from on up high tell us” (fieldnotes). Indeed, such 
messages were embedded into the system through the separating of responsibility and authority. 
While the social workers had the responsibility to do the work they were given, they were not 
always provided with the power to be able to make the decisions to fulfil this responsibility. The 
authority to do this was often vested in the team manager, for example, to provide money to a 
family, or whether to request a child protection conference, and sometimes in more senior 
managers, for example, in whether to initiate Court Proceedings. The social workers, therefore, 
had to routinely seek the authority from a superior, embedding compliance into the system, as 
Melanie, explained:  
“…it’s coming from the top down, you know, what’s expected, what isn’t expected, what’s 
acceptable and what isn’t. It’s process driven, isn’t it? You know, you have supervision, you talk it 
through “ok what’s next? Right we’ve got to do this”” (interview) 
This expectation for compliance was then further embedded into the safeguarding role through 
an annual review of “performance”, whereby the social workers were judged on how well they 
had been perceived to have performed this role, as demonstrated to me in Lucy’s annual review 
by her team manager:  
“[The team manager] explains the point of the review to [Lucy] and says that one part is how 
workers fit with what the local authority want to do and that all workers are signed up to the local 
authority’s values and vision. [Lucy], looking at the paperwork, comments that the grading system, 
by which she is evaluated, looks just like the Ofsted grades” (fieldnotes) 
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The annual performance review further reinforced the boundaries for the systemic shame making 
them explicit to the social workers enabling them to align their sense of shame accordingly. 
Therefore, and consistent with Menzies’ (1960) analysis of anxiety in hospital settings, the social 
workers felt anxious about not getting it ‘right’ and being shamed, creating what Menzies 
described as “upward delegation”. It was routine behaviour for the social workers to ask their 
team manager what to do and how to do it and I spent a lot of time following social workers 
around buildings looking for their manager, sometimes peering into key holes to see if they could 
see them, before undertaking a particular task. The role expectation for compliance could be 
considered to be symbolically represented by the wearing of an identity tag around their necks, 
which held an identity card detailing their name and role, and a swipe card which gave them 
access to restricted parts of the Council building, as Monica explained to me: 
“I ask [Monica] about her identity tag and she says “you have to wear it” because they are told to. 
When I ask “what happens if you don’t”, she says they “get into trouble if you don’t”. She says she 
sometimes takes if off if she is in the street so other people don’t see it and sometimes she takes it 
off if the parent has a visitor in the house” (fieldnotes) 
While Monica links wearing the tag with the expectation for compliance, she also shows that it is 
also a display of the professional identity by taking it off when she wants to hide that identity. 
Indeed, it was the tag rather than the identity card that could be considered to be a symbolic 
display of identity, as social workers who had lost both their identity and swipe cards continued 
to wear the tag with nothing in the card holder.  
SETTING ADMINISTRATION AS THE PRIMARY TASK  
Despite the efforts of the leader and the managers, as detailed in chapter four, the social workers 
not only made a distinction between professional practice and administration but also considered 
administration to be a hindrance to professional practice, as Carla’s comment demonstrates: 
“I prefer to be out seeing the children and everything, more so than doing the paperwork, I don’t 
mind, I know that, you know, you have to back up your evidence of seeing the children with the 
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paperwork but sometimes I find myself in not giving the families, children and families, the time 
that they require because I’m worried about going back to complete the assessment” (interview) 
While administration may be seen to be an inherent component of institutional and social life, 
Wilson argued back in 1887 that the methods of administration are only a part of society in the 
same way that “machinery is part of the manufactured product” (p.210). We can, therefore, 
separate out the practice of using administrative methods and the practice of a specific 
knowledge base, skill set, and value commitments that reflect the historical, cognitive, and 
practical traditions of the profession. Given the changes in the new safeguarding service, as 
outlined in the previous chapter, we can understand the primary task of a safeguarding social 
worker within this new service to be one of administration, as demonstrated by the experience of 
those in the West team: 
“[Jane] tells me that I should have been here last week when they got an email from [the strategic 
lead] she said they were “not happy” and “it went down like a lead balloon”. [Jane] and [Jemma] 
told me that [the strategic lead] had sent an email to all teams in [the area] that their statistics 
were not good and it stated that “this will be addressed”. [Jemma] said that it was not the 
statistics but the tone of the email that upset them. She said [Christine] has been coming in at 
5.30am, [Monica] and [Julie] have been working late, and everyone else has been taking work 
home” (fieldnotes) 
All of the teams in that area of the service had been shamed for their poor “performance”, and in 
efforts to avoid future shaming the social workers sought to improve their statistics, which 
primarily involved administrative methods, such as record on the computer when visits had been 
conducted, write up notes, minutes, or assessments, or close cases, which involved completing 
three forms. There were further opportunities to be shamed for what could be considered to be 
poor administrative practice within formal meetings, such as child protection conferences or 
Looked After Child reviews, which were chaired by Independent Reviewing Officers (IRO). Indeed, 
the IRO as shamer was made explicit by Knowles and Sharpe (2012) who stated that, “the point 
needs to be made clear to all concerned: the IRO is someone who not only carries a big stick but 
also has direct access to those whose sticks are even bigger” (p.1381). Within the Council the IRO 
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service had co-opted Ofsted’s rating system to grade cases, which social workers internalised as 
the IRO grading them personally, as Helen explained: 
“if you get an ‘inadequate’, you feel like you’ve done a crap job then… If it was an ‘inadequate’, 
they always email it to your manager, with you cc’d into it, to say this is why I scored an 
‘inadequate’. But even if you just get, if you put your heart and soul into a report, and you get a 
‘good’, sometimes I just think, “I want an outstanding, because I’ve done everything that you’ve 
asked me to do. What do I need to do?”” (interview) 
Cases could be graded as ‘inadequate’ for such things as one visit being one day out of timescale 
or a report not being provided to the family or the IRO within timescale. To avoid being shamed 
the social workers organised their time to ensure that they did not miss a deadline, embedding 
administration as the primary task of the safeguarding identity, as Lucy explained:  
“I'd like to spend a lot more time actually doing social work rather than typing minutes, typing 
reports, writing case notes, especially the direct work with the children.  I think we all find that the 
hardest to fit in because for everything there's a deadline or you're graded or you're marked on it, 
so we all prioritise trying to meet ‘stat’ [statutory] visit requirements or requirements for your 
conference report to be in on time.  So we all focus on those tasks because we're told that's what 
we need to do.  So sometimes the things that get missed are the real social work bits of working 
with the children in school.  We don't have indicators or targets to do that” (interview) 
The primacy of the administrative role for the social workers was evident in the team rooms 
where the vast majority of the walls were covered by an array of policies and procedures, 
telephone numbers and contact details of services they could refer to or professionals they may 
need to contact, information on timescales, instructions on how to use the computer system, and 
other general administratively important information. In one of the team rooms, this was sharply 
contrasted by the family support team at the other end of the room which had much fewer, but 
more practice relevant, posters on display with the most prominent being in the centre which 
outlined the teams approach to “family intervention”, which said:  
“One worker dedicated to a family  Consider the family as a whole 
Practical, hands on support 
Persistent, assertive and challenging Common purpose and agreed action” 
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While much of these meanings and expectations associated to the institutional representation of 
a safeguarding social worker were created to ensure that the Council performed its statutory 
functions, this was achieved by ensuring that the social workers knew the boundaries for being 
shamed and praised within the institution, providing a concept of an ‘acceptable’ safeguarding 
performance, which can be summarised in Figure 5.1.   
Figure 5.1: Expectations for the safeguarding social work role 
 
 
 
 
 
Counter-role: Team manager/Senior manager 
- An expectation to use statutory procedures to ensure 
children are safe  
Counter-role: Team manager/Senior manager 
- An expectation to be responsible for the work allocated 
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Counter-role: Team manager/Senior manager 
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regulative and constitutive rules 
Counter-role: Team manager/Senior manager 
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CREATING AND REGULATING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A SAFEGUARDING SOCIAL 
WORKER 
CONSTRUCTING A MORAL COMMUNITY  
Dwyer (2010) argues that children should be ascribed the highest moral status in British society 
because they are perceived to be “more innocent, more beautiful, more full of potential, and on 
the whole simply more empathy provoking and awesome than adults” (p.181). A number of 
scholars have highlighted the evolving trend within Western cultures to recognise and seek to 
protect children’s rights, with tragedies relating to children today provoking highly emotional 
responses (Payne, 2005; Ferguson, 2011; Parton, 2014; Warner, 2015). Indeed, Warner (2015) 
argues that “children are the moral referent” (p.7, italics in original) in Western society, providing 
a moral settlement that considers prioritising children’s needs as the ‘right’ thing to do. Certainly, 
in all matters relating to the Children Act 1989, the primary piece of legislation governing the 
work of child protection social workers, the court is compelled to consider the child’s welfare as 
the paramount consideration (section 1(1)). And consistent with these changes, Featherstone et 
al. (2014a) and Parton (2014) argue that the dominant discourses within the field of child 
protection have become child centric. Indeed, the new safeguarding service was constructed 
within this context, with those within the teams considering themselves to belong to a unique 
community of practitioners with a moral foundation, as a team manager explained: 
“we’re here doing good in a moral sense and that pleases me and I’m glad I’m part of it.  Yeah 
definitely I’ve never lost sight of that, I’m not burnt out, I believe in what we do, the way we do it 
can drive you to distraction but I believe in what we’re doing definitely” (interview) 
Larson’s (1979) analysis of the professions argued that professionals receive equivalent social 
status as their ‘clients’. Historically, social workers have been considered to primarily work with 
those experiencing poverty (Woodroofe, 1962) with research suggesting that those experiencing 
poverty feel shamed by wider society (Walker, 2014). In line with Larson’s (1979) argument, given 
the widespread negative attitudes towards those in poverty, some social workers have felt 
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ashamed to tell others that they were social workers (Walker, 2011). By creating a moral 
community based on protecting children from harm, the principal ‘client’ base of the social 
workers was refashioned away from people with low-status towards the high-status of children. 
This was explained to me by a team manager who stated that “social work doesn’t only apply to 
the poor; it’s a misconception” (interview). As Warner (2015) argues, “the face of the child has 
the ultimate power to transcend boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’” (p.7) making the 
safeguarding identity not only a morally important one but also a socially acceptable one. The 
social workers could, therefore, be proud of who they were, as shown by one team manager who 
said “I do actually feel proud to be a social worker” (interview).  
This moral foundation was supported through the interpretive framework (Alvesson and 
Willmott, 2002) for the community that ‘we’, i.e. the safeguarding community, protect children. 
Occasionally, the leader would seek out good examples of work that was child-focused and would 
praise the social worker or very occasionally send it around the service as a good example. This 
provided support for the belief that a safeguarding social worker was there principally for the 
child and not the parents, carers, or wider family. With knowledge that being child-focused 
received praise and acceptance within the group, social workers sought to consciously develop an 
‘acceptable’ attitude, as Jane explained: 
“I try very hard to focus, as is my job, to focus on the children, and not just on what the parents 
are telling us. Because I think there is a danger, that working in child practice, that you can get, 
sort of, veered more towards the parents, than you can sometimes, towards the children. And I 
think I do subconsciously try to make an effort to not let a parent’s views overtake the views of the 
children. And I think I’m quite conscious of that” (interview) 
Given that social work can operate in morally ambiguous situations (McDonald, 2006), where the 
social workers have to navigate complex moral questions about the right course of action, it was 
often that they experienced what Dahlqvist et al. (2009) refer to as a troubled conscience. 
However, consciously invoking the moral supremacy of children constructed of a vocabulary of 
motives (Mills, 1940) based on “the child’s best interests”. This served to resolve such complex 
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moral questions, thereby alleviating their troubled conscience, as demonstrated by Paula’s first 
experience of applying for an Interim Care Order (section 38, Children Act, 1989) with the 
intention of removing the children from their mother: 
“She said the solicitor is moving things too fast and she is not comfortable with it. She began to cry 
and reached for a tissue. She said she is not sure it is the right thing to do. During this conversation 
[Faye] had come in and sat down next to [Paula] and she tried to comfort her by saying that you 
always question if you’re doing the right thing even when you know it is in the best interests of the 
children. [Paula] said “really?” and [Faye] said “you have to keep the best interests of the child at 
the centre”” (fieldnotes) 
Faye was able to alleviate Paula’s anxiety about doing the wrong thing while at the same time 
reinforcing the message that to be one of ‘us’ is to keep the child at the centre. Such consistent 
messages ensured that the social workers knew the conditions to be praised and aligned their 
sense of pride accordingly. For those who had done so successfully, it was both important and 
natural to remain ‘child-focused’. Consequently, pictures children had drawn for them were 
displayed proudly on the walls by their desks, as demonstrated by Jane:  
“she said she “loved” the pictures from the children she works with and tapped a new one that 
was not up last time I was there” (fieldnotes) 
While interactions with children were legitimate grounds for interrupting the team to tell them 
the story, as demonstrated by Amy: 
“[Amy] is sitting at her desk and she interrupts everyone in the room to tell them that she had 
seen a little boy today who had taught her how to say “I am [Amy]” in Indian. She said “I could 
have taken him home”” (fieldnotes) 
For the newer members of the safeguarding team, it took time to align their sense of pride to the 
systemic pride in operation within the service through the conscious application of the 
interpretive framework. This was demonstrated by Paula’s first experience of removing a child 
from their parents: 
“Paula:  I can remember that as we - there was [sic] three social worker cars, and we drove over 
the Bridge, to head towards the address - and I can remember thinking, “child snatcher”. 
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Because we were all in convoy, one car after the other, I really felt like I was living up to 
that image of a child snatcher 
Me: What did it feel like when you thought that you were living up to this idea of being a child 
snatcher? 
Paula: I felt an element of shame and, sort of, “Well, what would my next door neighbours think 
of me, if they knew I was doing this? And my friends, what would they think? you know, 
they’re Mums themselves and what would their perception of me be?” (interview) 
Being a newly qualified social worker, Paula’s sense of shame and pride were not fully aligned to 
the boundaries of the systemic power in operation in the safeguarding service. She therefore felt 
ashamed about living up to the negative image of social workers as child snatchers. While the 
construction and application of the interpretive framework for the purposes of identity regulation 
can be considered to be a form of institutional work, once internalised by the social workers it 
became a form of identity and emotional work as they sought to alter how they felt and who they 
were. Consequently, Paula was able to turn her shame into pride, and verify her new 
safeguarding identity, as she goes on to say: 
“although it wasn’t easy to remove the children, it made me feel quite good, in knowing that now 
these children were going to be in a place of safety” (interview) 
Overall, the safeguarding social work identity was considered within the teams to be a distinct, 
morally superior, social grouping within the Council. Others, therefore, had a moral obligation 
towards them to ensure they were able to carry out the important work of protecting children, as 
Amy demonstrated one morning when she was unable to find a parking space:  
“[Amy] is sitting at her desk talking to a family support worker about the parking this morning. 
[Amy] was recalling what she said to the parking attendant in the morning and she said she had 
said to him, “I didn’t think being a councillor was more important than child protection”, and in 
the end she had got into the car park and had parked blocking 3 Councillors’ cars in” (fieldnotes) 
Hierarchically the Councillors were Amy’s superior within the structure of the organisation. 
Morally, however, Amy considered her role to be of more worth and therefore more worthy of 
the parking space, hence her justification for blocking three Councillors in the car park to enable 
her to fulfil her role. 
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CONSTRUCTING A COMMUNITY IN ADVERSITY 
The inevitable consequence of the reorganisation was that the safeguarding social workers would 
be the ones who had to hear stories, and see the effects, of abuse and neglect, as Carol 
described: 
“neglect, the abuse and listening to the trauma.  And not just listening to the trauma, it's seeing 
the impact of the trauma.  Witnessing it, I guess, about abuse.  Witnessing the effects of abuse on 
a child and listening to adults talk about - it's not just children, is it, but parents can be victims and 
it's listening to their traumatic history as children themselves and what kind of life experiences 
they've had.  And when you listen to that, that's not particularly very pleasant” (interview) 
The leader told me that is takes a particular sort of person to be able to do safeguarding work and 
one area manager told me that she believed the social workers needed “emotional continence” 
to do the work effectively. Indeed, not being affected by difficult emotional situations was 
considered to be a core characteristic of the safeguarding identity and if the social workers were 
unable to display this characteristic then institutional guardians could legitimately attempt to 
regulate the social workers’ emotions and/or identity through episodic shaming. Episodic 
shaming provided a direct threat to the social worker’s identity by presenting the social worker as 
not coping, as demonstrated by Donna’s experience of being accused of not being emotionally 
resilient by her team manager: 
“Ever since this, “it's been noted that you're struggling and you've lost your emotional resilience 
and you're not who you were and you're always down”, and this, that, and the other. And I find it 
quite offensive to be told that you've lost your emotional resilience… I think what was a response 
to feeling really frustrated about a case and not being able to do anything for the kids [which] got 
“[Donna]'s weak and she's emotionally unstable”. I can't stop thinking about that comment and it 
will haunt her [the team manager] forever because it just makes me feel really small and 
depressed” (interview) 
Such experiences not only served to directly regulate Donna’s identity but also to indirectly 
regulate the identity of others in the team who observed or heard about such experiences 
ensuring that those within the teams were aware of the boundaries for being shamed and for 
being accepted as a legitimate member of the group. This embedded the expectation of being 
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unemotional as an appropriate characteristic for the professional identity, as Carla’s experience 
showed:  
“[Carla] turns around on her chair to talk to [Amy] and says she has just been out on a duty case 
and spoken to a teenage girl who told her about the domestic abuse her father gives to her 
mother. She said this is the one child who has really touched her and it makes her feel sad. She 
said “I felt like crying but I had to remain professional”. The girl had disclosed the father strangling 
the mother and hitting her since the girl was 3 years old” (fieldnotes) 
Despite feeling moved by the suffering of another, Carla demonstrates the intentional emotional 
work she undertook in her attempts not to feel upset and, therefore, to remain “professional”. 
However, while she acknowledged that she did actually feel upset, the retelling of the story 
presented a picture of herself as someone who was able to endure emotional hardship and still 
demonstrate the appropriate institutional characteristics of a safeguarding social worker, thereby 
claiming to be one of ‘us’. Indeed, being upset was seen within the teams as a weakness, as 
Monica showed when she told me, “I’m not usually a weak person, please let me just tell you this, 
it is very rare that I get upset” (interview). The institutional message that to be one of ‘us’ one 
must be able to survive adversity constructed the conditions for worthiness, as Paula explains:  
“when you come into this, there you are, you’re a newly qualified social worker, and, okay, you get 
some guidance, but it is very much about learning about yourself as you go along, and that does 
help you to just… help you to feel that you’re better in – not better in your practice – but that 
you’re a worthy individual, of being a social worker, and I imagine that when you get some really 
difficult stuff to cope with, that that’s really essential, that you feel that you’re good enough to be 
there. I would say especially in Child Protection” (interview) 
Having aligned her sense of shame and pride to the institutional boundaries for being shamed 
and praised, Paula only felt an authentic member of the group, a sense of worthiness, or of being 
good enough for the group, if she thought she could face and cope with adversity. Further 
conditions were placed upon the notion of worthiness, however, which provided the message 
that the social workers had to come into work no matter what the situation, as Amy stated, 
“you’re made to feel like an arsehole for not coming in” (fieldnotes), when she couldn’t come in 
due to the snow. Equally, taking time off for illness could be considered an indication of 
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weakness, as explained to me by a team manager, “the message is loud and clear: you can’t take 
time off for illness, well you can, but there are consequences” (fieldnotes). Furthermore, given 
the potential risk for a child death and the negative media attention, a safeguarding social worker 
was expected to be able to live with such personal risks. It was not just surviving adversity, 
however, that was considered an important characteristic of the safeguarding identity but 
thriving in it, as shown in the message provided by a team manager to her team: 
“[The team manager] tells the team that her daughter who is doing a social work degree is going 
on a placement to a fostering team and says “fostering is where you go to retire, it’s not for when 
you are young” and makes a comment about the adrenaline of child protection work. [Linda] 
talking to [the team manager] says she loves “it” in relation to the adrenaline” (fieldnotes) 
By defining safeguarding work as more exciting than other types of social work, the team 
manager defines their work as superior, and one that requires a certain type of person. The social 
workers often had a higher caseload than the Council’s guideline providing them with more work 
than they could undertake in the hours they were paid for, and at times it required them to do 
things which had not been planned, making managing their workload difficult. The dominant 
narrative about the work in the teams was that it was fast paced, high volume, and complex. To 
thrive in such conditions it was believed that the social workers had to have a lot of energy and 
drive, which was represented through youth, as demonstrated by Linda’s experience: 
“Linda: When [the team manager] first took me on, [the area manager] asked her if I’d be able to 
keep up the pace  
Me: Why do you think she said that? 
Linda: cos of my age, yeah, I was mortified, and me and [the team manager] have shown her… 
she made a judgement of me before she’d even known me” (interview) 
By not possessing the characteristic of youth, sufficient grounds were provided to question the 
appropriateness of Linda’s appointment within the safeguarding service. The effect was to shame 
Linda and embed the notion that to be accepted she had to “keep up the pace”. Overall, the 
construction of a community in adversity and the concomitant characteristics that were 
considered necessary to survive and thrive in such conditions served as the standards by which 
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the management sought to regulate the identity of the social workers. Once these had been 
internalised the social workers not only used these as the standards to evaluate themselves, but 
also others within the group, as demonstrated to me at the end of a working day as I overheard a 
conversation between a number of social workers as I walked with them towards the car park: 
“They then start talking about [Faye] and said that she come back from leave on Monday and sat 
at her desk and burst into tears while reading her emails… [Linda] said she has told [Faye] to get 
out of safeguarding and they discussed that she may be better off in fostering and adoption as she 
is good with children” (fieldnotes) 
While Faye was seen to be a social worker (social identity) doing safeguarding work (role 
identity), her claim to be a safeguarding social worker (social identity), to be one of ‘us’, was in 
question as she was not perceived to possess sufficient characteristics to resemble a safeguarding 
social worker. 
CONSTRUCTING A COMMUNITY OF COMPETENCE  
The leader was considered within the teams to be a very competent person, as were the team 
managers, and competence was considered a key characteristic of the safeguarding identity, as 
demonstrated to me by a team manager: 
“there’s no case that comes through here that is even the most complicated, messy, bizarre, 
horrible ones, there’s no case that we can’t deal with, we know what to do, I know what to do, the 
social workers know what to do” (interview) 
Indeed, they considered themselves to be more competent than other workers given the same 
situation, as Jane demonstrated: 
“I get escalated cases from the [the family support team], “we can’t get in, they’ve been verbally 
abusive, I can’t get in, oh, they’re screaming, shouting, and swearing, duh, duh, duh”. I go knock at 
the door, first visit and I’m in the house” (interview) 
Being competent meant being able to work on your own, as Faye stated, “[area managers] sort of 
think you should be able to manage your case load and just get on with it” (interview), while 
Paula commented, “if you took a worker with you to every single appointment, you’d never get 
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anything done” (interview). A competent safeguarding worker was therefore someone who knew 
what to do and how to do it, and usually that they could do this without much support. 
Confidence was a key component of competence for this social group. The system required the 
social workers to be confident about their assessments to ensure the organisation could do what 
was necessary to keep children safe. To be confident about one’s assessment, the social workers 
felt they had to be authoritative, as shown by Paula:  
“I feel that I can ask virtually any question without feeling embarrassed or worried about saying 
something. I can be very direct. I speak as I find, to some degree, obviously, with restrictions, 
because of the profession. But, you know, I can be very open with people. And I can say, “Okay. So 
why are you doing that?” And, “Why are you in a relationship with this person?” you know, sort of, 
sometimes difficult questions that we might, generally, as people, find difficult to ask” (interview) 
Being a ‘safeguarding social worker’ enabled Paula to ask, with pride and confidence, questions 
that wouldn’t be asked, or would be embarrassing to ask, as a ‘person’, i.e. not a safeguarding 
social worker. Such authoritative practice was valorised through those with greater experience 
who provided stories as a reference point for what could be considered important and natural for 
a safeguarding social worker to do, as demonstrated by a team manager’s story to me in front of 
others in the team: 
“[the team manager] tells me she had to lock the building when the mother was here to prevent 
her from running away with her baby. [The team manager] said she took the baby off her there 
and then” (fieldnotes) 
While the display of this authoritative practice was sometimes resisted, not displaying such in-
group characteristics were grounds for personal questioning about whether one measures up 
sufficiently to the in-group, as demonstrated by Monica:   
“I do worry that I’m not authoritative enough, but then the families make the changes that they 
need to so I suppose you don’t have to speak to people like shit in order to get your message 
across” (interview) 
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Another significant aspect of the work of a safeguarding social worker was the need to work with 
other professionals, which brought with it further characteristics associated with being 
competent, as Carol explains:  
“I think some professional networks see you as that lead person and they see that you should be 
that - we are really.  I know we are the lead agency, that's what we are” (interview) 
With the legal and policy framework providing the Council with the main responsibilities within 
the child protection system, the delegation of work to the safeguarding social workers transferred 
the ‘lead agency’ into individual ‘leaders’ of multiagency teams. The social workers had to 
organise and chair the meetings, take the minutes and distribute them, and make the 
recommendations in relation to the child protection issues. Given the need to organise their own 
time and work, with the constant pressure of being allocated new cases and the concomitant 
deadlines, as well as organising other people, organisation was also a key characteristic of 
competence. Furthermore, being a ‘leader’ enabled the social workers to fulfil the Council’s aim 
to become a commissioning authority. The social workers were expected to lead the multiagency 
team, collect information, and have an overview of the situation to be able to refer families to the 
right service, rather than do the work themselves, as Paula explained:  
“a lot of the work that we do is about recognising what services we can put in place for those kids, 
you know, and just, sort of, being able to have that knowledge and information, so we know 
where to resource it from” (interview) 
The construction of a specific community within the Council that had to operate within certain 
conditions provided a set of characteristics that were considered important to do the work 
effectively, defining them as a distinct social group within the Council. Through interaction, the 
social workers learnt the acceptable or praiseworthy characteristics, and conversely the 
unacceptable or shameful characteristics, which provided a clear institutional representation of a 
safeguarding social worker that can be summarised in Figure 5.2.  
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Figure 5.2: Institutionally acceptable characteristics for the safeguarding social worker 
 
POLICING AND DETERRING DEVIATION FROM THE INSTITUTIONAL REPRESENTATION  
The primary mechanism for the institutional reproduction of the safeguarding service was the 
safeguarding identity. The above discussion outlines the general process for identity regulation, 
namely using discursive practices to construct an institutional representation of a safeguarding 
social worker and using episodic shaming and praising to support and embed this into the social 
workers’ identities by making known the conditions for being shamed or praised, which, once 
learnt, aligned one’s sense of shame and pride to these conditions. In attempts to avoid being 
shamed, and seek to be recognised and accepted, the social workers operated within the confines 
of these boundaries, thereby becoming ‘safeguarding social workers’. A useful metaphor for this 
process is that of a road. A road has boundaries that define where a car can legitimately and 
safely drive, the road has rules that define how a car can be legitimately and safely driven on the 
road, and one can be considered to be an excellent or a poor driver. With the social workers 
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learning the conditions for shame and pride they learnt the boundaries of the safeguarding 
identity that defined what and how they could legitimately and safely do, and could be 
considered to be excellent and poor in doing it. However, just as there needs to be processes to 
maintain the rules of the road, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) argue that “relatively few 
institutions have such powerful reproductive mechanisms that no ongoing maintenance is 
necessary” (p.229). Just as driving is policed and drivers deterred from breaking the rules, 
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) go on to argue that policing institutional arrangements and 
deterring institutional change are some of the tactics used by institutional guardians to maintain 
the institution. Given that the primary mechanism for institutional reproduction was the 
safeguarding identity this meant policing the boundaries of this identity and deterring deviation 
from it.  
Policing the safeguarding identity can be marked out as a distinct form of identity regulation on 
the basis of it being a much more humiliating experience, akin to Garfinkel’s (1956) notion of a 
degradation ceremony. While the legitimacy for such institutional use of humiliation was argued 
to be on the grounds of transgressing a role expectation, it crossed the fuzzy boundary between 
the role and social identities to denounce the transgressor as a failure at performing the role and 
of not being one of ‘us’. Donna recalled such an experience in a team meeting, where the health 
and safety officer had attended to talk the team through the Council’s occupational stress risk 
assessment form. While the specifics of Donna’s experience were not typical, the process was:  
“[Donna] explained to the health and safety officer that “I had 88 cases and I worked 9 til midnight 
every day”… She said at that time an email went round with a list of all the social workers names 
on with the number of cases they had… She said her name was on the top of the list highlighted in 
red and that she was told that she had too many cases because of her time management so she 
had to photocopy her diary and account for every minute of her time. She spoke with a slightly 
raised voice and spoke quickly and forcefully. She said “it was the most humiliating experience of 
my professional life” and said “it feels like being punched”. She said she acquired 300 hours toil 
[time off in lieu] during this time and one day when she was not at work “I was called and 
someone told me to cancel my 300 hours toil because how dare I have that amount of toil with 88 
cases”, implying that it was her fault she had too many cases therefore she was not entitled to the 
toil she had accrued. She stopped talking, stared into space, bit her top lip and her eyes welled up. 
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No one asked her about how she was feeling or attempted to comfort her. She said “I was put on 
medication”” (fieldnotes) 
Donna claimed that it was the effects of the reorganisation that threatened her identity as a 
social worker. This, however, was turned on its head by the managers who presented Donna as a 
threat to the identity of the organisation. From their perspective Donna had broken the role 
expectation for responsibility, while at the same time not displaying the necessary safeguarding 
characteristic of competence. Donna’s identity as a responsible and competent social worker was, 
therefore, publically denounced in such a manner, as to be a painful humiliating experience, 
constructing a new spoiled identity (Goffman, 1963) that was not one of ‘us’, as Donna told me in 
her interview: 
“…your name goes round on a blacklist round [the Council] and that's how you're introduced to 
team managers, as the person in [the Council] with the most cases” (interview) 
Donna’s options to validate her professional identity were either to leave and work for an inferior 
local authority, itself an identity threat, or to comply with the expectations and standards within 
the Council in an attempt to earn sufficient social acceptance and status to reclaim her identity. 
The systemic shame within the Council had been asserted and Donna’s sense of shame aligned 
accordingly. Such a process served to defend the institutional representation of a safeguarding 
social worker through deterring anyone from deviating from what was considered ‘professional’, 
as the threat of such an experience was widely felt through the retelling of the story by everyone 
in the team. Within both the teams, such experiences were not uncommon. For example, 
Christine, having been perceived by the area manager to have not followed certain procedures, 
which Christine denied, she was considered to have transgressed the expectation for compliance 
and the characteristic of competence. She stated that she was shouted at by a manager in the 
team room, was stopped from working on EDS for 3 months, which Christine believed was “to 
frighten me”, and was sent to occupational health for a cognitive functioning test. Her claim to be 
a safeguarding social worker was publically denounced by the manager who recast Christine as a 
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dangerous and incompetent worker, i.e. not one of ‘us’. She said this experience had made her 
feel “worthless” and “hurt” and told me she felt “humiliated”. To prove her worth as a 
safeguarding social worker to the senior managers, Christine had to work long hours, which took 
a significant personal toll with her saying she couldn’t eat or sleep and that she dropped a dress 
size in a week. All those in the team were aware of this humiliating experience ensuring everyone 
knew that the boundaries for action would be policed through shame and humiliation, further 
heightening the systemic shame within the Council, ensuring all workers produced work to an 
‘acceptable’ standard, in a ‘professional’ manner. 
THE INSTITUTIONAL REPRESENTATION OF A SAFEGUARDING SOCIAL WORKER: A 
SUMMARY 
Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) argue that identities describe the relationship between the actor 
and the field in which that actor operates. The historical and traditional discourses within the 
profession provided the social workers with a fairly common view of their understanding of their 
relationship to those they worked with and their place in society, as Christine, a social worker 
with over ten years of experience, explained: 
“my ideal social worker is [Alice] on the [other] team. She is a social worker’s social worker. She’s 
somebody who would put aside paperwork and spend time, at her own detriment, really… she’s 
old-style social work, where she’ll go in and she’ll spend the time, and she’ll have a phone, and 
she’s on-call to the family, if needed, you know, 24/7. And, you know, we’ve moved away from 
that. We can’t be like that anymore. But, if I wanted a social worker, it’d be [Alice], and most 
people I know would say that” (interview) 
As Christine highlights, however, the new arrangements not only prevented the social workers 
from practising in a manner consistent with their idea of traditional forms of social work but also 
that they were no longer able to be the type of social worker that would practice that type of 
social work.  Indeed, all those who had over ten years of experience commented on the change in 
what they had to do and how they now had to be. In other words, they believed there had been a 
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change in the relationship between the actor and the field, i.e. the identity, as Linda made clear 
to me in the team room:  
“She said that “the worm has turned” in practice and that while Munro said they should bring the 
old social workers back to practise there would be no point because they don’t fit in with the new 
way of working. She said they would be like a fish out of water” (fieldnotes) 
While the inspectorate can be considered to have undertaken purposive action to regulate the 
identity of the organisation, the organisation can be considered to have undertaken purposive 
action to regulate the identity of the social workers. Indeed, as Deetz (1995) argues, “the modern 
business of management is often managing the “insides” – the hopes, fears, and aspirations – of 
workers, rather than their behaviors directly” (p.87). It has been argued that the role of self-
conscious emotions, specifically shame, humiliation, and pride have been central to these 
attempts to regulate the identities of the social workers to create what we might consider to be 
the ‘appropriate’ or the ‘right’ professionals. The systemic shame and pride embedded into the 
new service provided legitimate grounds for episodic shaming and praising, making the 
boundaries for the institutional representation of a safeguarding social worker known. In 
attempts to avoid being shamed and rejected and create the conditions for experiencing pride 
and acceptance the social workers aligned their sense of shame and pride accordingly, 
embedding the institutional meanings and expectations into the social workers’ safeguarding 
identity. Self-conscious emotions can, therefore, be considered to play a central role in the 
construction of the ‘right’ organisation and the ‘right’ professionals. The result was an 
institutional representation that can be considered to consist of prototypical characteristics that 
are shared within the social group (Hogg and Abrams, 1988) and standards for how to perform 
the role (McCall and Simmons, 1978). The culmination of these expectations can be considered to 
have created a Weberian ideal type (Weber, 1978), as one team manager explained:  
“Me: If you were to describe the ideal type of social worker that you think the 
organisation wants, what would that look like? 
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Team Manager: Somebody who ticks all the boxes and meets all the timescales, makes all the 
deadlines, satisfies the performance indicators, can work 60 hours a week and 
not get ill or complain they’re tired, somebody who isn’t affected by their 
emotions and their dealings with human nature.  I think somebody robotic 
really… if you appear to meet all your timescales and you appear to be fully 
compliant and doing everything quietly, without complaint, not causing any 
problems anywhere, then you’re pretty much what’s required” (interview) 
Self-conscious emotions can be considered to be at the heart of the institutional processes of 
identity regulation that created and maintained the desired institutional arrangements, actions, 
and practices. The implication of this new context was that anyone who failed to develop an 
adequate safeguarding identity in the eyes of the institution would not be able to do what was 
required in a manner that was considered appropriate or professional. Given this context, we can 
now consider the responses of the social workers to these processes of identity regulation to 
consider the experience of both the social workers and those who interact with the social 
workers.  
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CHAPTER 6: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES OF 
IDENTITY REGULATION  
While we can conceive of the processes that construct and define an institutional representation 
of a safeguarding social worker, along with the processes to regulate and police adherence to this 
representation, the social workers could not simply be considered as institutional automatons. 
Even when they engaged in habitualised routines and practices that conformed to all of the 
meanings and expectations of the institutional representation, they did so with awareness and 
purpose (Battilana and D’Aunno, 2009). Furthermore, while a social worker could actively identify 
with the institutional representation, they could also actively resist it (Breakwell, 2001; Duveen, 
2001), with a range of possibilities in between (Oliver, 1991). Further still, one social worker could 
actively identify with it in one context while actively resisting it in another. This chapter, 
therefore, provides a conceptual framework to understand the internal processes by which social 
workers came to identify with, or resist, the institutional representation. These processes can be 
considered to lay the foundations for the strategic responses to the institutional processes of 
identity regulation that are used to organise the following chapters.  
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The pragmatic argument is that we are temporally embedded in a process of social engagement 
(Dewey, 1929a; Mead, 1934; Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). While we are continually receiving 
new sensory, bodily, and perceptual information (Barrett et al., 2014), we develop knowledge of 
our physical and social world by categorising this information to create concepts, memories, 
associations, beliefs, predictions, etc. which we can use to give meaning to new situations 
(Hobbes, 1651/1969; Peirce, 1878; James, 1898; Mead, 1922; Berger and Luckmann, 1967). This 
meaning is established by (1) relating sensory information to our past, i.e. our store of conceptual 
and experiential knowledge, to categorise the agents, objects, setting, behaviours, events, 
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properties, relations, and bodily states that are present (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; Barsalou, 
2009); (2) relating these situational meanings towards the future to imagine alternative 
possibilities (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998) and draw conclusions that go beyond the information 
given (Barrett et al., 2014); and (3) contextualising these past and future orientations within the 
present moment to conceptualise the situation and decide how to act (Emirbayer and Mische, 
1998). This process can be considered to be a situated conceptualisation framework (Barsalou, 
2009), as we construct novel ‘situated conceptualisations’ in the present which are informed by 
our past and imagined future.  
The variations within and between the social workers’ practice can be understood through their 
situated conceptualisations. For example, there was a belief within the teams that decisions were 
made based on the ‘facts’ of the case, as demonstrated within one of Helen’s assessments: 
“I considered the historical nature of the Local Authority’s involvement with this family, exploring 
the support previously implemented to support [the mother] with the care of her children. I also 
gave consideration to the ages and individual needs of the children, [child 1] and [child 2] both 
falls within the most vulnerable age groups of children” (written assessment) 
Yet the role of self-conscious emotional experiences in the process of conceptualising a case as 
either a ‘safeguarding case’ or not, as a ‘high risk case’ or not, etc. could be observed routinely, as 
Monica demonstrated following a visit to a mother who had ended a relationship with a man who 
had been violent towards her: 
“[Monica] questions if she can trust the mother, as the mother had not told children’s services 
that she had got back together with that man last time when she was not supposed to. [Monica] 
says she worries that something will happen and that she has missed something. I asked her what 
would happen if something does happen and she says “my practice will be questioned and I will 
end up on the front of the Sun”” (fieldnotes) 
Despite the mother having ended the relationship, changed her phone number, and having called 
the police when the man came to the home, these ‘facts’, i.e. situational meanings, were related 
to her past experience that told her that things can go wrong and social workers can be blamed, 
and imagined that this could happen to her. Given that this posed a threat to her identity as a 
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safeguarding social worker, she was able to categorise the case as posing a risk to the child and 
use her resources to keep the case open, thereby offering some protection from being shamed by 
being beyond blame under scrutiny. This scenario can be contrasted with Donna’s experience of a 
situation that she had categorised as a case of fabricated illness and had used her resources to 
call a child protection conference. Her manager, at first, disagreed with this course of action and 
asked her to cancel the conference, before then changing her mind and agreeing a conference 
was necessary. As the parents had made a formal complaint about Donna, rather than reorganise 
the conference Donna used her resources to protect her social worker identity from an imagined 
criticism for such action, as she explained to me:   
“In the team room [Donna] is sitting at her desk doing work and says to me that [the team 
manager] had admitted to her that he had made a mistake by pulling the child protection 
conference on the fabricated illness case. I asked if that meant they were now going to go to 
conference and she said “no, I’d look like a right idiot”” (fieldnotes) 
As these cases indicate, the role of identities and self-conscious emotional experiences were 
central to how the social workers perceived the situation and decided what they should do. As 
these cases also indicate, however, the social workers were embedded within the structure of the 
institution and subject to the institutional processes which exerted an influence on how they 
thought, felt, and acted. Given that the social workers were being evaluated against, and had 
been made aware of, a set of meanings and expectations, i.e. the institutional representation, 
social workers in some contexts can be considered to have identified with this institutional 
representation and therefore sought to practise in a manner consistent with these meanings and 
expectations. While social workers in other contexts disagreed with these meanings and 
expectations and, therefore, not only dis-identified (Pratt, 1998) with the institutional 
representation but also sought to resist the institutional processes of identity regulation. The 
factors that could be considered to have led to identification or resistance were (1) the level of 
conflict between the person’s identity-meanings and those within the institutional 
representation; (2) the level of empathy they felt for the family they were working with; and (3) 
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the level of emotional safety they felt in the situation. Each of these factors altered how the 
situation was conceptualised, and are outlined below. 
THE LEVEL OF CONFLICT BETWEEN IDENTITY-MEANINGS AND THE INSTITUTIONAL REPRESENTATION 
Identities can be thought of as concepts, or representations, containing a set of meanings and 
expectations (Mead, 1934; Stryker, 1980; Burke and Stets, 2009). These then provide the means 
to make behavioural choices and decisions when that identity is activated (Burke and Stets, 
2009). An identity is activated when the person perceives that situational meanings in the 
environment are relevant to the identity meanings (Carter, 2013). Being at work, for example, 
employed as a social worker, would activate one’s social worker identity. Of course, each 
situation holds a range of different meanings activating multiple identities in the same situation. 
A social worker may have their identity as a woman, a moral person, a social worker, and an 
employee all activated at the same time. With multiple identities activated, there are many 
possibilities for how these identities interact with one another, influencing how one thinks, acts, 
and feels. For example, there may be conflicts between what a person believes they should do as 
a moral person and what they believe they should do as an employee. Furthermore, there are 
many possibilities for how these identities interact with other people. For example, a person 
acting as a social worker in the moment may interact with a parent very differently to how they 
might if they met them in a different role or social situation. One’s representation of the self in 
the moment, therefore, stems from a process of relating the situational meanings back to their 
store of identities (their self-concept), towards the imagined future, while addressing the 
presenting issue.  
Miller (2010) argues that the development of a person’s social worker identity begins prior to, 
continues during, and develops further, following the formal socialisation process that leads to a 
professional qualification. While the discussion so far has mainly focused on the creation and 
maintenance of the safeguarding identity after formal socialisation, as Miller (2010) implies, the 
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social workers did not begin working within the Council as a blank slate, ready to accept cultural 
norms, values, and expectations without question. The social workers had all had experiences 
prior to successfully engaging in formal education programmes and attaining a recognised 
qualification, which provided them with a range of meanings they had already associated to their 
social worker identity. Consistent with the historical foundations and values of the profession, the 
shared characteristics that were considered to make one a social worker were being respectful, 
caring, and understanding, together with being open and honest with people. The social work 
role was considered to be “an important job to do on behalf of society”, as one team manager 
told me, which related to helping those in need, as Carol demonstrated: 
“you can see that families can change.  Change can happen and it can be sustained.  It's not always 
sustained with some families but when it does you feel you are here for a reason, a purpose.  We 
are serving a purpose and it's all the hard work you've put in to getting here into your job as that's 
what it's for” (interview) 
Consistent with findings from identity theory research (e.g. Thoits, 1983, 2003), the above 
comment from Carol was typical of the social workers in the teams that performing the role of a 
social worker provided them with meaning and a sense of purpose. Social work was therefore 
seen as much bigger than the team, department, or local authority in which they worked, 
providing a sense of belonging to a wider community which offered possibilities for alternative 
meanings in constructing their professional identity (Yuval-Davis, 2006). In some contexts, 
therefore, the institutional meanings and expectations were inconsistent with a social workers’ 
already established identity-standard, i.e. the set of meanings for that identity, while in others 
there was no conflict. The former contributed to social workers feeling prevented, or at least 
constrained, from practising in a manner that they wished to practise, which lay the foundations 
for resistance to the institutional processes of identity regulation. While the latter contributed to 
social workers identifying with the institutional representation, leading to comments such as, 
“there’s nothing that’s preventing or prohibiting me in practising in a certain way, which is how I 
practise now” (interview), as Melanie stated.  
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THE LEVEL OF EMPATHY FOR THE FAMILY 
For the classical pragmatic philosophers32, empathy was considered to be an internal emotional 
experience resulting from taking the perspective of another. Indeed, Dewey argued that empathy 
required one “to put ourselves in the place of others, to see things from the standpoint of their 
purposes and values” (Dewey and Tufts, 1909, p.334). From such a perspective, empathy is an 
active imaginative process. One’s capacity for empathy can, therefore, be considered to be both 
temporal and contingent upon a range of situational factors that may help or hinder an 
individual’s imaginative engagement with another’s social world. What one is doing, such as 
being engaged in a difficult task or rushing to finish a piece of work for a deadline, can focus one’s 
attention on these tasks and reduce both the attentive and imaginative capacity that an 
individual needs for empathy, as demonstrated by Jane: 
“when I have to visit places like [faraway place] and [faraway place] and [faraway place] and 
[nearby place] on the days when I’m supposed to be writing up, you know, I think everything else 
gets left and, you know, I should, you know, my minds back at the office, “I should be doing that”, 
rather than, you know, travelling 400 miles, you know, to do, to do a visit” (interview) 
Furthermore, feeling shame can refocus one’s attention onto the self, reducing the focus on the 
experience of the other (Leith and Baumeister, 1998). What the social workers were doing, and 
how they were feeling, were observed to significantly affect the social workers’ capacity for 
empathy with the family. This was demonstrated by Melanie following a meeting where a father 
was angry at her for the children being made subject to child protection plans and he had heavily 
criticised her during the meeting:  
“Sitting in the team area [Melanie] is talking to [Linda] and [Gill] and tells them about the core 
group meeting yesterday and describes it as horrendous saying it was a “beeline” for [Melanie]. 
[Gill] said “he’s horrible” and [Melanie] said “he’s vile”” (fieldnotes) 
                                                          
32
 James, Dewey, and Mead often referred to sympathy rather than empathy. However, as the word 
‘empathy’ was not introduced into the English language until 1909 (Greiner, 2015) it was not in use at the 
time of much of their writing. A review of their discussions can be considered to be closer to what we term 
today as empathy. 
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With Melanie being focused on following the child protection policies and procedures and feeling 
criticised/shamed by the father in the meeting, she had little capacity to foreground the father’s 
frustration and experiences in her conceptualisation of the situation. Conversely, having time and 
space to proactively consider how another person may be experiencing a specific situation was 
observed to support the processes a person needed for empathy. Indeed, there were examples of 
significant contrasts between how some social workers spoke about service users in practice and 
how they spoke about them in the interviews. While this is long standing issue in social research 
(Bryman, 2012), the interviews could be seen to provide time and space from the institutional 
pressures for the moral identity of the social workers’ to become more salient, as shown by Amy:   
“we are all people. I’m no better than them. They’re just in a situation where they need help, 
aren’t they? I’m not in a situation where I need help with children or all of those things… And it’s 
not because, you know, like a lot of people, like, my friends go, “how do you work with scumbags 
like that?” Well, they’re not scumbags. They have had a different path to me. They have had a 
different way of doing things. Have had different parenting, all of those things, and they have a 
different education to me. And it’s about a level of understanding of that. So it doesn’t make me 
go in and go, “I’m better than you”, because I’m not. I’m not any better. We’re all just people, 
aren’t we? And that’s important to remember that” (interview) 
Accepting that the context affected the social workers’ attentive and imaginative capacity, the 
ability of a social worker to empathise with family members could be considered to vary 
depending on the context. This variability can be thought of as a continuum, with high empathy 
at one end and low empathy at the other (Baron-Cohen, 201133), which affected a social workers’ 
conceptualisation of the situation. This process can be seen in a conversation I observed in a team 
room:  
“[Gill] says that the mother is a “dick”, which [Amy] repeats is true and adds that the mother and 
the father left the child in hospital after she had given birth and questioned why they didn’t want 
to stay with their new born baby. [Linda] disagreed that this was a sign of not wanting the child or 
not caring saying that when you have had a baby you have hormones and they are all over the 
place and they are in a situation where social workers are saying they will remove the child if they 
try to take the child from hospital. [Gill] disagreed with [Linda] saying that the parents “could have 
worked with us and had a different outcome” adding “mum made her choice”” (fieldnotes) 
                                                          
33
 Baron-Cohen states his theory of empathy is grounded in psychology essentialism, which is rejected here; 
however, his notion of an empathy continuum is a useful one for this analysis 
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As this was Gill’s case, she could be considered to feel the systemic pressures within the Council 
more keenly, heightening her sense of shame and pride. Her focus was on making sure the child 
did not come to harm in the future and that she was not criticised for making mistakes. Her 
capacity for empathy with the mother was therefore lowered, while Linda, less burdened by the 
institutional pressures and expectations for that case, was more able to foreground the 
experiences of the mother and imagine alternative possibilities. Their different positions, with 
different pressures, altered their situated conceptualisations by altering what was considered 
relevant from their past, how they imagined the future, and, therefore, how they understood the 
present. This led Gill to identify with the institutional representation, while Linda dis-identified 
with it.  
THE LEVEL OF EMOTIONAL SAFETY IN A SITUATION  
With the social workers knowing the conditions and consequences for being shamed and praised, 
inevitably the social workers sought to avoid being shamed. There were some situations, 
however, where the social workers felt more vulnerable to being shamed than in others, while 
there were other contexts in which the social workers felt more able to deviate from institutional 
prescriptions. While Edmondson (1999) uses the term “psychological safety” to refer to a shared 
belief within a team that it is safe for members to speak out and take risks without being 
criticised, Marx (2001) uses the term a “just culture” to refer to the belief within an organisation 
that an employee won’t be blamed for making honest mistakes or failures in the system beyond 
their control. Both concepts indicate the threat of shame not only guides action in a direction to 
avoid practitioners being shamed but also that it silences them, limiting the individual and the 
organisation’s ability to learn and improve. Linked to these concepts, Catherall (2007) explicitly 
identifies shame as the core component in his notion of “emotional safety”. He confines this to a 
feeling two people have in their romantic relationship and defines it as a shared belief that there 
is no threat to their identities within the relationship or to the relationship itself. He argues that 
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such a feeling results in increased trust and greater benefit of the doubt in questionable 
situations. Where a person feels that their identity or the relationship is threatened, Catherall 
(2007) argues that those in the relationship feel emotionally unsafe and are therefore more 
suspicious and distrustful of the other’s actions and motives. Expanding Catherall’s (2007) 
concept, we can conceive of emotional safety in an institutional context as the feeling of being 
protected from being shamed, both in the present and in the future, as demonstrated by Donna:  
“it is why I have faith in [the team manager] because she has had a child death and she couldn't 
possibly have predicted it and she wasn't found responsible.  But, in that respect, I do think she 
would be, as much as she is able to be, there for you... I think it makes her the manager that she 
is… But that's how I've always felt about [the team manager].  It's why she's so cautious and that's 
why I feel quite safe being a practitioner on her team” (interview) 
Donna feels “safe” because she believes the team manager not only understands the actions that 
she has taken, or will take in the future, but also supports her in making decisions that will 
protect her from being shamed. Feeling emotionally safe meant that her identity as a social 
worker, and her position within the Council, was not threatened, or at least the possibility of 
being shamed was reduced. Conversely, feeling emotionally unsafe was a negative experience 
resulting from a belief that they were vulnerable to being shamed and rejected, as demonstrated 
by Donna in a different situation:  
“[Donna] told me she was “pissed off” but that she can’t say too much because she doesn’t feel 
that it is “safe”. I ask why and she said that someone in the team has told [the team manager] that 
she has been having melt downs and she suspects this is [Jane]. She said [the team manager] 
spoke to her and told her she was emotionally unstable and [the team manager] then told the 
area manager who has arranged to go out for coffee with [Donna] and [the team manager] to sort 
it out. She said that she isn’t going to say anything to [the team manager] or in front of others in 
the team room as she doesn’t feel she can express her opinions saying “I thought that’s what 
social work was about”... She said “I thought [the team manager] had my back but she doesn’t, 
she has her own”” (fieldnotes) 
Such contrasting views from Donna demonstrate not only the situational and contextual nature of 
emotional safety, but also the role of the institutional processes of identity regulation. It was the 
episodic shaming that the social workers sought sanctuary from. How emotionally safe a social 
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worker felt influenced the overall conceptualisation of the situation by altering what was 
considered relevant from their past to the current situation, how they imagined the future, and 
therefore the perceived possibilities for action in the present.  
RESPONDING TO THE INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES OF IDENTITY REGULATION 
The systemic shame and pride provided a constant force on the social workers conceptualisation 
of the situation. The episodic shaming and praising served to reinforce the institutional pressures 
and expectations when these had been transgressed or adhered to. Together, these shaped the 
social workers sense of shame and pride, which influenced who the social workers thought they 
were in a situation, what they thought was expected of them, how vulnerable they felt to being 
shamed or humiliated, and how empathic they felt towards the people they worked with. 
Considering these issues the social workers could identify with some aspects of the institutional 
representation while resisting others, creating a complex mix of possible internal responses. 
Oliver’s (1991) typology of strategic responses to institutional processes provides a useful 
foundation to analyse the external behavioural responses of the social workers, which could be 
categorised on the basis of shared characteristics. Where social workers reported thinking, 
feeling, and acting in a manner consistent with the institutional representation, even habitually, 
these could be considered as an enactment of the institutional representation. Social workers 
could, however, internally resist the meanings and expectations of the institutional 
representation yet still act in accordance with them, which could be considered as compliance. 
Greater levels of internal resistance were recorded in some situations that meant the social 
workers felt they could not adhere to the pressures and expectations and therefore sought to 
compromise, conceal, and influence institutional sources and processes, in behaviour that could 
be considered to express increasing levels of resistance. This view, provided in figure 6.1, provides 
an analytical framework to understand the role of self-conscious emotions in child protection 
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practice while exploring the experiences of the social workers and those who had to use the 
safeguarding service.  
Figure 6.1: Conceptual framework for the strategic responses to institutional processes of identity 
regulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following chapters provide an analysis of these responses, with forms of identification, i.e. 
enacting and complying, being considered in chapter seven, and forms of resistance, i.e. 
compromising, concealing, and influencing, being considered in chapter eight.  
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CHAPTER 7: FORMS OF IDENTIFICATION 
A social worker could be considered to have identified with the institutional representation of a 
safeguarding social worker when they practised in line with the institutional meanings and 
expectations. Some social workers, however, willingly practised in such a manner, which can be 
considered to be an enactment of the institutional representation, while others reluctantly so, 
which can be considered to be a conforming to the institutional representation. Enacting had 
minimal conflict between the social worker’s identity-standards and the institutional 
representation through the social workers accepting the institutionally constructed and 
promoted interpretive framework; a low level of empathy for the family members as a result of 
holding them responsible for wrong-doing; while seeking to create emotional safety for 
themselves by acquiescing to the institutional norms, pressures, and rules. Social workers who 
complied, meanwhile, did not accept the meanings and expectations associated with the 
institutional representation as their own. Indeed, there were greater conflicts between the social 
workers’ identity-meanings and the institutional representation, greater levels of empathy for the 
families, and a greater sense of vulnerability to being shamed. Consequently, compliance could 
be categorised on the basis of social workers feeling unsure of how to act but prioritising shame 
avoidance, while at the same time seeking to alleviate any subsequent feelings of shame and guilt 
so that they could continue to comply. This chapter outlines the conditions for enacting followed 
by an analysis of the effects of such a strategy on the social workers and the families they work 
with, before outlining the conditions for complying and the subsequent effects.  
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ENACTING THE INSTITUTIONAL REPRESENTATION 
ACCEPTING THE INSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK 
As the institutional interpretive framework provided meaning to both the ‘means’ and the ‘ends’ 
of safeguarding work, a social worker willingly sought to enact the institutional meanings and 
expectations where they accepted it. The belief that a child would benefit from being placed in 
the care of the local authority provided the meaning for the ‘ends’, as demonstrated by a 
conversation within the team room: 
“[Amy], [Linda], and [Gill] are sitting at their desks discussing removing children as [Amy] is due to 
remove a child later that day with [Helen]. [Amy] says that it is not nice but the conversation 
moves quickly to talk about certain children they know who have thrived in foster care. [Linda] 
chips in that it is like miracle grow for flowers” (fieldnotes) 
While the belief that procedures could be used to change the behaviour of parents and carers 
provided meaning to the ‘means’. Procedure could, therefore, be considered to be used as a 
mechanism to regulate the identity of parents to change their behaviour to something that was 
more acceptable, as shown by Lucy when she explained to me what she was doing:  
““it’s procedure. It’s what we do when we have an incident. It also sends a message”. I ask “what 
message?” and she says “that it is serious so he won’t do it again or he could lose his children”” 
(fieldnotes) 
Being able to achieve behavioural change in the parents provided a foundation for pride in the 
social workers as this could then be perceived to have been beneficial, on the whole, for the 
children and family, as described by one team manager:  
“I do actually feel proud to be a social worker, I’m glad I’m a social worker…  I believe in what we 
do, I think we do make a difference, we’re not perfect sometimes, we make things worse, but yeah 
I’m glad I’m a social worker” (interview) 
The meaning of the day to day work of the social workers, however, was less clear. For example, 
they were routinely engaged in administrative work on a computer in the office. When asked, the 
144 
 
social workers generally stated that they spent about seventy to ninety percent of their time 
doing administrative tasks, which was supported by my observations and consistent with 
previous research (Baginsky et al., 2010). This administrative work, however, was still ascribed 
meaning because it was considered important for the family, as Carol explained:  
“Timing is such a right. You've got to have timely assessments. Children and families need to know 
where they stand. They need to know what is expected of them. They need to know in a timely 
way.  Not just that, but if the family needs support and help that needs to be put in in a timely 
manner, it's not delayed. That's the pressure. That's what you're doing it for. You try to get that 
service in or you're trying to get the risk management plans together because you know that the 
child's at risk and you should be doing that in a timely way” (interview) 
Furthermore, the administrative work was ascribed meaning because it provided opportunities 
for the social workers to feel proud. For example, “Completed 2 assessments and closed 2 cases” 
and “Supervision – felt I have improved (got back up to date) and TM [team manager] pleased 
with progress” were recorded as pride in the diary entries. Equally, being prevented from being 
able to perform the administrative tasks to a high standard provided opportunity for shame, as 
Julie described:  
“She complained that she had to complete 4 reports for the meeting next Monday but she works 
part time and has meetings all booked up in the days she is in. She put her head in her hands and 
said “I don’t care” and then said “that’s not true, the problem is that I do care”. She then said “I 
tell you what it makes me feel, inadequate, like I can’t be a good social worker”, “I take pride in my 
reports being robust but it’s not good enough” referring to the one she is writing” (fieldnotes) 
Accepting the institutional interpretive framework provided meaning to the social workers for 
what they did and how they did it, reducing any conflict between the standards they evaluated 
themselves against and the standards they were being evaluated against by others.  
ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY FOR WRONG-DOING  
It was only necessary to perform safeguarding work if there was a child in need of protection. The 
work of the safeguarding social workers was, therefore, inherently tied to identifying the harmful 
actions of others towards children. Where there was no harm, or there was no person to protect 
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the child from, there was no role for a safeguarding social worker. The social workers, however, 
not only sought to identify the harm a child had suffered, but more often sought to predict the 
harm a child may suffer, which involved interpreting the motivation for such behaviours. As 
White (2003) argues, social workers are often engaged in moral judgements and issues of blame 
and responsibility. If a parent was considered to have been responsible for any wrong-doing that 
contributed to harm, or potential harm, to a child, either through omission or commission, then 
they were blamed and action needed to be taken to protect the child. The process of blaming a 
parent, or otherwise, can be understood through adapting the sociological accounts for personal 
behaviour in negative self-evaluative situations (Scott and Lyman, 1968; Tavuchis, 1991; Arluke 
and Hafferty, 1996). From this perspective, when a person breaks a social convention or does 
something immoral, they can engage in motive talk to recast the meaning of their behaviour and 
avoid the negative evaluation of the self (Mills, 1940; Goffman, 1971). While a person can accept 
responsibility and either accept wrong-doing, leading to apologies (Tavuchis, 1991), or deny 
wrong-doing, leading to justifications (Scott and Lyman, 1968). A person can deny responsibility 
and either accept wrong-doing, leading to excuses, or deny wrong-doing, leading to absolutions 
(Arluke and Hafferty, 1996). These accounts of personal behaviour are summarised in figure 7.1. 
Figure 7.1: Assigning of wrong-doing and responsibility to self (Arluke and Hafferty, 1996, p.222) 
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This approach to the personal motive-talk, however, can be seen as one side of the evaluative 
coin. The other side relates to how the person interprets the situation and assigns or denies 
wrong-doing and responsibility to another. While a person could excuse, justify, and absolve the 
actions of another, they could also assign responsibility for wrong-doing and blame them. The 
legitimacy for blaming a parent was perceived as unambiguous in some situations, as the 
following interaction demonstrates: 
“[Amy] is talking to [Mandy] while sitting at their desks about the “starved child” that [Amy] had 
written the Court reports for the other day. She says they got an ICO and [Mandy] punches the air 
and says “get in”. I ask her why she says that and she then says that she doesn’t usually do that 
when they remove children but this was a particular case. [Amy] says that it was “intentional 
abuse” and [Mandy] says she didn’t like the father and [Amy] responds saying “he’s a tosser that’s 
why”. [Mandy] said that the child was developmentally small for her age and that the parents 
must have done some damage to her future development. She said “that is reason I do my job” 
referring to removing the child from the abusive home” (fieldnotes) 
To Amy and Mandy the father was clearly responsible for the wrong-doing towards his daughter, 
activating their safeguarding identity and motivating them to do something to protect her. 
Blaming the father and focusing on what they had to do to find and place the child in foster care 
reduced their capacity for empathy towards the father and the family. Being unhindered by 
feeling the distress for the parents, removing the child from their family did not trouble their 
conscience. Furthermore, as such actions lived up to institutional expectations, they were able to 
verify their safeguarding identity and feel proud of what they had done. It was, therefore, both 
legitimate and socially acceptable to express pleasure in being involved in removing the child 
from her family. While not all parents were blamed, indeed some were considered not to be 
responsible for wrong-doing and such cases were closed or referred to other services, it seemed 
to be a cultural response to assign blame even in ambiguous situations, as Melanie explained:  
“She commented that the mother was “failing to protect” her children and then that “we blame 
the mother, because that’s what we do” recognising that the father was the person posing the risk 
but they expect the mother to protect the children” (fieldnotes) 
147 
 
The moral judgements behind such blaming were made clear in the discussions within the teams 
and in the documents the social worker produced, as demonstrated in one assessment that 
concluded, “this raises concerns regarding [the father]’s integrity”, while another, written by a 
team manager, stated: 
“The social worker asserts that [the mother] loves her children and wants the best for them. I 
would question whether or not this is true as the parenting portrayed here is not that of a mother 
who wants the best for her son. What I read is that [the mother] is intractable and unmoveable, 
rigid in her thinking... [The child] is suffering from episodic punitive parenting and living in an 
environment that features high criticism and low warmth… [The child] receives inconsistent care 
and must be in a state of high arousal never knowing whether his mother is going to be kind or 
cruel” (written assessment) 
This statement demonstrates how moral judgements contributed to a social worker’s 
conceptualisation of the situation. The perception that there was someone to blame for a child 
needing protection resulted in the meanings and expectations held within the institutional 
representation seem reasonable and desirable.  
ACQUIESCING TO INSTITUTIONAL EXPECTATIONS TO CREATE EMOTIONAL SAFETY 
As the social workers believed that they would be blamed if a child was harmed, the context was 
often described as a “blame culture”. Social workers also believed that they would be held 
responsible not just for the safety of the children in the present but for what happens in the 
future, heightening their sense of shame in the process of conceptualising a situation. Where a 
situation was categorised as explicitly posing a risk to a child’s safety, it was also categorised as 
implicitly posing a risk to the identity of the social worker, as demonstrated by Donna:   
“I had a day where I was fairly upset about a case before I went away and I was genuinely 
concerned for the children's safety and I would have - because I always talk about the case, not 
once did I get given the time of day to ask me about why I was so worried.  “Don't worry.  Don't 
worry about it.  It will be fine.”  What if it's not fine? It's on my head and I don't feel like anybody's 
got my back above me” (interview) 
Enacting the institutional representation increased their feeling of emotional safety by offering 
protection from being shamed or humiliated. For example, a typical situation was of a social 
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worker prioritising the administrative component of the work at the expense of the relational 
component, as demonstrated in a session between Donna, a Child and Adolescent Mental Health 
Service (CAMHS) worker, and a mother: 
“As they discuss issues [Donna] spends most of the time making notes with her head down while 
the mother and the CAMHS worker talk about her son. The CAMHS worker and the mother laugh 
at points while [Donna] continues making notes. [Donna] looks up from her notes and makes a 
suggestion about her visiting the boy soon with another worker and then puts her head back down 
to continue making notes while the mother and the CAMHS worker discuss it. When the meeting is 
over I ask [Donna] about the notes and she says that if she doesn’t do them you get into the 
situation like she had the other week when [the team manager] accused her of not prioritising her 
minutes of meetings in front of the parents” (fieldnotes) 
While Donna justifies this habitual practice as necessary acquiescence to avoid being shamed, it 
could also be seen to be an active engagement in the process of intentionally selecting and 
performing particular patterns of behaviour which enacted the meanings and expectations of the 
institutional representation. Donna also demonstrates, however, that the primary focus of the 
work was on her relationship with the organisation, where the greatest risk of being shamed lay. 
The experience of the parents or carers in such circumstances was considered irrelevant, as a 
team manager explained:   
“[the team manager] said workers become less sensitive as they progress in their careers but “we 
get measured on timescales not on not upsetting parents” and described the process as “bruising 
and horrible” for parents but that they have to go and speak to a head teacher for example which 
may upset a parent” (fieldnotes) 
The team manager’s comment shows how the sanctions, supports, and rewards within the 
organisation ensured that there was an explicit focus on the priorities as defined by the 
organisation. While acquiescing to these expectations offered some protection to the social 
workers from being criticised and shamed, it also ensured that they were on the lower end of the 
empathy continuum in relation to the parents’ experience.  
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CONSEQUENCES OF ENACTING THE INSTITUTIONAL REPRESENTATION 
In contexts where a social worker had accepted the interpretive framework provided to them, 
identified a specific person to blame for the harm/potential harm to a child, and acquiesced to 
the policies and procedures to create a feeling of emotional safety, the foundations were set for a 
social worker to enact the institutional representation. The culmination of these factors affected 
the experience of both the social workers, who became committed to their situated 
conceptualisation to protect their identities, and the parents they worked with, who felt shamed 
and humiliated.   
A) COMMITTING TO A CONCEPTUALISATION 
The social workers felt very personally about how they had conceptualised a situation. They had 
often spent a lot of time researching the family history, talking to the family and other 
professionals, and had used their knowledge and experience to come to a conclusion about the 
causes and consequences of parental actions. In short, their identity as a social worker was tied to 
their conceptualisation. Any challenge to this conceptualisation could, therefore, be interpreted 
as a threat to the social workers’ identity, framing them as incompetent. Protecting a 
conceptualisation could, therefore, be considered a proxy to protecting their identity as a social 
worker, as demonstrated by a team manager in a child protection conference:  
“The father challenges parts of the report and says, “how it is written is not how it happened”… He 
tells his version of events which provide more detail to what is in the report and he says there are 
always two sides to every story and no one has heard his side... As the father explains his side [the 
team manager] disagrees with him and she talks over him telling him he is wrong and what is 
written are facts. The father seems frustrated and takes a deep breath and says “can I speak 
please?”” (fieldnotes) 
Protection was necessary, however, not only from the families but also from those within the 
Council, as demonstrated by Donna in a meeting with a group of managers and a solicitor to 
discuss the possibility of applying for a Court Order to remove the children from their parents. My 
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observations did not indicate that this was a particularly difficult meeting for Donna. Yet Donna 
recorded the experience in her diary entry as: 
“Frustrated because I felt I couldn’t get my point across and felt that my assessment was 
undermined by people who haven’t worked with the family for 2 yrs [sic] like I have… Felt a bit 
sweaty and had clamy [sic] palms which got worse as I got more frustrated I felt tense and felt 
myself sit up straight and cross my legs to appear more assertive and then felt myself close my 
body as I felt rejected by those there who made me feel ‘I’m crap’” 
Furthermore, she recorded this experience as rejection, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, 
anxiety, and anger and resolved to “become assertive” in the future, indicating a commitment to 
her conceptualisations rather than a reassessment of it. Conversely, where someone agreed with 
or acted in accordance with their conceptualisation, the social worker could perceive this as 
verifying their identity and feel proud, as Carla states, “I get kind of a boost from it, when I see 
that families are grateful for the work” (interview). Furthermore, the parent/carer could then be 
seen in a positive light, leading to absolutions, as demonstrated by a conversation between 
Monica and her team manager: 
“[Monica] and [the team manager] discuss a case and [the team manager] says “the dad seems to 
have done everything in the right way, hasn’t he?” They agree to close the case” (fieldnotes) 
Once a social worker had committed to a conceptualisation, it was a moral necessity to act in 
accordance with this perspective and to ensure others did too. To not do so was to believe they 
were responsible for placing the child at risk of harm and placing themselves at risk of being 
shamed. The social workers therefore engaged in acts to convince others, as demonstrated by 
Jemma: 
“when you request to remove a child and it’s like, “no, no, no” and you just keep going and going 
and going until you get that positive outcome what you want, the child out… you’re requesting 
consideration be given for a child to be accommodated and they’re coming back and forth with 
you via email, “no this” or “no that” and if I’m passionate that that child’s at risk I will keep firing 
those emails until they see what I’m seeing” (interview) 
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The primary mechanism for convincing others came through the written assessments and reports 
which outlined the information the social worker had collected and what sense they had made of 
it. These written reports could be considered as ‘boundary objects’ (Star and Griesemer, 1989), 
being used by different social groups for different purposes. While explicitly the assessments 
were considered to be for the parents so that they understood the situation, statements such as 
“[the drugs worker] agrees that everything in the social worker’s report is a true picture” were 
included to convince the reader of the accuracy of the conceptualisation. With agreement 
between all those involved in the case on the cause of the problem, the parents had to align their 
perception of the situation accordingly or face conflict with the child protection system and 
possible Court applications by the Council. As Faye explained, “99.9% of the time we need the 
parents to change, it’s not children that have got the problem is it? It’s the parents” (interview). 
While the social workers were the subjects of identity regulation within the institution, the 
parents were the subjects of identity regulation by the social workers. From the parents’ 
perspective, such practice was often experienced as acts of episodic shaming, as demonstrated by 
one mother’s experience when discussing an assessment, which was considered to be a good 
example within the team, with the team manager:  
“the mother says that none of it is backed up with evidence and says that she has no mental 
health problem, does not drink, has not abused the child, and so there is no concern and so should 
be able to see her child... She says once it has been investigated why hasn’t it gone back to the 
way it was [being able to see her child]… The mother seems angry, speaking firmly and loudly, and 
says that the report is lazy and offensive and that she will be spending every penny she has on 
legal costs then walked out” (fieldnotes) 
B) A SHAMING AND HUMILIATING EXPERIENCE FOR PARENTS 
As the above quote demonstrates, for social workers engaged in enacting the institutional 
representation the experience of the parents was often a very difficult one. The accusation of 
failing to live up to a particular standard threatened their identity as a good mother, a good 
father, a moral person etc., as demonstrated by Paula’s experience of visiting a mother who had 
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asked for advice relating to contact between her three year old son and his father, who was now 
her ex-partner:  
“[Paula] told me that the mother had got upset when she had asked to see the child’s bedroom 
and look in the cupboards and fridge. She said the mother burst into tears and said “I can’t believe 
you’re doing this to me”. I asked her how she felt looking in the fridge and cupboards and she said 
“fine”, “I’m ok doing it”, and “it’s normal” and then said they have to do it because some people 
lie and said some people only have bottles of vodka in their fridge. I asked if there was an issue 
with the home and she said it was immaculate and there were no issues with the food” 
(fieldnotes) 
While Paula’s practice of looking in the cupboards and fridges to ensure that there was sufficient 
food for the children was habitual and valorised within the Council, such practice was 
experienced as shaming for the mother. This experience was intensified for those where child 
protection procedures were used, or Court action taken, as these accusations could be verified in 
the minds of others, casting them as someone who stands outside of moral life. With the social 
workers focusing on creating safety for the child and themselves, the conditions were created for 
an institutionally supported perception of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ (Sumner, 1906), as demonstrated by 
Monica: 
“I think they [parents] think negatively of us anyway don’t they just because of who we are and 
what we stand for” (interview) 
Such ‘othering’ had two consequences. The first was that the issues and needs of the parents 
were not always seen as a legitimate focus of their work, as Lucy showed: 
“[Donna] stands near [Lucy]’s desk and they talk about a case which [Donna] describes as the 
professionals parenting the parents and [Lucy] says “they suck you in don’t they? And make you 
focus on their issues”” (fieldnotes) 
And the second was that the social workers could perceive the parents as an obstacle to achieving 
the aims of their work, which prevented social workers from being able to verify their 
safeguarding identity, as Amy described:  
“[Amy] goes on to say that she knows it is the right decision [to have removed the children] and 
doesn’t think the children should ever go back to their mother because it is easy to make changes 
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without the children. She said that this mother has been so frustrating and I ask why? She says 
because “I want to effect change” but that “mum got in the way of that”” (fieldnotes) 
To Amy, the mother was a threat to her identity as a safeguarding social worker and she blamed 
the mother for her inability to create safety for the children while they lived with her. Blaming 
others has often been associated with experiences of shame (Tangney and Dearing, 2002) and 
Brown (2012) defines the practical effects of blame as “the discharging of pain and discomfort” 
(p.195). The social workers could, therefore, be considered to be discharging their pain and 
discomfort of failing to live up to the ideal of effecting change, absolving themselves of any 
responsibility for wrong-doing and further supporting the notion that ‘we’ protect children from 
‘them’. Given the consequences to the child and practitioner if a child was harmed, the social 
workers often felt vulnerable and emotionally unsafe and would often say “I don’t trust him/her”. 
Such distrust could, at times, be observed to play a role in their situated conceptualisation 
through imagining the worst case scenario, as demonstrated in a meeting between the area 
manager, a solicitor, the team manager, and Carla where the issue was of violence in the father’s 
previous relationship: 
“The area manager says that there have been no violent incidents between the father and the 
mother… [Carla] says that they are saying they will work with children’s services... They discuss the 
seriousness of the situation and at one point the area manager says they can’t stop the father 
throwing the baby against the wall if they are living together. They agree this would not be safe 
and the area manager states the father has to leave the family home once the baby is born” 
(fieldnotes) 
Their imagined future provided justification for adhering to institutional expectations by using 
authoritative measures. The resulting decision could be considered to be as much an act of 
emotional work intended to create a feeling of emotional safety for the managers and social 
worker, as it could safety for the child. As the focus of the work was on creating safety, with a lack 
of focus on the experience of the parents or carers, many parents complained that they were 
being treated unfairly, not getting what they needed, or that the social workers were making 
things worse, as Carla’s experience demonstrated:  
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“he blamed me for splitting the family apart and for me aiding him to drink more because I was 
stressing him out because he couldn’t be with his family but, I, all my focus was for the kids and 
protecting them and keeping them safe, you know, but of course he didn’t see it like that so he put 
several complaints in about that” (interview) 
Such situations reinforced the idea that some parents were a threat to the identity of the social 
workers, and the perception of the parents as ‘shamers’ was a very real experience for many, as 
Paula demonstrated on the drive to a meeting with the mother in a school: 
“she told me that she had had little sleep last night and when she was eating breakfast she felt 
sick… She said she is scared of the mother and I asked her why and she said that she is aggressive 
and verbally attacks her. She said the mother is “out to wreck my career before it’s begun” and 
said she undermines her confidence and began to get teary as she drove. We arrived at the school 
and [Paula] seemed nervous as she got her bag out of the boot of the car and she said she felt like 
crying and she looked like she was about to cry” (fieldnotes) 
As this scenario shows, seeking to protect themselves from shame and humiliation within the 
organisation by acquiescing to the institutional expectations at times created the conditions for 
feeling shamed from the reactions of the parents. The social workers could then be seen to 
protect themselves from this by reducing the possibility of being criticised/shamed by ‘them’, as 
Melanie explained:  
“I’m not gonna go to a service user’s house and say “can you comment on my practice”, what do 
you, do you think I’m doing a good job or not? Because you’re opening yourself up then, aren’t 
you, for criticism” (interview) 
In a parallel to the social workers’ experiences within the institution, their actions as described 
above could be considered to regulate the identities of the parents and carers so that they could 
trust that the child would be safe in their care. In further parallels to the social workers’ 
experience, however, some instances were consistent with Garfinkel’s (1956) notion of a 
degradation ceremony. For example, a mother being told to leave a meeting for arguing with a 
health visitor and having her disability publically questioned as she left; a mother being made to 
pour wine down the sink in her own home; parents being told they had to separate or they would 
remove the children; a heavily pregnant and upset mother being shouted at by a social worker to 
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tell her they would be convening a child protection conference; to a father being told in a child 
protection conference that “if he reverts to type” (fieldnotes) then they would seek to remove his 
children. Garfinkel (1956) argues that such organised action is intended to degrade the status of 
the individual by rejecting their claimed identity so that they are more accepting of external 
control. Despite the distress and negative feedback from the parents subject to these processes, 
such situations did not threaten the identity of the social workers. Indeed, there was a general 
belief that their actions did not contribute to any harm to the parents, as a team manager 
demonstrated:  
“I mean my own personal view on both care and child protection conference is that these are tools 
that we shouldn’t be afraid to use if we have to... I’ve come across social workers who have said, I 
don’t want to put these parents through the oppressive thing of a case conference… well I don’t 
think it is oppressive for parents actually, certainly not oppressive for children, I view these things 
as positive tools” (interview) 
Enacting the institutional representation was founded in a belief that their work was both 
meaningful and necessary, enabling the social workers to justify their actions or even absolve 
themselves of any responsibility for wrong-doing (Arluke and Hafferty, 1996). Indeed, enacting 
was not an unconscious, passive process. In echoes of Haslam et al.’s (2015) conclusion from their 
reanalysis of Milgram’s (1974) obedience to authority experiments, “people are able to inflict 
harm on others not because they are unaware that they are doing wrong, but rather because… 
they know full well what they are doing and believe it to be right” (p.79). 
A CASE ILLUSTRATION OF ENACTMENT  
Enactment of the institutional representation can be illustrated by following one particular case. 
Amy had been working with a mother and three children for about three years where the 
children were subject to child protection plans due to issues of neglect. Amy told me that she felt 
guilty that she had not removed the children previously and questioned whether she had done 
enough to create change in the family, recording “Feel bad that I may not have made decisions 
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quickly enough” as shame in her diary entry. Such feelings of shame and guilt contributed to the 
conceptualisation of the situation as too risky for the children to remain living with their mother. 
Prior to the Court hearing which would decide whether a Court Order for removal would be 
granted (s.38, Children Act 1989), Amy sought to accommodate the children to local authority 
foster care under a voluntary agreement with the mother (s.20, Children Act 1989), which Amy 
described as follows: 
“the mother was holding one of the girls in her arms and was crying into the child’s ear and when 
the children were placed into the car the mother, while crying, went back and forth from the 
house to the car to hug them. [Amy] described this as the mother trying to make the children cry 
as they weren’t. [Amy] said that when she was ready to leave the mother rolled on the floor crying 
and described this as an immature act. [Amy] told this story in a jovial manner laughing at the 
situation and what the mother had done. She went on to say that the mother had said that she 
was busy while she was trying to get the older child ready to be moved but that she was just at a 
friend’s house. [Amy] described this as “disgusting”. She said “I can’t stand mum, I think she is a 
dick head” and went on to say that she doesn’t understand neglect, she could understand lashing 
out in anger, but not, not feeding your children” (fieldnotes) 
Amy placed the children with foster carers and recorded in her diary entry, “Day after placing 3 
children. Discussed in supervision how it went smoothly… Relieved that they were now safe and 
having needs met. Proud of the relationship I have built with them” and recorded this as relieved, 
happy, and proud. The conditions for pride were in place because having accepted the 
institutional interpretive framework and blamed the parents, the most ‘appropriate’ action within 
the institution, given how the situation was conceptualised, was to seek to remove the children. 
With the children in foster care they were now considered safe. Having felt anxious about them 
being harmed, guilty for not having removing them earlier, and shame for not living up to her 
identity standards, Amy now felt relief. While relief can be considered as the subsidence of a 
negatively valenced emotional experience (Ekman, 2003), in this case it could be more specifically 
seen as the subsidence of shame and guilt and a feeling of emotional safety. The subsequent 
application for a Court Order provided Amy with the opportunity to not only feel proud about 
what she was doing but also to feel “professional”, as she recorded in her diary entry. Amy felt 
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“professional” because this situation had enabled her to not only enact the institutional meanings 
and expectations but to also to become the embodiment of the institutional representation.  
COMPLYING WITH THE INSTITUTIONAL REPRESENTATION 
FEELING UNSURE 
Given the complex nature of the social situations of both the family context the social workers 
were seeking to understand and the institutional context in which they had to operate within, it 
was a common experience for the social workers to feel unsure with social workers often saying, 
“I don’t know what to do”. Social workers often felt unsure of what to do, how to do it, what the 
procedure was, what to say, how to say it, and if they had the knowledge and ability to do what 
they were being asked to do, with Lucy saying on one occasion, “I feel out of my depth with this 
case” (fieldnotes). Feeling unsure meant that they were unable to conceptualise the situation and 
come to a conclusion about the potential harm to a child, the blameworthiness of the parent, or 
the utility of certain procedures. Not knowing what to do meant they were unable to verify their 
safeguarding identity, as Monica demonstrated on the way back from a home visit:  
“She said she doesn’t know what to do and then “I feel like a bad social worker” like “a shit social 
worker” if she doesn’t know” (fieldnotes) 
With a sense that one should live up to the ideal of competence, not living up to this expectation 
was grounds for feeling shame. In seeking to live up to this ideal and avoid feeling shame the 
social workers were more susceptible to the institutional processes of identity regulation, as Carol 
demonstrated: 
“you retreat to your colleagues and your manager and say, “things aren't going well here.  Don't 
know what to do, really.  I don't know whether I'm doing this right.  Should I be doing a bit more of 
this?  Should I be doing more of the other?”  And then it's like if you see it differently, it's like, 
“well, am I seeing it right?  Am I actually seeing it right?  Am I being too lenient or are people being 
risk averse?  Am I not getting it right?”” (interview) 
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The support the team manager provided served to reinforce the ‘appropriateness’ of the 
institutional representation, providing a form of emotional regulation that supported Carol to 
comply: 
“[the team manager] certifies that actually you're doing okay, you're going along the right lines.  
Sometimes when you're frustrated about moving things on and you talk it through in supervision 
you can see that the barriers are nothing to do with your practice and you realise that.  Yeah, it's 
just confidence boosting, isn't it, and certifies that you're doing okay and doing what you should” 
(interview) 
While the conflict between Carol’s identity-standard and the institutional representation was 
resolved through identity regulation by the team manager, there were many contexts in which 
the situation was not as simple, as Melanie demonstrated while explaining the impact of her work 
on one family: 
“[Melanie] said that the father had been sacked from his position in the scouts, was being 
investigated by his HR [human resources] department at his work and thinks his job is at risk, and 
the family are now arguing with each other. She said that the children are 16 and 17 and are hard 
to engage, and are difficult for the parents too, yet they have put in place a child protection plan, 
which she said, “the plan is destructive and ineffective. It’s more damaging than supportive” as 
she said nothing is going to change and this plan has caused a lot of problems for the family. She 
said “it’s just a tick box exercise… stat visits… we have to do it for accountability and show we have 
tried to engage them when it all goes tits up”. She said “I don’t know what to do” but she has 
discussed it with [the team manager] who has told her to continue with what she is doing. She 
described it as “uncomfortable”” (fieldnotes) 
Melanie did not blame the parents and displayed empathy for their situation. Furthermore, the 
conflicts between her identity-standard and the institutional representation created a troubled 
conscience that questioned the usefulness of the child protection procedures. Yet, while she felt 
unsure, she also felt she has no choice but to comply and engage in emotional work to hide her 
“uncomfortable” feelings. 
PRIORITISING SHAME AVOIDANCE  
Social workers who complied felt they had no choice but to comply because they felt emotionally 
unsafe. The need to prioritise avoiding being shamed, therefore, became a consideration above 
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all others. The military was used as a metaphor in both teams to describe how their opinions 
were seen as irrelevant, with their role solely being to carry out the instructions of those in more 
superior positions, as one team manager explained to me: 
“She relates the senior management to being like Nazi Germany as the senior management give 
orders from high and they have to carry them out” (fieldnotes) 
With knowledge of the conditions for being shamed within the institution the social workers 
routinely adhered to the expectations placed upon them undertaking tasks that they neither 
understood, as Carla explained:  
“She then said she has to go and see a family member in prison because it is in the child protection 
plan... She said she doesn’t know why she has to go or if she should go but that she will because it 
is in the plan” (fieldnotes) 
Nor agreed with, as Lucy stated:  
“She comments that sometimes they hold on to cases for too long and that sometimes they’re 
involved when there are no concerns against her better judgement “just because ‘they’ 
[managers] want to control things”” (fieldnotes) 
Such action can be considered to be a form of quasi-magical thinking, whereby “people act as if 
they erroneously believe that their action influences the outcome, even though they do not really 
hold that belief” (Shafir and Tversky, 1992, p.463). While they knew their actions would not 
change the outcome, by adhering to procedure they created a sense of emotional safety in the 
knowledge that they would be beyond blame under scrutiny, as a team manager’s interaction 
with Melanie demonstrated: 
“[the team manager] then enters a conversation with [Melanie] about a case and says that “I’ve 
decided” it needs to go to child protection conference but that she knows that this “won’t effect 
change but we have to be seen to have tried something” and states that they are children and so 
they need to do something” (fieldnotes) 
As the team manager’s comment indicates, the threat of being shamed or humiliated for not 
adhering to the policies and procedures, or the institutional pressures and expectations, existed 
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at all levels of the hierarchy. The team manager needed to be “seen” to be adhering to them as 
much as the social workers. Indeed, the area managers, the strategic lead, and even the director 
of the service were as much subjected to the force of the systemic shame and pride as they were 
architects and guardians of it. As one team manager explained:  
“I do what I have to do.  I’m not a big fan of timescales.  I’m much more bothered about quality 
and understanding what’s going on for that child, but we do it” (interview) 
ALLEVIATING FEELINGS OF SHAME AND GUILT THROUGH COLLECTIVE EMOTIONAL WORK 
Compliance necessarily involved prioritising the meanings and expectations of the institutional 
representation over their own identity-meanings in an attempt to avoid being shamed and 
rejected. Such action inevitably created feelings of shame and guilt in the social workers, as Lucy’s 
experience showed: 
“[Lucy] comes over to me and tells me that she has to go out and speak to a mother to ask her to 
accommodate her child under section 20. She says the child is 2 years old. She tells me that she 
isn’t sure if that is what they should do and that she can flip in her mind from one day to the next 
depending on how the visit goes – some are good and some are not. However, the case was taken 
to an LGM
34
 and it was decided at that meeting that [Lucy] had to ask the mother for section 20 
and then to issue proceedings after, but not to tell the mother. [Lucy] says she feels like she is 
stabbing the mother in the back by not telling her they will be issuing proceedings straight away” 
(fieldnotes) 
The relationships within the teams provided a context which made it easier to overcome any 
reservation about complying. The social workers felt they had to present an acceptable image to 
those within the institution (Goffman, 1959), as Jane explained:  
“In the car on the way to visit the new referral [Jane] spoke about [Julie]’s “breakdown” and said 
that she was crying in [the team manager]’s office. She said that they all have a “mask” and “we 
say yes we can take more cases but we can’t”” (fieldnotes) 
The team, however, provided a safe haven, free from the need for such impression management, 
as they felt understood and protected from criticism and blame, as Jemma stated, “the office is 
                                                          
34
 Legal Gateway Meetings were meetings with the social worker, team manager, area manager, and a 
solicitor to decide whether to enter the public law outline (PLO) process, to either initiate the formal pre-
proceedings process or apply for a Court Order 
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our safe place” (fieldnotes). With all of the social workers occupying a similar social location, 
subject to the same institutional pressures and demands, and having very similar work 
experiences it was easier to empathise with one another creating a sense of solidarity within the 
teams, as Donna describes:  
“And the rest of the team, really, even with the person that I don't particularly have any fondness 
for, we get on. We support each other. We're always there for each other. We've always got each 
other's backs and if somebody's down and crying then there's always someone there with an arm 
round the shoulder. And I think we just talk cases. We don't suffer in silence” (interview) 
As Donna suggests, the sense of solidarity within the teams encouraged team members to both 
seek support from each other and to provide it when needed. Such reciprocity contributed to the 
social workers sense of acceptance within the teams, providing them with a purpose beyond 
protecting children, as Melanie explained: 
“I feel like I’ve got my place within the team and I’m valued for, for who I am, yeah and accepted I 
think, you know, I feel like I fit in” (interview) 
Such a feeling was contrasted with others who were not subject to the same forces and were 
therefore considered to be unable to understand, as demonstrated by a conversation in the team 
room:   
“[Helen] comes in and sits at her desk and starts talking to [Amy] about the viability assessment 
she was doing yesterday and [Amy] tells her about her partner. [Helen] and [Amy] both discuss the 
fact that their partners don’t understand and that they can’t understand but [Helen] says that you 
have to try and explain it to them at least” (fieldnotes) 
Given that they felt alone with their very specific sense of shame, there was an expectation 
within the teams that they would create an emotionally safe environment for each other. This 
meant doing one’s best not to criticise or blame anyone in the team, as Monica explained: 
“my intention is not to upset anybody, even on day to day running’s of the team, if I thought I’d 
offended anybody or excluded anybody I’d be really upset if I thought that because that isn’t how 
teams work” (interview) 
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Such action could be considered to be a form of collective emotional work whereby the social 
workers sought to hide their own feelings from each other if they believed this would cause 
shame or guilt in a colleague, as a conversation with Lucy and Donna demonstrated: 
“[Lucy] says some people’s assessments in this team “I would be ashamed to put my name on” 
and says they only look at the specific issue that has been referred and so they miss things and 
they end up being re-referred. [Donna] joins in and says it is difficult challenging someone because 
of a case that was open in the team before” (fieldnotes) 
As this conversation indicated, priority was given to not shaming team members rather than 
providing an opinion about past work. Where a person had, in the past, provided their opinion, 
the social workers engaged in action to avoid receiving feedback from them. I observed an 
example of this on one occasion when Lucy had visited a mother three days in a row and had not 
been able to get into the home. Christine, a very experienced social worker, then went out and 
got into the home on her first visit. Christine provided information about the visit to Lucy in the 
team room, yet there was no discussion about how she had managed to get into the home. When 
I asked Lucy later why she hadn’t asked, she told me, “[Christine] lets you know if she thinks 
you’re not good enough or made a bad decision” (fieldnotes). Not asking protected her from 
feeling shame. Feedback was welcome, however, when it was an attempt to alleviate their 
unease about what they were being asked to do. Such action by team members could be 
considered as a form of collective emotional work that relieved any potential for shame and guilt 
and supported their ability to comply, as shown by Gill: 
“Me:  how do you cope with that doubt and the decision to remove [a child]? 
Gill: I think it’s just about the discussions with other team members and reassurance really from 
them” (interview) 
Further forms of collective emotional work could be observed through the use of humour, which 
was considered essential to being able to cope with the stresses of the job, as Donna explained:  
“Me: the worst part of your job. How do you cope with it? 
Donna: Humour.  Humour, food, exercise and just having bloody good teammates” (interview) 
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Mulkay (1988) argues that applied humour can be used for a hidden or veiled purpose so has a 
serious point to it. Indeed, the inconsistency between what the social workers believed they 
should be doing and what they were being asked to do provided many opportunities for humour 
about their shared predicament, as Linda’s comment showed:   
“[Linda] turns around from her desk and jokes to [Amy], in reference to phone calls she has been 
receiving today from parents, “it’s getting in the way of my paperwork!”” (fieldnotes) 
While humorous, the serious point was that such action sought to alter the quality, intensity, or 
duration of negative self-conscious emotional experiences resulting from conflicts between their 
actions and the meanings they held in their identity standards. Such action could be considered 
as emotional work, seeking to alter the feelings of the person making the joke as well as those 
who heard the joke. This contributed to the social workers ability to continue practising despite 
their troubled conscience, reservations, and feelings of shame and guilt, as Monica explained:  
“Me: what’s the best part of your work? 
Monica: the team 
Me: what about the team? 
Monica: I dunno? I’m getting upset again [starts to cry], the working toget, because I think social 
work practice is a very lonely job isn’t it really and I suppose the team just makes it more 
bearable [crying]” (interview) 
CONSEQUENCES OF COMPLYING WITH THE INSTITUTIONAL REPRESENTATION 
In some situations social workers felt unsure or concluded that the parent or carer was not to 
blame for the harm or potential harm to a child, or that the use of certain procedures was 
unnecessary or even harmful to the family. Yet the potential for being shamed by not living up to 
the institutional meanings and expectations remained a central feature of how the situation was 
conceptualised. Therefore, despite any reservation, social workers could still actively comply with 
the meanings and expectations of the institutional representation as a strategy of shame 
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avoidance. While the experience for the families remained the same as that of enacting, it had a 
very different experience for the social workers. 
A) FEELING ASHAMED AND DISILLUSIONED  
While compliance provided a feeling of emotional safety, it also laid the foundations for feeling 
shame by threatening one or a number of their identities. For example, complying with the 
institutional representation could mean compromising the meanings they associated with their 
social worker identity, as demonstrated by Linda’s experience: 
“They discussed the situation and [the team manager] began writing down the specifics of the 
working agreement. [Linda] asked if it could be written in less authoritarian language and [the 
team manager] said it could not because the mother has to agree with it otherwise they would 
remove the children. [Linda] said that she was not sure about all of the allegations that have been 
made about the family... We left [the team manager]’s office and… she said she feels she is 
battling against [the team manager] and the other professionals who have already made their 
minds up about this family... She said she feels she has to take out the working agreement which is 
worded in a way which is oppressive and so she is an “ally to oppression”” (fieldnotes) 
For those who felt that they had to compromise their own identity standards to comply there was 
a feeling that they were losing a part of their identity, as Carla explained to me in the team room, 
which I recorded as, “[Carla] says that she thinks the job is eroding her social work values because 
she is doing things she did not come into the job to do”. Some identity threats arising from 
compliance, however, were more distressing as they compromised the fundamental meanings 
that defined them as a person, as Amy described: 
“Makes you feel sick sometimes. Very stressful. When I went off sick, I just felt shit. I felt awful. It 
does make, it makes you feel really guilty. You feel guilt, and then you feel tired, and then you feel 
low, and then you just feel, I mean, I got to a point where I was just, like, “I’m not, I’m not doing 
anything”… Like, I got to a point where I didn’t feel like me. I felt like I was, like, you know, just a 
shell, and my personality was elsewhere, because it does, it drains you, it sucks it out of you, when 
you can’t do it properly” (interview) 
Feeling ashamed of what one was doing as a result of complying inevitably led to a sense of 
disillusionment, and all of the social workers expressed disillusionment in some form at some 
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point during my time with them. Without an ability to see any change in the system, that 
disillusionment could turn to hopelessness, as Jemma demonstrated: 
“I’m quite disillusioned by it all… I think I’ve just come to accept it now there’s not a lot I can do 
about it, I can’t change it… I’m looking around to see what other kind of work I can do with this 
qualification, I don’t think it will be local authority forever… I think the ideal job is a family support 
worker… Because they do get more time with the children” (interview) 
The comparison with a family support worker was an important one as it struck at the heart of 
the issue as those engaged in compliance saw it: that they were not practising social work. 
B) PRACTICE AS SOCIAL ADMINISTRATION 
The idea that much of what the social workers were doing was not social work was a belief held 
by all of the social workers in both of the teams at different points, as illustrated by a 
conversation I overheard in the team room: 
“[Christine] turns to [Jane] and says “they’ve taken what God gave us: free will”... [Jane] says they 
are just “highly paid admin workers” and [Christine] says that what they are doing is not social 
work and “they’ve taken what was attractive to the job”” (fieldnotes) 
While Christine’s comment demonstrated the perception that they had no choice in what they 
did, Jane’s comment demonstrated the common held belief that complying with the institutional 
demands and expectations equated to little more than a complex administrative role distinct 
from the more traditional understandings of social work. Wenger’s (1999) notion of a community 
of practice that provides the social foundation for the activation of one’s identities provides a 
useful starting point to illustrate the distinction between the competing practices of 
‘administration’ and ‘social work’. While Wenger (1999) considers all practice to be social, not all 
social practices have the same aims, functions, values, or rely on the same specific body of 
knowledge, techniques, and skills (Larson, 1979). Indeed, the aims, functions, values, and specific 
knowledge, techniques, and skills that have been traditionally associated with social work 
practice (e.g. Biestek, 1961; Larson, 1979; Munro, 2011b; British Association of Social Workers, 
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2012) can be contrasted with those of the closely associated, but distinct, discipline of social 
administration (e.g. Lohmann and Lohmann, 2001; Spicker, 2004; Page, 2010). From these 
traditions we can define social work broadly as the field concerned with the practicalities of 
improving the quality of life and subjective well-being of individuals, families, groups, and 
communities. While social administration can be defined as the field concerned with the 
practicalities of service organisation and delivery. The government, the inspectorate, and the 
Council were more interested in the macro-practices of social administration to provide the 
evidence for an acceptable and legitimate service. The expectations placed upon the social 
workers, meanwhile, can be understood to relate more to the micro-practices of social 
administration. The distinctions between these practices can be summarised as pure-types 
(Weber, 1978) in figure 7.2. 
Figure 7.2: Distinguishing between social work and social administration  
 
Tools 
Documents 
Assessment 
Well-defined roles 
Focus on organisational needs 
Effective use of scarce resources 
Specific criteria 
Codified procedures 
Laws 
Regulations 
Public order and safety 
Government policy 
Contracts 
Referrals to Services 
Accountability 
Social 
Administration 
Use of theory, method, and research 
Use of local and indigenous knowledge 
Use of knowledge of individual, group, 
family, community practices 
Analysis 
Interpersonal Skills 
Therapeutic support 
Relationship building 
Direct work with individuals, groups, 
families, networks, communities 
Advocacy 
Respect for diversities 
Human rights 
Collective responsibility 
Social justice 
Well-being 
Social 
Work 
Practice Community 
Language 
What is said and what is left unsaid 
Implicit relations 
Tacit conventions 
Subtle cues 
Untold rules of thumb 
Recognisable intuitions 
Specific perceptions 
Well-tuned sensitivities 
Embodied understandings 
Underlying assumptions 
Shared world views 
(see Wenger, 1999) 
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For those engaged in compliance, the focus on social administration at the expense of social work 
fuelled their sense of disillusionment with the profession, firstly because they felt compromised 
as a professional, as Melanie explained:  
“I think it’s a bit hypocritical. I think you’re saying this needs to be done but I can’t do it cos I’ve 
got ten thousand other things to do, and I think that’s not what social work is about that, isn’t it? 
Social work is about social work, you know, going into people’s houses, supporting them with this, 
supporting them with that and you don’t do it so the role’s very different. And I think, I don’t 
know, I look back and I think “did I expect to be doing that when I was, before I went to Uni, or 
whilst I was at Uni, did I expect to be doing that?”… I kind of expected to be going into people’s 
houses and doing the work with them rather than expecting someone else to do it, or even for 
them to do it themselves, you know, and then criticising them when they haven’t done it” 
(interview) 
And secondly, because they did not feel that the work that they did made a difference to the lives 
of the people they came into the profession for, as Helen explained:   
“this week, for example, and it’s just a tick box exercise really, I’m getting information from the 
families to put on the system. I know it’s done, so that senior management know it’s done. [The 
team manager] knows it’s done. And I’m not actually doing any work with the family, as such. I’m 
just, kind of, checking everything’s going okay… we kind of make judgements of families, but we 
don’t actually spend enough time with them, to understand why that may be a problem. Although 
we ask the question and we, kind of, go away don’t we? and we leave them. Okay, so you’ve give 
us all this information, I’ll type it up, and then I won’t see you for four weeks… It just doesn’t quite 
feel right” (interview) 
Perhaps inevitably, the social workers who believed that they were not making a difference 
began to feel ashamed, as they felt responsible for not living up to their identity-standards, as 
Faye demonstrated:  
“I’m still sitting there crying thinking, “well actually, no, you’re crap social worker”… I will say, “oh, 
oh, what change have I actually made out of hundreds of cases I’ve had?”… and I can like think of 2 
cases… so to me that’s a really small percentage of good stuff that I set out to do. So sometimes I 
will have that conversation and still doubt myself because the majority of your cases aren’t, that 
have nice outcomes, they’re not positive, so then I think, “well really no, you haven’t made change 
in many cases as you possibly could of”” (interview) 
While the systemic shame and pride created a constraining environment for practice, rather than 
blame this environment or the parents and carers, as Faye’s experience showed, some social 
workers blamed themselves, resulting in very personal feelings of inadequacy and incompetence. 
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The comparison the social workers made between what types of action were possible for them 
and what were possible for the family support workers was significant because the family support 
workers were considered to have greater freedom and were considered to be doing the work 
that the social workers wanted to do. Indeed, there were occasions where there was tension 
between the social workers and the family support workers, who could be seen to be challenging 
social work’s monopoly on working with certain client groups (Freidson, 1988). Linda 
demonstrated this tension on one occasion when she told me, “we’ve got people coming in from 
the [family support] team saying what they’re going to do with our families” (interview).  
Given the constraining nature of the environment and the shame, guilt, and distress the social 
workers felt, they could be observed to engage in a form of emotional work designed to alter 
these unpleasant feelings by stating that they loved their job. Typically, such a declaration was 
made at the end of a statement about how difficult and challenging they found the work, as 
demonstrated by Amy:  
“it’s like a pressure cooker. You’ve got it from your families, pressure, “Bleeding do this”, because 
they’re always in crisis and they need you. And then you’ve got management and your policies, 
and you’re, like, rammed in between. And then you’ve got your own pressure that you put on 
yourself... in safeguarding, you see shit all day. Just negative, negative, negative. And even when it 
gets to a positive, and you close a case, you still think, “I bet that’ll come back in”, because you’re 
constantly critical of yourself. And then you’ve got others being critical of yourself. So it’s, actually, 
you get very little positive. But then, at the same time, you love your, like, I love my job” 
(interview) 
With a feeling of being constrained in what they were able to do and how they were able to do it, 
for those engaged in compliance there was a sense that they were losing, or not even acquiring, 
the knowledge and skills that they believed they needed to practise social work, as Helen, a 
senior practitioner, stated:  
“I’ve done the work with families, asking questions for the assessment, but I’ve not actually done 
any work with them that I would want to do. I don’t really know what work I’m talking about here, 
but, because I’ve never done it. But I’d like to just do some meaningful. Get to know the family 
more. Get to know what the problems are, rather than, sort of, guessing, really, what the issues 
are” (interview) 
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If a profession can, in part, be defined by the use of a specific cognitive base, particular skills, and 
commitment to certain values (Larson, 1979), then the complaints and distress of the social 
workers could be seen as a response to what many have considered to be the 
deprofessionalisation of social work (Specht, 1972; Dominelli, 1996; Healy and Meagher, 2004). 
Indeed, some suggested to me that the professional basis of social work was being eroded, as 
Linda demonstrated: 
“Linda:  So why do the academics teach us to communicate with children, teach us child 
development, because you’re teaching us and it’s not exercised  
Me: You don’t need it to do the job? 
Linda: well, no, not the job that we’re being asked to do… I’m scared for the profession” 
(interview) 
A CASE ILLUSTRATION OF COMPLYING 
Compliance to the institutional representation as a response to the institutional processes of 
identity regulation can be illustrated by Melanie’s experience as she began to cry, and continued 
to sob, as she explained the situation:  
“I’ve really struggled with this case of removing a baby, I’ve just, I’ve really struggled with it 
[crying] and I just, I question whether it’s the right decision and then further discussions that I 
have with social workers about further assessments, and they, they, they just predict that, they’ve 
already made their mind up that this family are not going to be successful, do you, now that’s just 
disheartening that this child could potentially not go back to live with its biological family and I 
just, that just has, that just really challenges me ‘cos I just don’t think that’s right, do you know 
what I mean?, and I’ve been a part of that journey and that process and I’ve gone to Court and 
been cross-examined and, it just made me question everything about my role” (interview) 
While Melanie was unsure about how unsafe the situation was for the baby and whether she/he 
should be removed from her/his parents, she still provided written statements as evidence to the 
Court and was cross-examined for over three hours arguing why the baby needed to be removed. 
An Interim Care Order was granted and the baby was placed in foster care. The institutional 
processes of identity regulation had ensured that Melanie’s sense of shame was aligned to the 
systemic shame in operation whereby the creation of her own emotional safety had become the 
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overriding feature in her situated conceptualisation. By engaging in compliance Melanie was able 
to avoid being shamed and gain social acceptance within the institution with Melanie being 
praised by the senior social worker who attended Court with her, by her team manager, and by a 
newly qualified social worker who told her she was jealous of her giving evidence in Court. Yet 
Melanie’s struggle demonstrated the difference between compliance and enactment, as she 
explained: 
“I’ve been supported in making the decision in conversations that I’ve had with the team, which 
has reinforced, “yeah, yeah, ok, you’re making the right decision, yeah”, and then when I go away 
and think about it personally and I just think surely there is something more that we could have 
done… you’re either in agreement with them [managers] or you’re not, and can I show that I’m 
not in agreement with them? I don’t feel like I can. I don’t know maybe I could? I don’t know. I 
could speak to [the team manager] about this and say how I’m feeling and how it’s challenged me, 
but she’s going to reassure me that what, the decision that I’ve made has been right, she’s not 
going to say it’s wrong is she? Otherwise we wouldn’t have, we wouldn’t be here now, she has to 
believe that the decision we’re making is the right one, so if I was to open up to [the team 
manager] and talk about how upset I feel I wouldn’t get the response I needed, I’d turn to family 
for that response” (interview) 
Despite avoiding being shamed and gaining praise and acceptance, Melanie was visibly distressed 
in her interview because she felt she had not lived up to the standards of her identity as a moral 
person, having been involved in something she did not think was “right”. Such a situation is 
consistent with an experience of feeling ashamed. And while Melanie began to question her place 
within the safeguarding community: 
“I think “do other social workers experience that or do they, are they desensitised doing that?”… is 
this normal? Is this what the service expects?… if I struggled here at my second removal what 
about my next case? Is that going to challenge me the way that this one’s challenged me? Am I 
going to be challenged the way I feel now in 10 years’ time or will I, will it become easier to do 
that?... I hate to think that this could become easy and you, you know, if it became easier for me 
then there’s a problem” (interview) 
She also began to question the whole safeguarding system: 
“families have really got to prove themselves, what is it that they’re not doing, that they need to 
do, and could they do it with more support and over a longer period of time, you know, with an 
intense package, rather than people, social workers dipping in and out doing their stat visits and 
not actually accomp, achieving anything. Are we setting them up to fail?” (interview) 
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Ultimately, such identity threats led Melanie to consider whether she had to engage in emotional 
work to ease any conflict with her moral identity just to be able to continue to practise 
safeguarding work: 
“maybe I just have to push it all to one side so that I can continue to do the job rather than 
knowing that what I’ve done is wrong” (interview) 
FORMS OF IDENTIFICATION: A SUMMARY 
The systemic shame and pride provided the boundaries for shameful and praiseworthy behaviour 
for the Council’s child protection service. Having been episodically shamed by Ofsted, and seeing 
other Council’s being shamed by similar mechanisms, the leaders and senior managers of the 
child protection service acted in a manner that sought to avoid such institutional shaming in the 
future. This meant defining the meanings and expectations of the social workers within the 
Council and ensuring the social workers had knowledge of the conditions to be shamed, for 
transgressing these boundaries, or praised, for adhering to these institutional prescriptions. 
Consequently, the social workers developed a sense of shame and pride in line with such 
institutional forces. This served to regulate not only the actions, but also the judgements and 
attitudes of the social workers, i.e. their identities. The possibility of being shamed and praised 
became a prominent feature in their conceptualisation of any given situation. For some, the focus 
was on living up to the meanings and expectations provided for them. For others, it was a focus 
on avoiding being shamed. Either way, such acts of enactment and compliance successfully 
reproduced the institution. From the perspective of the parents and carers, however, particularly 
those who disagreed with the social worker’s conceptualisation, such institutionally desired 
actions and practices were often experienced as shaming, humiliating, and dehumanising, as one 
mother told me while I was asking her permission to observe a meeting: 
“She told me that she thought all social workers should be sacked and that it is a horrible 
experience for parents as they make you feel “stupid” and that you have “no voice” and that she 
began to “doubt myself” as a parent” (fieldnotes)  
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Given the need for the social workers to focus their attention on the needs and expectations of 
the organisation, such experiences are perhaps inevitable as their focus is diverted from the 
relationship with the children and families and onto the relationship with the organisation. From 
the social workers’ perspective, however, enacting was the most beneficial to their wellbeing. By 
living up to the institutional representation, the social workers could positively evaluate their 
practice while receiving praise and social acceptance to verify their identities. In other words, 
they could feel proud of what they had done even if it conflicted with wider social attitudes, as 
Paula’s experience, contrasted with Melanie’s above, demonstrates: 
“I did my first child removal. And although that’s not something that an everyday person would be 
proud of, I felt quite honoured to have experienced it, even though it’s not pleasant. So it almost 
sounds – well, it does sound wrong. I want to almost say that I enjoyed it, but I didn’t enjoy it. I 
just enjoyed the experience” (interview) 
Compliance contrasted with such practice, as the social workers did not blame the parent or carer 
and felt greater levels of empathy towards them. Despite such attitudes, the social workers 
continued to act in accordance with the institutional expectations, as they knew that such 
practice offered protection from shame and provided acceptance as a valued member of the 
service. As Culpitt (1999) argues quite simply, self-protection overrides the ethical concern for 
others, because, as Satyamurti (1981) argues, such action can be necessary for organisational 
survival. Compliance was, therefore, a much more distressing experience. While the social 
workers verified their safeguarding identity from the praise and acceptance they received from 
others, they were unable to live up to the standards of other identities they held. This produced a 
complex internal experience of shame for failing to live up to these standards, guilt for being 
involved in harming others, and distress from the lack of integrity between their identities. Social 
workers reported having nightmares, not eating, and not sleeping at the imagined future of being 
blamed, with some of their partners threatening to end their relationship due to them working 
too many hours. Despite these internal and external pressures, in some situations the social 
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workers did not feel able to resist the institutional processes of identity regulation and engaged in 
identity work to comply and emotional work to hide how they felt, as Donna explained:  
“I went into defence mode, put my head down, got on with it and I've not shown any emotion or 
stress since and probably not the person that I am, I don't think.  I think I'm more guarded” 
(interview) 
And as Donna’s comment demonstrates, such identity and emotional work could begin to change 
the social workers’ identities. However, while identity theory predicts that it is the higher level 
identities, such as one’s moral identity, that change the lower level identities, such as one’s social 
identity, (Burke and Stets, 2009), for these social workers it was the lower level safeguarding 
identity that changed their higher level person identities. Consequently, the feeling that they 
were changing as a person was experienced as forced and unwanted. As Linda suggests, those 
who are more able to engage in enactment are perhaps the ones who are able to remain 
performing safeguarding work: 
“we’re all taught to the same standards, we then, personalities come into play, go into an 
organisation, and the ones that conform, do what’s expected of them, do what the policies and 
procedures say, stay. That’s been my experience” (interview)  
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, however, there were situations where the social 
workers rejected the meanings and expectations associated with the institutional representation 
and therefore resisted the institutional processes that sought to regulate their identity. It is these 
situations and conditions to which we can now turn.  
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CHAPTER 8: FORMS OF RESISTANCE 
While enacting or complying with the institutional representation provided the social workers 
with social acceptance and emotional safety, there were many situations in which either 
response was considered unworkable or unpalatable. Being a part of the institution, however, 
subject to the same systemic forces as everyone else, and having knowledge of the conditions for 
being shamed and praised, the social workers could not simply ignore the institutional pressures 
and expectations. Instead, they were compelled to respond to them. As Jenkins (1996) argued, 
“identification is often a matter of imposition and resistance” (p.73). This chapter therefore 
continues the discussion from the previous chapter to outline the conditions that supported 
resistance to the institutional representation in the social workers’ situated conceptualisations 
and the strategies employed by them to resist the institutional pressures, expectations, and 
demands. The foundation of resistance was a conflict between the meanings in a social worker’s 
identity-standard and those held in the institutional representation. In such contexts, and despite 
the sense of solidarity within the teams, some social workers observed a difference between their 
own practice and the practice of those engaged in enactment or compliance, which served to 
create divisions within the teams, as Monica demonstrated: 
“they’re very authorative, authorative [sic] and very, I’d say borderline rude and, I dunno, I’m just 
completely different I think and I know that we’re social workers and that we are, you know, it’s a 
career and we’re professionals but I don’t think you need to be in people’s houses making them 
feel belittled in their own home, you know, and we are there to criticise and also to say the good 
points about people’s parenting and I think sometimes some members of the team are very, you 
know, belittling of people and quite oppressive” (interview) 
Given that all of the social workers shared this same social identity, evaluating another’s practice 
negatively provided the foundations for feeling vicarious shame (Lickel et al., 2005), as the actions 
of others could be perceived to reflect badly on the social work profession, and consequently 
them as a member of that group, as Linda explained: 
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 “So I was embarrassed by the fact that there was families in [the area] who deserved a better 
service, disappointed in some degree in the way that the young social workers that I’d seen on the 
team had received the same training as me… but they conform, they fall in, and they don’t 
challenge what the organisation, they just sort of slot in… Ashamed to see, and that’s why I said I 
wouldn’t be a, I wouldn’t go through all that blood, sweat, and tears with a student again… But I, 
why are they in, the anger, the, the, why, why, why, why? What is it that people become so 
compliant? … [I’m] embarrassed and ashamed. Disappointed, disappointed in what we’re churning 
out” (interview) 
While such attitudes of resistance did not always translate into actions of resistance, there was a 
range of behaviours which did demonstrate increasing levels of resistance, from more minor 
levels, which compromised the institutional expectations; to more active forms of resistance 
which attempted to conceal behaviours that would be unacceptable to the institutional 
guardians; to a highly active form of resistance that sought to influence the institutional sources 
and processes to create an outcome that was more acceptable to the social worker (Oliver, 1991). 
This chapter outlines these three forms of resistance below. 
COMPROMISING INSTITUTIONAL EXPECTATIONS  
Where social workers held identity-meanings that were inconsistent with the institutional 
representation, yet felt vulnerable to being shamed, some were seen to engage in action that 
could be considered to resist the institutional pressures by only partially complying with 
expectations. Such action could be considered to be either an act of necessity to avoid being 
shamed or an act of choice to provide sufficient space to be able to focus on work that they could 
feel proud of. The foundation of compromising actions was adherence to the minimum 
standards, which did not fully satisfy the institutional requirements, but ensured they avoided 
criticism, as Jemma demonstrated: 
“[Jemma] told me that they now get a weekly report and showed me hers, which lists all their 
cases which are out of timescales and by how long they are out by... She said some in the team 
think this report is helpful while others are not happy about it. I asked “what’s the consequence of 
doing this?” and [Jane] said “we don’t do visits” and [Jemma] quickly responded to her saying, “I 
do my stat visits, I just don’t write them up. I just put ‘child seen’” (fieldnotes) 
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While Jemma’s actions were not considered good practice within the Council, having recorded 
that the visits had been done and the child had been seen, her statistics, and therefore those of 
the team and the Council, improved. Compromising became an act of necessity where the social 
workers conceptualised the situation as presenting unresolvable competing and conflicting 
demands. In such situations the social workers felt that they could not comply with these 
expectations, even if they wanted to, creating a feeling of vulnerability to being shamed. In such 
cases, the social worker compromised both the institutional standards and their own identity-
standards, as Amy described:  
“I’ve gone through a time when I’ve had 50 cases. I can’t dedicate an hour to them per week, you 
know. You can’t… because you’ve got 6000 things, as I keep saying. So it’s, you’re unable to. So it 
impacts on your practice as a whole. I think it depends on your character, because to me, because 
of the time, sometimes, you’re doing a child social work assessment after doing two visits. A 40-
day assessment in two visits. That’s not 40 days is it? That’s not knowing the family for that, to do 
that assessment justice, or to do the children justice, because that’s what it’s about” (interview) 
The expectations as laid out in the Council’s procedures were that a forty day assessment should 
be an in depth assessment of the child’s needs and circumstances. Amy was aware that two visits 
over forty days did not meet this expectation but she felt she had no option but to reduce the 
quality of her work to pacify the institution and protect herself from being shamed by not 
adhering to the competing expectation for timeliness. Furthermore, this reduction in the quality 
of her work also conflicted with her own social worker identity-standard. Amy, and other social 
workers, could therefore be observed to engage in emotional work to excuse her actions, by 
denying any responsibility for failing to living up to these meanings (Scott and Lyman, 1968), 
thereby protecting herself from feeling shame, as she explained:  
“I think although my assessments sometimes, the quality can be really good, sometimes it can be 
very slapdash for the sake of getting it in for the duty tracker” (interview) 
In some contexts, however, the social workers felt they had more choice over their actions. In 
such situations compromising could be considered a strategy to create some space in which the 
social worker could do work that they felt proud of while avoiding the likelihood of being shamed 
177 
 
or humiliated. By minimally complying with the institutional expectations on some cases, 
sufficient time could be freed up to focus on a small number of cases in which the social workers 
could verify their identities. Greater levels of empathy for a child or family provided the 
foundation to want to focus on a particular case, for example, Paula stated to Amy on one 
occasion, “I really like the kids, they’d fit in with my kids” (fieldnotes). Such empathic 
identification created a desire to do more for them than was expected by the institution. This was 
illustrated by Helen, who was working with a child she had known previously: 
“he woke up, took an overdose in the family home, and was left in his bedroom for 36 hours, 
unconscious. And when he woke up, he had these burns to his body, like, down his back and his 
bum, and his hair. So he had, hair loss and all sorts, blisters everywhere, and he couldn’t 
understand what happened… he was one of the cases where I did lots of direct work with him, and 
I put the time in, and I made sure I saw him every week. But that was a massive commitment in my 
diary, but I made sure that, to do a good job for him, you make sacrifices” (interview) 
The child was placed in foster care and the expectation was to see the child for “statutory visits” 
every six weeks. It was unusual to visit more regularly than that. However, by making sacrifices 
elsewhere, Helen was able to go above and beyond the expectations with this particular child, 
which verified her identity as a good social worker, as she demonstrated in her retelling of the 
account to me:  
“I think the foster carer and [the child], at the time, I took time to build a relationship with them 
both. To get to know if it was the right placement for him, you have to get to know them. And, 
again, it’s about making your stat visits, doing your visits on time, and above and beyond what the, 
you know, the guidance, sort of, says. I think they would see, well, I know they thought I was a 
good social worker because he was gutted when I left. And the foster carer said that they were 
disappointed that I was leaving because I had invested a lot of time into [the child]. And there are 
cases where you do spend more time with than others” (interview) 
As this case illustrates, compromising tactics could be considered as minor levels of resistance, 
whereby some of the institutional pressures, expectations, and demands were adhered to while 
others were not. Consequently, the social workers could create a sufficient level of emotional 
safety and attract a sufficient level of social acceptance, while in some situations being more 
active in seeking to verify their own identity meanings. This provided the opportunity to feel 
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satisfied with what they had done, as Helen showed in her concluding comments about her work 
with the above child: “that’s, like, the best bit. That’s why I want to do this job” (interview).  
CONCEALING ACTS OF RESISTANCE 
Concealing acts of resistance were founded in the rejection of the meanings and expectations of 
the institutional representation. However, a practitioner could not escape the institutional 
pressures without leaving the organisation. In a parallel to Brandon’s (2008) analysis of the 
actions of parents who seek to present a façade of acquiescence to social workers’ demands, 
Oliver (1991) equally argues that institutions can seek to disguise their compliance to resist the 
pressures placed upon them. Rather than seeing the social workers’ actions as disguised 
compliance, however, similarly to Hébert’s (2006) analysis of some in the Nazi party in Germany 
before 1945, it could be more accurately described as disguised resistance. The social workers 
could be seen to comply with the institutional expectations and demands in situations where 
their actions would be detected by institutional guardians, in attempts to avoid being shamed, 
while resisting them in situations where they would not, in order to practise in a manner they 
could feel proud of. This could be seen at both the individual and the team level. While the levels 
of surveillance and monitoring of the social workers were considered constant within the office, 
there was a distinct lack of monitoring of the social workers’ direct work with the children and 
families. The dominant form of practice could be considered to be enacting or complying, yet the 
lack of oversight of their direct work provided opportunities to resist the institutional norms, 
values, and expectations, as Monica demonstrated to me as we sat in the car following a home 
visit:  
“[Monica] tells me she is worried she is too soft. She tells me that the 12 year old boy disappeared 
yesterday with a 9 year old boy from next door and that [Julie] is working with that family. She said 
that [Julie] told her before she went out that she was going to call the mother of the 9 year old boy 
and “give her a bollocking”. [Monica] said to me “I didn’t give her [the mother] a bollocking” but 
then says she doesn’t think it is her job to tell people off. She says she doesn’t have children and 
so “how can I tell people how to parent?” I ask her why she is worried she is too soft and she says 
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“I don’t know”. She says you go out on your own and so you don’t get any feedback about your 
practice” (fieldnotes) 
While Monica expressed self-doubt that her practice did not conform to the institutional 
expectations, it could be seen as an act of resistance by practising in a manner contrary to these 
expectations. Such acts of resistance were, however, sporadic and concealed by practice that 
conformed to the institutional norms and expectations in other contexts, as demonstrated in one 
of Monica’s assessments:  
“There is a culture within this family dynamics of drug misuse which is minimised by [the father]. 
There is a further consensus with [the mother]’s family that deception towards the local authority 
is acceptable and is deemed as a moral method to meet their own gratification disregarding the 
potential negative impact this would have upon [the child]. Both parents have an extensive 
criminal career and morally [the father] believes that stealing from large supermarkets is 
acceptable, resulting in a culture of criminality in which [the child] would be surrounded around 
and believe such behaviours are socially acceptable” (written assessment) 
Such comments could be considered to be in line with the institutional representation that 
sought to regulate the identities of the parents to create a more socially acceptable parental 
identity. While some acts of resistance outside of the institution’s sphere of observation could be 
concealed relatively easily, acts of resistance were also reported to be concealed within its sphere 
of observation through a more active form of deception, as one team manager experienced: 
“Team Manager: I’d much rather them tell me they can’t do something or they need extra help 
than lie to me and say they’ve done it and I find out they haven’t because I can’t 
cope with that 
Me:  Does that happen? 
Team Manager: Sometimes, and then that does upset me.  If people say to me, “We’ve done de, 
de, de”, you have a degree of trust, don’t you?  You have to trust people and 
then if I find out that actually, no, that’s not been done or, that does upset me.  I 
mean I don’t get cross but I deal with it and say, “Right, you haven’t done it.  I 
want it done by such and such a date and I will be monitoring more”, so I have 
the odd person who sometimes says they’re doing more than they are or says 
they’re doing things that I find they’re not and that is not okay” (interview) 
Such disguised resistance could enable the social workers to avoid the demands and expectations 
placed upon them. As the team manager demonstrated, however, it was usually only a matter of 
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time before such pretence was identified and action taken to regulate their identity through 
episodic shaming and/or heightening the sense of shame in that individual. To be able to achieve 
a more enduring form of concealment, action needed to be taken on a collective level. The team 
could create sufficient emotional safety to take the risk of deviating from the norm by collectively 
disguising their resistance. The team managers, who felt proud of their teams, presented a 
positive image of the team and the individuals within the teams to senior management, as Amy 
explained:  
“[the team manager] is very protective of the team, so she probably, she’ll say that, you know, 
we’re all wonderful to our area managers” (interview) 
The team managers could then take further action to reduce the scrutiny of the team by the 
senior management, such as by ensuring that the data for the team was acceptable for the 
institutional requirements: 
“[The team manager] then said she wanted to look at the “dirty data” and took some printed 
spreadsheets and said that the “data is doing us a disservice” and that it is “not making us look as 
good as we are”” (fieldnotes) 
The term “dirty data” was used in one team for the information that presented the team in a bad 
light, such as having statutory visits out of timescales. Once identified, the team manager would 
ensure that this was rectified immediately, thus ensuring a positive image was presented to 
senior management for as much of the time as possible. Indeed, the team managers considered 
themselves to be social workers first and managers second, making a distinction between ‘us’ 
(social workers) and ‘them’ (the management), as one team manager told me, “it’s not me and 
them [the social workers]; I’m part of them.  We’re in it together” (interview). This sense of 
solidarity with the social workers led the team managers to attempt to protect the social workers 
from being shamed by senior managers, as one team manager explained:  
“I would watch their back, that’s probably the best way of putting it.  If anything goes wrong in 
there, I’ll defend them.  You can come in and bollock me, I say, “don’t pull that on my social 
workers”, so I will deal with it.  I don’t think it would happen for me.  That’s, perhaps, the best 
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way.  They’re more secure because they’ve got me, haven’t they?  They’re my team, so I will take 
it.  If they mess up, I deal with it but in a nice way and they don’t do it again” (interview) 
By presenting a positive image of the team and ensuring acceptable data is provided for the 
team, together with preventing episodic shaming of the social workers from the senior managers 
as best they could, the team managers created the space for resistance within the team, as Linda 
explained:  
“she’s given me what I want out of the job and I’m giving her what she want, it’s a working 
relationship, I’ve got the knowledge and the experience that she can trust me and I can write 
credible reports and she’s given me the freedom to practise social work as I was taught, as she was 
taught and as [Carol] was taught, so it’s a, it’s a good working relationship in that respect” 
(interview) 
Having rejected the institutional representation, Linda felt that she was able to verify the 
meanings of her social worker identity free from the more constraining forces of the institution 
because the team manager was able to present a “symbolic acceptance of institutional norms, 
rules, or requirements” (Oliver, 1991, p.155) to senior management. Such concealment of the 
team’s resistance, however, only lasted for as long as the disguised resistance remained 
disguised. Once identified, the institutional processes of identity regulation and policing were 
legitimate, as illustrated below. 
INFLUENCING INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES AND PROCESSES 
For those who rejected the institutional representation but found themselves under pressure to 
act in a manner contrary to their identity-standard, concealing their acts of resistance was not 
always sufficient to placate their conscience. In such situations, social workers could seek to 
influence the source of the institutional pressures, norms, and expectations either through 
challenging the source or controlling the processes that reinforced the cultural norms and 
practices (Oliver, 1991). While this risked being shamed by institutional guardians, it ensured they 
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did not feel ashamed of their actions. The foundation for the strategy of influencing was an 
attitude of resistance, as demonstrated by Linda: 
“I see myself as a proper social worker, I see myself as a ‘social social worker’, I don’t see me self 
as an ‘agent of the state social worker’” (interview) 
Such attitudes could compel some social workers in some contexts to challenge what they 
considered to be inappropriate or even immoral actions. Indeed, challenging the rules, norms, 
and practices could be distinguished from other forms of resistance by the lack of desire to 
conform or feign conformity. Minor acts of challenge could be seen in single interactions, such as 
Monica’s actions in a legal gateway meeting (LGM):   
“one particular family of mine I took it to LGM and they were sitting there saying, talking about 
adoption for the youngest 2, I was like, “are you kidding me? Absolutely no way… that isn’t what 
I’m asking for, that isn’t what I think is proportionate”” (interview) 
Acts of challenge were necessary, however, across multiple interactions in order to sustain 
resistance to the pressures to conform to institutional norms and successfully influence the 
outcome of a situation, as demonstrated by Donna’s resistance to the expectation to remove a 
child from his mother: 
“I had already removed two kids off the mum and then the mum got pregnant again but with a 
different partner and we completely reassessed it, we didn't judge it by, I pushed for that and it 
was a hard fight.  It was a fight with the guardian.  It was a fight with management but people did 
listen to me and it worked.  And she's at home now with that baby, well, he's two, not a baby.  
Number two on the way, child thriving, thriving as an adult herself… instead of removing at birth, 
which would have been the natural thing to do because the girl had only just gone… But it was the 
fact I fought for her to keep that baby because it was the right decision” (interview) 
Donna challenged the “natural” thing to do because she did not think that was “right”, which 
compelled her to fight the multiple layers of institutional arrangements which were reinforcing 
the pressures and expectations. It is important to note, however, that it was not a simple process 
of the social workers resisting the senior managers. Systemic shame and pride operated outside 
of any individual and at times it was the social workers who could be considered the source of 
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institutional pressures while the senior managers resisted them. In one example, a social worker 
brought a case of a boy who had been beaten with a belt by his mother to a legal gateway 
meeting asking to enter the pre-proceedings process as a warning to the family expecting this to 
be a straight forward agreement, yet this was not the case, as I recorded:   
“They discussed the son refusing to have a bath and a few days before he had posted pictures of 
the mother, who was pregnant, in her underwear on Facebook for the second time. The area 
manager stated, “he’s being fucking arsey”, and then apologised for swearing while laughing. She 
explained that she has had teenage boys so “I’ve lived it”… There is a discussion about the benefit 
of going into pre-proceedings and the senior manager refers to the Facebook photos saying that 
“all women could understand” how the mother felt about the pictures going on there while 
laughing at the thought of it” (fieldnotes) 
Being a woman, a mother, and having parented teenage boys, the area manager had a high 
capacity for empathy with the mother in this situation and could find reason to excuse her 
actions. Being in a position of greater power than the social worker and team manager, she had 
access to greater resources to influence the outcome of the situation. Such instances were 
infrequent, however, as the senior managers’ social location and corresponding responsibilities 
made it more likely that their situated conceptualisations would be in line with the dominant 
institutional expectations creating actions which reinforced them. As one team manager told me, 
“there must be something in the further back you are the harsher you are” (fieldnotes).  
There were some instances where the social workers sought to gain a greater level of influence 
than by simply challenging institutional sources. Indeed, in some contexts social workers felt that 
they had to more directly control the institutional processes to avoid an outcome they could not 
accept. One example of such action was demonstrated in a conversation between Amy and a 
social worker from the Court and Care Planning team, who stated that she felt compelled to act in 
a manner that provided the maximum amount of influence she could exert, which enabled her to 
avoid feeling ashamed:  
“The social worker said that she had put her job on the line as her managers were saying they had 
to separate some siblings, with the younger one to be placed for adoption, but she couldn’t agree 
184 
 
to this and said she would resign if that happened. She said in the end senior managers had to 
agree to a further sibling assessment, which concluded they shouldn’t be split up. She said her 
name was mud for 3 or 4 months” (fieldnotes) 
Oliver (1991) argues that influencing tactics differ from all other forms of action as it does not 
treat the institutional pressures and expectations as a constraint to be obeyed or defied. Instead, 
influencing the institutional processes sought to alter or control these pressures to change the 
outcome of a situation. Influencing tactics, however, could only be effective in relation to 
influencing another’s situated conceptualisation. It was not possible to influence the institutional 
expectations relating to administration. These were impermeable to influence and were indeed a 
constraint to be obeyed or defied. Even defiance of these requirements, however, could only 
exist by avoiding scrutiny through concealing such behaviour and once identified were subject of 
episodic shaming and used as examples to deter others from taking such action. 
RESISTANCE: AN OVERVIEW 
A social worker began to resist the expectations placed upon them where they felt that they 
conflicted with their own identity-standard. Such conflicts, however, complicated their situated 
conceptualisations. On the one hand they knew they could be shamed or humiliated for not 
complying with these expectations, while on the other they could feel ashamed for not living up 
to their own identity-standards and guilty for being involved in harming another. With the 
consequences for being shamed and rejected by the institution being considered to be too great 
to risk, the dominant actions of the social workers complied with the institutional expectations. In 
some situations, however, the consequences for feeling ashamed and guilty of one’s actions 
outweighed the consequences for potentially being shamed by institutional guardians. Not being 
able to cope with what one had done led social workers to resist the pressures and expectations 
designed to direct their actions in a particular manner. In some situations this required action to 
compromise the institutional expectations to be able to undertake their work without being 
shamed or provide sufficient time and space to do what they felt was right. In other situations it 
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was an attempt to conceal actions which they felt were right but defied the institutional 
expectations. While in some situations it was considered necessary to challenge the pressures 
and expectations to influence, alter, or prevent action that they considered inappropriate or 
immoral and avoid feeling ashamed of their actions. Such acts of resistance provided greater 
opportunities for relational engagement, recognising both social workers and parents as human, 
with individual strengths and struggles. 
RECOGNISING OTHERS AS HUMAN 
Pain and distress could be regularly observed in both the social workers and the parents and 
carers. The social workers could often be observed to struggle with the actions they had to take, 
struggle to produce work to a standard that they were satisfied with, and I often observed social 
workers in tears. The experience of the system for the social workers was summed up by one 
team manager as:  
“this job takes it out of you, it takes it out of everybody, it’s hard and the nature of the job, the 
whole thing about child abuse, child neglect, it’s unpleasant, it’s not nice… it’s emotionally 
draining.  And then on top of it you’ve got too much of it and then on top of that you’re being told, 
“we know it’s unpleasant, we know you’ve got too much but where’s that assessment, why is that 
assessment six months overdue, if you don’t improve your performance, well”. So it’s pressure 
upon pressure upon pressure.  In those circumstances maybe it’s a wonder that people aren’t 
crying more often” (interview) 
Equally, I observed or heard about the parents and carers regularly complaining, becoming angry, 
and feeling distressed. In a parallel process, we can consider both the social workers and 
parents/carers to be treated as ‘less than human’ (Rorty, 1989) within this system, only being 
recognised within the institution as a person worthy of respect and equal rights (Honneth, 1992, 
1995) if they conformed to certain expectations. For the team managers, resistance provided a 
mechanism by which they could recognise the social workers as more than just safeguarding 
social workers. So while one team manager explained the new context as, “the nurturing and the 
compassion is [sic] no longer there, I would say.  It’s pure business and that’s a bit of a conflict for 
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me because I care about people” (interview). They went on to explain how they used strategies of 
resistance to provide a more empathic environment:  
“I do what I have to do.  I’m not a big fan of timescales.  I’m much more bothered about quality 
and understanding what’s going on for that child but we do it.  We’re a performing team but then I 
will find time for my staff to do more work with the children and I find other ways of getting it how 
I want it really.  My nurturing is not approved of really but I’m not going to stop doing it because 
I’m like that out of work … so I comply to allow me to then be flexible and creative” (interview)  
This process was paralleled between the social workers and parents, as social workers sought to 
practise in a more compassionate manner. By resisting the institutional pressures, the social 
workers were able to acknowledge and respond to the pain and distress they saw in the parents 
and carers, affording them degrees of recognition. Such acts of resistance, however, conflicted 
with the institutional forces, as demonstrated in a child protection conference:  
“[The team manager] says if she [the mother] doesn’t “follow the plan then we would go to Court 
to get an Order which would give us the authority to remove your child”. The mother says “what 
do you mean?”, now with red eyes. [Donna] puts her hand on her arm and says “let me explain” 
but [the team manager] continues to explain the seriousness of the situation and [Donna] stops 
talking to the mother and withdraws her hand. The mother starts crying. [Donna] then puts her 
hand on the mother’s arm and starts to explain the situation and asks for some tissues which [the 
team manager] gets up and gets from another table to the side of the room and passes them to 
the mother. The mother stops crying and [the team manager] says that we “need to spell this 
out”” (fieldnotes) 
While Donna’s actions could be considered as a minor act of resistance in that it did not alter the 
child protection process, her actions did acknowledge the mother’s distress and provided some 
comfort against the message provided by the team manager. Where greater degrees of 
resistance were possible, greater degrees of recognition could be seen, as shown by Linda’s 
experience:  
“he [the father] used to ring me up and I used to give him feedback on his child and I think the 
bodies around me [the social workers] struggled and I said listen, this little child, when he gets 
older will see that a social worker tried to promote a positive relationship with his father, albeit a 
couple of hours contact a week, but at least he’ll have that sense of belonging, he’ll know who his 
father was, because the previous social worker had just cut the father out the picture. Well, you 
know, I don’t see that as good practice, I don’t care what they’ve done, the child still has, you 
know, still has a right to know” (interview) 
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Recognising others as worthy individuals, with rights and needs common to all human beings, was 
difficult because these were eclipsed by institutional priorities and concerns within their situated 
conceptualisations. For some, however, such action provided the foundations for feeling proud of 
their work, being recognised by the parents and carers, and having a more satisfying experience, 
as Linda, reflecting on her time in the team before she left, explained:  
“I took over from another social worker and I took a totally, I took the approach that I was taught 
to take and, yeah, I mean they’re ringing [the team manager] up, they’re sending flowers, they’re 
buying cakes, one of them wanted to come to my leaving do, you know, they’ve been stunned” 
(interview) 
A CASE ILLUSTRATION OF RESISTANCE  
The interaction between acts of resistance and the institution can be illustrated by the following 
case. A black family, consisting of a mother, her adult son, and three children under ten years old 
had recently moved into the area. The adult son was wanted by the police and they believed the 
mother was aiding his evasion. The police also believed the mother had stolen from a number of 
shops and were also seeking to arrest her. The children were already subject to child protection 
plans for neglect when the case was allocated to Linda. Linda’s conceptualisation of the situation, 
however, was that there were no child protection concerns and that this was an issue of 
challenging behaviour of the younger children. She rejected the need for child protection plans 
but complied with the processes which sustained them. She believed the mother was not only 
suffering from poverty and was, therefore, stealing to put food on the table for the children, but 
was also suffering from racial abuse in the area and harassment from the police. Being able to 
undertake direct work on her own enabled her to conceal her resistance, as she explained:  
“I worked with a woman who the local authority have been in and out of her life for years and 
have not seen any motivation for change, my colleague who has just taken the case over knocked 
at the door she run away from the front window, hid in the garden, I rang up and she answered 
the phone to me. That’s partnership working, that’s not [Linda], that’s the skills of partnership 
working and treating people with respect and not seeing them as a lower entity, there for the 
grace of god, go I” (interview) 
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Linda also challenged the police by making a complaint about their visits to the family, challenged 
the team manager by questioning why she was being asked to threaten the mother with removal 
of the children, and attempted to influence others’ perception of the family by promoting her 
conceptualisation within the team. As the team manager’s primary source of information about 
the family was Linda, her understanding of the situation was influenced by her. So while Linda did 
not believe the team manager was taking the situation of police harassment seriously enough, 
the team manager believed she was, as demonstrated in an interaction I observed in the team 
room:  
“[The team manager], a worker from another team, and [Amy] are talking in the team area about 
the family suffering from discrimination from the police. The school had called raising concerns 
about the children and the other worker said “all the world is against them”. [The team manager] 
said she has spoken to the police about the incident but she needs to go higher as she is not 
getting anywhere” (fieldnotes) 
Despite the team manager’s actions being consistent with Linda’s view, she still questioned 
Linda’s practice, and once Linda had left the authority, the team manager transferred the case to 
someone who she believed would be more compliant:  
“I’ve had a close eye on [Linda] on it [the case] because I know she’s been quite positive with it… 
[Linda]’s probably a bit optimistic on some of her cases.  She sees people as better than they are.  
I’ve given it to [Carla].  I think [Carla] and I have got a shared view” (interview) 
This shared conceptualisation was that greater authority was necessary to regulate the identity of 
the mother to create change in the situation, as demonstrated in one interaction I observed: 
[Carla] is talking across the desks to [Amy] and says that the police have been to the house again 
and broken the door in. She tells [Amy] that she told the mother “you’re at risk of losing your 
children if you’re engaged in criminal activity” and she also said that she told the mother that she 
needs to tell the police where her 19 year old son is” (fieldnotes) 
Carla’s actions could be considered to be an act of compromising institutional expectations as she 
had done enough to evade greater scrutiny while resisting the pressures to remove the children. 
This resistance could be considered to have stemmed from Carla having been influenced by Linda, 
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which was demonstrated through Carla retelling stories which Linda had highlighted as 
significant:  
“[Carla] said that uniform officers had gone to the home, confiscated the mother’s phone, arrested 
her, leaving 3 children aged 6 and twins of 8 with 2 police officers. The mother was taken away 
and [Carla] said the mother had bruises to her arms when she met up with her after this incident, 
and while the police officers were looking after the children one pulled the hair of one of the 8 
year olds and pushed his head into the sofa… [Carla] said “it’s not right” and “it shouldn’t be like 
that” and that she believed that it should be “innocent until proven guilty”” (fieldnotes) 
While no longer physically present, Linda’s actions had focused Carla’s, and the team manager’s, 
empathic attention towards the mother and the children, which supported them in resisting the 
systemic pressures to remove the children, as the team manager explained:  
“The police have got a thing about this family.  They’ve been saying to me for weeks, “Why haven’t 
you removed them?  Why haven’t you removed them?”, and I said, “I haven’t got enough 
evidence to remove them because actually, they’re in school now, their health needs are met, lots 
of things are better on the Child Protection”… I’ve been trying to manage it in the real world. You 
know, if I remove them into care, will they have a good outcome? No they won’t. They won’t have 
a good outcome at home but it might be slightly better. This isn’t something I’ve ignored” 
(interview) 
While the team manager provided the possibility for Linda, and then Carla, to resist the 
institutional expectations in their work with the family, once the team manager became ill and 
was off work for two weeks, the protection she provided was no longer present. The police again 
arrested the mother and requested the children be accommodated. The social workers had to ask 
the area manager who instructed them to apply for an Emergency Protection Order (EPO)(Section 
44, Children Act 1989). With any social worker knowing that they could be shamed or even 
humiliated for resisting such demands and expectations, they complied and the children were 
removed from their mother under an EPO and placed with foster carers. The children absconded 
from the foster carers, however, which then meant even higher levels of management became 
involved, as the team manager explained:  
“It’s gone upstairs and all the councillors have got involved.  They then set up a military operation 
in here where they all go out and find them with the police; then they find them and the mother is 
trying to take them on a train.  She’s charged with abduction, which I accept she’s played into that 
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and she shouldn’t have done it, so then all the children have all the police back again; all my team 
were out till half eleven.  They’ve driven them to [the North] and put them there.  The little one’s 
been put on his own.  The twins are together.  They’re all devastated.  They’re terrified of the 
police.  I have caused them, not me, this Local Authority has caused them further harm” 
(interview) 
The team manager’s comment that it was not her that had caused them harm can be considered 
to be a form of emotional work to alter her feeling of vicarious shame through absolving herself 
of responsibility and wrongdoing (Arluke and Hafferty, 1996). With the actions of the team 
manager not being considered to be consistent with the institutional norms in the eyes of the 
senior management, upon the team manager’s return to work they did not just question her 
decision making in that particular case, but in all cases, thus shaming her through threatening her 
identity as a team manager, as she explained:   
“there’s been lots of problems while I’ve been off and they [the senior management] were saying, 
“well, we used to trust your decision making but now we’re not so sure because you’re not taking 
things to Legal Gateway quick enough”… I’m not sure it’s always what’s best for the children; it’s 
what’s best for the Council… I’ve been very clearly told that I should have done it sooner; that I’ve 
perhaps made the wrong call on this but I haven’t… and somebody has to be blamed, don’t they?  
By putting the responsibility back on me, although I wasn’t here, it helps everybody else” 
(interview) 
As this case illustrated, while acts of resistance were possible, they were, on the whole, kept 
within certain boundaries. While this settlement provided some opportunity for the social 
workers to verify their identities, it also provided sufficient collective action to ensure the 
institution achieved its aims and objectives.  
RESISTANCE: A SUMMARY 
Self-conscious emotions can be considered to have played an important role in the situated 
conceptualisations of the social workers which led them to reject the institutional representation 
and resist the processes involved in regulating their identities. While perhaps not a simple 
process, shame and pride could clearly be seen in how the social workers related the situation to 
their past experiences, imagined what would happen in the future, and decided on what they 
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should do and how they should do it. Resistance occurred because the social workers did not 
want to feel ashamed or guilty of what they had done or who they were. While shame and pride 
may have been a driving force for action that resisted the institutional pressures and 
expectations, it was the meanings that the social workers had associated to their identities that 
conflicted with the institutional representation that drove the feelings of shame and pride. Those 
who felt compelled to resist invariably felt constrained by the systemic pressures and episodic 
actions of the institutional guardians. Such constraints served to weaken the attraction of the 
profession to the social workers, as Amy told me, “I love social work for what it should be” 
(fieldnotes), and the team managers, as one commented, “I’m just worried it’s [social work] 
going, or changing its guise, for the worse” (interview). Indeed, while the recent changes in the 
profession and the Council provided an “opportunity to move to a more human system”, as the 
other team manager commented, she concluded, “it hasn’t, it’s got worse” (fieldnotes). 
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CHAPTER 9: A RETURN TO EXPERIENCE  
The aim of this study was to explore the role of self-conscious emotions in child protection social 
work practice. Grounded in the pragmatic tradition, which calls for research to return to 
experience (Emirbayer and Maynard, 2010), it has sought to consider (1) the context for these 
emotional experiences, (2) how these emotions were experienced, and (3) the influence they had 
on how social workers practised. While the analysis that has been provided here is specific, not 
only to the Council, but also to the time in which I collected data within the Council, as Hughes 
argued back in 1958, such specific accounts of processes in one context can be useful to 
understand the processes in others. So while this chapter seeks to answer the research questions 
specifically for the Council involved in this study, it provides the first account of the role these 
emotional experiences have in social work practice providing a source for others to understand 
practice from this perspective in different organisations and contexts. This chapter takes each 
research question in turn, returning to the emotional experiences of the social workers by 
integrating these into the analysis provided in the previous chapters.   
WHAT IS THE CONTEXT FOR SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES IN CHILD 
PROTECTION SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE WITHIN THE COUNCIL AS REPRESENTED BY THE 
TWO TEAMS INVOLVED? 
Pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment can be considered simply as terms to 
categorise a unified conscious experience resulting from one’s thoughts and feelings in a given 
interaction between the person and their social world (Barrett, 2006a; Barsalou, 2009; Burkitt, 
2014). In understanding these emotional experiences, three different levels of analysis have been 
significant. The institution provided the social context in which the social workers sought to verify 
their identities and can, therefore, be considered to provide what Pearce and Cronen (1980) term 
a contextual force on the social workers’ identities. Self-conscious emotional experiences were 
constructed, principally, from the social workers’ identities, which provided a contextual force on 
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their emotional experiences. While the labels for different emotional experiences provided the 
ability for the social workers to understand and communicate their experience, these experiences 
can be considered to provide what Pearce and Cronen (1980) term an implicative force on the 
social workers’ identities, which in turn provided an implicative force on the institution. 
To understand the institution, however, and therefore the contextual force that it exerted, we 
have to understand (1) the actions of those within the institution, which Lawrence and Suddaby 
(2006) define as ‘institutional work’, i.e. “purposive action aimed at creating, maintaining and 
disrupting institutions” (p.216); and (2) the actions of those outside the institution, which we can 
consider as ‘institutional regulation’, i.e. the purposive action aimed at shaping, enabling, and 
constraining institutions. To understand identity, meanwhile, we have to understand (1) the 
actions of the person to create, maintain, or change an identity, which Alvesson and Willmott 
(2002) term ‘identity work’; and (2) the actions of a person intended to construct, shape, and 
change another’s identity, which Alvesson and Willmott (2002) refer to as ‘identity regulation’. 
Finally, to understand the emotional experience, we have to understand the actions of the person 
intended “to change in degree or quality an emotion or feeling” (Hochschild, 1979, p.561), which 
Hochschild35 terms ‘emotion work’. The idea of emotion work, however, is limiting as it deals only 
with the person ‘managing’ the internal feeling/emotion through the conscious effort to change 
one’s thoughts or bodily sensations. Burkitt (2014) argues that we not only seek to alter our 
internal state but also seek to alter our external environment in attempts to change what and 
how we feel. Indeed, while the diary entries suggested that the social workers did engage in 
emotion work, e.g. justifying actions to themselves, my observations suggested that they 
routinely sought to change their external environment, such as by saying or doing something 
which changed the social situation and therefore how they felt, e.g. challenging criticism. We can, 
therefore, consider ‘emotional work’ to incorporate, but be distinct from, Hochschild’s notion of 
                                                          
35
 Hochschild’s work is founded on the notion of emotions as natural-kinds, which Burkitt (2014) argues 
contributed to the reason she focused on the internal work of individuals to alter how they feel and ignore 
the external work they engaged in 
194 
 
emotion work, as it includes the conscious effort to change in degree or quality an emotion or 
feeling through altering what one is thinking and feeling by altering one’s internal state and/or 
one’s external environment. In addition to the intentional actions of the individual themselves to 
alter how they feel, we also have to understand the actions of a second person intended to 
induce, influence, or alter the emotional experience of the first, which we can consider as 
‘emotional regulation’36. Indeed, a team manager could, for instance, want a social worker to feel 
ashamed or guilty in order to shape or change their behaviour. The resulting self-conscious 
emotional experience stems from the interaction between the attempts by others to regulate 
how a person feels and the work of that person to alter how they feel. This interaction, between 
the regulation of others and the work of the individual, can be considered at any of the analytical 
levels, i.e. the institution, an identity, or an emotional experience.   
These components can be brought together with Creed et al.’s (2014) analysis of shame in 
institutional work to provide a more holistic framework to understand the context for self-
conscious emotions. Systemic shame and pride can be considered to provide the wider context in 
which all action and experience takes place. Institutionally inspired discourses were constructed 
within this context, which, together with episodic shaming and praising, can be considered to act 
as a regulatory mechanism, intended to align the institution, and therefore the identities and 
emotional experiences of institutional actors, to the boundaries of the wider systemic shame and 
pride. A person’s felt experience and/or their sense of shame and pride, meanwhile, may induce 
institutional, identity, and/or emotional work of the person to create, maintain, or disrupt their 
institution, identity, or emotion. This creates a tension between the intensions of the regulators 
and those of the regulated, which can result in resistance. This process is diagrammatically 
represented in figure 9.1, which shows how a social worker’s emotional experience, situated 
within a particular interaction, was embedded within wider social processes.   
                                                          
36
 The psychological literature refers to intrinsic and extrinsic emotional regulation, where intrinsic refers to 
what I am calling emotional work, and extrinsic refers to what I am calling emotional regulation (see Gross, 
2008)  
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Figure 9.1: Contextualising self-conscious emotional experiences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This perspective enables us to contextualise Brown’s (2007) assertion that “shame comes from 
outside of us—from the messages and expectations of our culture. What comes from the inside 
of us is a very human need to belong, to relate” (p.xxiv). While the messages and expectations 
emanating from the wider culture are perhaps complex, providing many possibilities for 
belonging, those within the Council were narrower and more consistent as a consequence of the 
narrow and consistent messages provided by the media, politicians, and Oftsed intended to 
regulate the institution. These collective messages provided a systemic force which defined 
shameful and praiseworthy behaviour for a child protection organisation. This systemic force can 
be considered to have been operationalised within the Council through the creation of policies, 
procedures, and shared rules. This provided highly defined boundaries of what was acceptable 
and what was not, i.e. systemic shame and pride, which the social workers had to be socialised 
into. To paraphrase Brown (2007), the social workers did not start out with a desire to go to Court 
wanting to remove a child. They did not start out with a deep anxiety about not being perceived 
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to be competent. They did not start as a social worker with a belief that their worthiness was 
linked to their ability to meet timescales on the one hand and manage an excessive workload on 
the other, all while never being seen to get upset. This situation came about because a set of 
meanings and expectations were created, i.e. the institutional representation of a safeguarding 
social worker, to evaluate the social workers against. These boundaries were supported and 
policed by those with cognitive, emotional, and/or moral commitments to the Council, i.e. 
institutional guardians, who would praise those who lived up to the institutional representation 
and shame those who transgressed its boundaries, i.e. episodic shaming and praising. By seeking 
to belong to the team and the safeguarding service, the social workers learnt from their 
interactions with others how to practise child protection social work and how to be a child 
protection social worker, i.e. they developed a contextually relevant sense of shame and pride. It 
is through these processes that we can understand how the social workers experienced pride, 
shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment. 
HOW ARE SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS EXPERIENCED IN THE CONTEXT OF CHILD 
PROTECTION SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE WITHIN THE COUNCIL AS REPRESENTED BY THE 
TWO TEAMS INVOLVED? 
On the one hand the social workers were being evaluated by others within the institution against 
one set of standards, i.e. the institutional representation, while on the other they were evaluating 
themselves against another set, i.e. their own identity-standards. In any given situation the social 
workers had to consider how they were/would be perceived by others, how they were/would be 
perceived by themselves, the likely consequences for the possibilities for action or inaction, and 
how they felt/would feel given these actions, i.e. their situated conceptualisation. It is through 
these complex conceptualisations of the perceived meanings in a given situation that a social 
worker could categorise their experience as pride or shame etc. or anticipate such a potential 
emotional experience.   
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PRIDE AND ACCEPTANCE 
Experiences categorised as pride stemmed from positive self-evaluations, where the social 
workers felt personally responsible for verifying their identity, as demonstrated by Jemma’s diary 
entry:  
“[Situation:]  Achieving a visit to see a disengaged teenager who has moved out of 
area. I had to persuade TM [team manager] to keep case open to me, as 
it is in childs [sic] best interests.  
[Thinking:]  Happy, pleased that I had been persistent and patient. Visit went well, 
despite young person being very late.  
[Bodily sensations:]  Relaxed, lots of smiles. Informal chat, information gathering – (young 
person is usually closed to conversation).  
[Description:]  Felt like I had achieved what others had been unable to – Proud, 
patient.  
[Categorised as:]   Pride 
[Influence] I have learnt that with some service users it is important to adopt 
different approaches also, to challenge decisions I don’t think are in 
child’s best interests” 
As the above diary entry shows, however, the focus in experiences categorised as pride was the 
‘self’ and contrary to Scheff (2014), feeling proud did not equate to feeling accepted. The focus in 
experiences categorised as acceptance, in contrast to pride, was the actions of others, which 
provided a sense of acceptance in someone else’s social world, as Monica’s diary entry showed:   
“[Situation:]  I visited a family who were previously very hostile however are now 
very cooperative and pleasant. The case will end soon 
[Thinking:]   How well the family had progressed 
[Bodily Sensations:]  I felt relaxed 
[Description:]  I felt accepted 
[Categorised as:]   Acceptance” 
Some social workers did categorise their experience as pride and acceptance, however. While the 
actions of another provided a feeling of acceptance, a social worker could consider the reason for 
receiving this acceptance and, if they felt this was because they had some responsibility in 
verifying their identity, feel pride, as Melanie’s diary entry demonstrated:  
 “[Situation:]   I felt good when I was praised and valued for my practice.  
[Thinking:]   Felt accepted like I can do the job.  
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[Bodily Sensations:]  Smiled. Warm feelings inside.  
[Categorised as:]   Acceptance. Pride. Embarrassment 
[Influence:]   Felt confident, self-belief” 
While episodic praising and a sense of pride were reported by the social workers to provide a 
motivational effect, encouraging them to act in a manner that attracted praise and acceptance, it 
was not a strong deterrent to act against with their own identity-standards if encouraged to do so 
by institutional guardians. Episodic shaming and a sense of shame provided a more effective 
deterrent and could, therefore, be considered to work alongside episodic praising and a sense of 
pride to provide the means to regulate and control the identities of the social workers. 
SHAME 
Experiences categorised as shame related to a negative self-evaluation. The focus in such 
experiences was the feeling of being responsible for failing to live up to their own identity-
standards, as shown in Mandy’s diary entry:  
“[Situation:]  Not addressing an assessment I need to undertake. It is in relation to DV 
[domestic violence]. Father controlling and monitoring mother’s phone. 
I had rang the school to make/or try and make arrangements to see her 
there. School said they can never get hold of mum – Dad always 
answers the phone and neighbour always takes and collects child.  
[Thinking:]  Oh shit – I have got to deal with this and not leave it any longer. How 
can this be planned safely. I need to talk to manager. I need guidance so 
I don’t make a situation worse.  
[Bodily Sensations:]  None 
[Description:]   I felt shame as I was bloody annoyed with myself 
[Categorised as:]  Shame 
[Influence:]  I had/requested a mini supervision with the manager. I beat myself up 
over things anyway and I’m my own worst critic – I don’t think that will 
change. I will always have my stick!” 
As this diary entry shows, however, experiences of shame, or indeed any other ‘emotion’, did not 
always correspond with changes in bodily sensations. One could ‘feel’ shame, or pride, etc. 
because their unified experience sufficiently corresponded to their understanding of the term, 
which, at times, could relate more to thoughts than feelings. While in some situations the social 
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workers saw no conflict in verifying their identities through adhering to the institutional 
representation, in others, the social workers could feel their identities were threatened by doing 
this and felt ashamed of doing what they thought was wrong and immoral. Consequently, the 
social workers sought to avoid such identity-threats.  
The social workers could also experience shame, however, if they evaluated themselves 
negatively as a result of a perceived negative evaluation by others. This form of shame did not 
require another person to criticise or blame them and, contrary to Scheff’s (2000) analysis, the 
focus in such experiences was a negative self-evaluation rather than a feeling of being rejected. 
Such experiences stemmed from an imagined judgement, i.e. interpreting a negative judgement 
from another without the presence of someone else, or an implied judgement, i.e. interpreting a 
negative judgement from another without such judgement being directly expressed, as 
demonstrated by Monica’s experience: 
“She said that they [other professionals] often want her to remove children when she didn’t think 
that was the best option and she said “I think there’s something wrong with me, like I’m 
incompetent, if they all think this why am I the only one not to?”” (fieldnotes) 
The result of such imagined or implied negative judgments was to consider themselves from the 
perspective of another and, therefore, feel that their identity was threatened from this 
perspective. The identity and emotional regulation of the social workers by the institutional 
guardians ensured that the social workers’ knowledge of how they were being judged by others 
remained in the foreground of their situated conceptualisations. The social workers, therefore, 
undertook emotional and identity work to verify their own identities while adhering to these 
external expectations. There were only three diary entries categorised solely as shame, however. 
It was more often a label used in conjunction with other terms, reflecting the complexity of the 
social situations the social workers found themselves in and their resulting self-conscious 
emotional experiences. 
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REJECTION, HUMILIATION, AND SHAME 
Distinct from imagined and implied judgements, the social workers often experienced instances 
of being directly criticised and blamed, which we can term an actual judgement. Such experiences 
were categorised as rejection, along with other terms such as shame, humiliation, and/or 
embarrassment, as shown in Donna’s diary entry:  
“[Situation:]  In supervision with team manager I wanted to discuss feeling 
undermined but felt like I wasn’t understood and it took ages to get 
across my point, I still felt at the end of it that my point wasn’t 
understood properly 
[Thinking:]  Annoyed – felt a bit worthless and misunderstood. Felt disappointed in 
my T.M. who I always thought I got on with and understood me 
[Description:]  I was going hot, then cold – I was tense. I tried to get my point across in 
gestures by using hand gestures 
[Categorised as:]   Rejection. Humiliation. Embarrassment. Anger 
[Influence:] I tried to defend myself – in future I’m worried I might not address 
issues which upset me as I felt it backfired and made me look ‘silly’” 
While rejection was the experience of a perceived actual judgement by others, humiliation was 
used to indicate this was experienced as intentionally hostile, which, when experienced in public, 
was an even more distressing experience.  Shame, on the other hand, as described above, could 
be considered to be the reflection of rejection, as a social worker perceives the negative 
evaluation by someone else to have some validity, as the following diary entry by Melanie, who 
had been criticised by her manager the previous day for a mistake she had made, exemplified:  
“[Situation:]  I came to work this morning feeling anxious about an error from the 
previous day that I had attempted to rectify which I feel/felt was/is out 
of my control and had potential disciplinary consequences. I was 
anxious about the managers uneasy feeling towards a professionals 
meeting I was having today.  
[Thinking:]  I felt responsible for my error, responsible for any potential 
consequences for me and my team manager as a result of my actions. I 
felt conscious of what others would think of me and my practice.  
[Description:]   I felt tense, emotionally sensitive.  
[Categorised as:]   Rejection, Shame, Anxiety 
[Influence:]  I was (felt) less confident – open up for criticism” 
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Melanie felt shame because she believed she was responsible for not living up to her identity-
standard of being a competent worker and a reliable team member, she felt rejection because 
her manager had criticised and blamed her, and she felt anxiety because she worried what her 
colleagues thought of her. While experiences of shame and rejection were closely related, they 
were not considered the same experience. It was the emotional experience of shame and 
rejection, with the threat of this being humiliating, which was most intense and difficult to deal 
with and, as such experiences were feared, the social workers attempted to avoid situations 
where this was a possibility. Within such contexts, the social workers prioritised the need to live 
up to the institutional expectations over their need to verify their own identities. Episodic 
shaming was, therefore, a very successful mechanism of social control and institutional 
reproduction. Indeed, it turned the implied judgements of institutional guardians into actual 
judgements by proxy. While I was able to identify an actual judgement fairly easily through my 
observations, I was surprised at the reported intensity of feeling resulting from some implied 
judgements from institutional guardians, as some seemed indistinguishable from the experiences 
resulting from actual judgements.  
GUILT 
Some experiences of guilt related to a transgression of a moral boundary. For example, a social 
worker could feel guilty for not being busy and feeling relaxed, as this contravened the accepted 
cultural standard for a social worker that provided the message that they should be busy, as 
demonstrated by Mandy’s diary entry: 
“[Situation:]   That I wasn’t so busy today in the office. I felt guilty.  
[Thinking:]  I can think! I’m not rushed off my feet. I can get my paperwork done. 
Felt guilty for taking advantage of the lull.  
[Bodily sensations:]  Relaxed.  
[Feeling:]   Guilt” 
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Such moral transgressions, however, had no observable consequence on others and there were 
instances of others who found themselves in similar situations but did not feel guilty. More 
typically, experiences of guilt involved a focus on the consequences of their actions, which, 
believing they had disadvantaged or harmed another person, perceived such action to have 
transgressed a moral boundary, as Jemma’s diary entry showed:  
“[Situation:]  Making mother cry in a meeting whilst discussing her father who has 
recently passed away – I was focused on him being a PPRC [person who 
poses a risk to children] and safeguarding children.  
[Thinking:]  Insensitive to mother’s situation and grief. Others probably thought I 
was insensitive too. Other professionals remained quiet.  
[Bodily Sensations:]  I felt hot and tense, sweating fidgety 
[Description:]   Felt guilty – not for what I said but how I said it. Lacked empathy 
[Influence:] I rushed into meeting, little preparation, due to other commitments. 
Came across to mother as very ‘matter of fact’ with little regard to her 
feelings. I must show more consideration for families lived experiences 
in future – oh and slow down and be prepared!” 
As this diary entry shows, feeling guilty motivated the social workers to make amends or avoid 
certain actions. However, as the interpretive framework promoted by the institutional guardians 
elevated the moral status of the children and devalued the status of the parents and carers, the 
focus of such experiences was typically the children themselves, as Helen’s diary entry 
demonstrated:  
“[Situation:]  Having to cancel and rearrange an appointment with a YP [young 
person].  
[Thinking:]  Felt guilty to cancel an arranged appointment and didn’t want to let 
down the YP. The YP sounded disappointed initially although was happy 
with the arranged date  
[Bodily Sensations:]  I didn’t feel sensation, if the YP wanted to see me today I would have 
visited therefore I didn’t feel nervous, tense or anxious about making a 
call to her  
[Description:]  Letting this YP down. I didn’t/don’t want the YP to feel as though they 
aren’t important to me.  
[Categorised as:]   Guilt  
[Influence:]  I feel I was able to ask the YP if she was OK with changing the date. I 
should have made it clear that if she wanted to see me today, I would 
get to her before the end of the day – I will try to do this in the future 
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Indeed, I observed a number of instances of social workers challenging what they were being 
asked to do by their team manager because they said they would feel guilty about the 
consequences for the child. There were much fewer instances of this in relation to the parents 
and carers. In fact, some saw feeling guilty for the consequences of their actions on the parents 
as an unavoidable and necessary part of doing a good job, as Lucy’s diary entry shows:  
“[Situation:]  This afternoon I had to inform a young mum that her partner was a DV 
[domestic violence] perpetrator who has other children subject to CP 
[child protection] plans 
[Thinking:]  How the mum would take this information and the impact that this will 
have upon the relationship and child. The mother was initially very 
angry with me but then explained that this was because she was upset. I 
felt sad for the mother 
[Bodily Sensations:]  I felt tense at the beginning of the conversation but relaxed and was 
able to offer mum some reassurance. The situation was displeasurable 
[Categorised as:]   Guilt. Important 
[Influence:]  Because I felt that my role was important in safeguarding both mother 
and baby I was able to explain the next step to mum calmly. I felt guilty 
for upsetting her with the information” 
While some social workers felt guilty about what they had done, by accepting the institutional 
interpretive framework that protecting children often involved having to upset parents, this 
displeasureable experience could be refashioned as a positive one. This ensured that the social 
workers were protected from the debilitating effects of self-doubt and shame in potentially 
distressing situations. From an institutional perspective, this ensured that they were able to 
continue to perform child protection social work and maintain the institutional arrangements. 
EMBARRASSMENT 
Contrary to Goffman’s (1956) analysis, while embarrassment was experienced by the social 
workers, it did not seem to play a significant role in their daily lives. Within the diary entries, it 
was a term used to categorise both positive experiences, being used alongside pride and 
acceptance, and negative experiences, being used alongside shame, guilt, humiliation, and 
rejection. My observations and discussions with the social workers indicated that a typical 
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experience of embarrassment related to a perception that the self was being falsely presented, 
rather than one’s identity being threatened. False-positive presentations of self stemmed from 
positive praise that the social workers did not believe they deserved, as shown in a conversation I 
observed:  
“While sitting at the desks working [Lucy] spoke to [Jemma] to say that in her previous workplace 
one of her assessments was used as a good example and sent around the teams, describing this as 
embarrassing” (fieldnotes) 
While false-negative presentations of self stemmed from imagined or implied negative 
judgements that the social worker did not accept, as demonstrated by Helen’s experience:  
“She said that some cases get closed and come back in and when it is your old case it is 
embarrassing and told me of a case she had closed and then it came back in and the children were 
removed and this was especially embarrassing” (fieldnotes) 
There seemed to be little anxiety about sharing embarrassing experiences, with the social 
workers retelling such stories in the team room. In the diary entries, however, embarrassment 
was never used on its own, potentially because these experiences were not at the forefront of 
their minds, or considered significant enough to report on, at the end of the day when they were 
completing the diary entries.  
RELIEF 
What I had not anticipated as part of this study were experiences of relief. Relief is not commonly 
discussed in the literature and research on self-conscious emotions, yet it was regularly reported 
by the social workers. Relief could be seen in contrast to anxiety, as self-conscious emotions were 
implied in both experiences. For example, Donna’s experience of anxiety implied a threat to her 
identity through an imagined judgement by others: 
“[Situation:]   Going on holiday for 2 weeks after today.  
[Thinking:]  Stressed. Anxious. Worried about how much work I haven’t completed 
prior to going on leave.  
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[Bodily Sensations:]  Heart racing – body feels tense. I have strange feelings in my stomach ie 
as though my stomach is flipping over.  
[Description:]   I feel anxious.  
[Categorised as:]   Anxiety” 
While Amy’s experience of relief demonstrated the alleviation of such anxiety:  
“[Situation:]   Granted ICO [Interim Care Order] 
[Thinking:]   Relief, comfort that they’re safe. THANK GOD FOR THAT!  
[Bodily Sensations:]  Relaxed. Tearful 
[Description:]   Happy. Relieved” 
The feeling of getting a Court Order to place the children in care meant the tension from the 
possibility they would be harmed, the shame and guilt she may have felt as a consequence, or the 
shaming she may have had to endure, was now gone and she could finally release the tension 
through her tears and feel relaxed. Where relief was recorded in the diary entries, it was either 
the only label used to categorise such experiences or it was used together with pride. By acting in 
accordance with the meanings and expectations of the institutional representation, the social 
workers could temporarily alleviate any threat to their identities and feel pride and acceptance 
within the institution. While the social workers enjoyed and sought out opportunities to be 
praised, however, alleviation from shame seemed to be a more important goal, motivating them 
to do undesirable tasks, as Melanie’s diary entry shows: 
“[Situation:]   Completing (typing up and sending to TM) an assessment – sat in office.  
[Thinking:]  I was determined to type and send my assessment to TM. It was 
overdue in terms of timescale data however I had done it some weeks 
before and not got around to typing it.  
[Bodily Sensations:]  Relief 
[Description:]   Accomplished 
[Influence:]   After typing this I moved on to another outstanding assessment” 
SUMMARY 
These data demonstrate that self-conscious emotions were an inherent part of child protection 
social work practice. Firstly, the social workers felt anxious about not doing the ‘right’ thing in the 
‘right’ way. They were anticipating the possibility of being shamed, explicitly or implicitly, in every 
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situation. Secondly, they were asked to do things which they felt ashamed or guilty of. They felt 
they had to do them because otherwise they would be shamed and/or humiliated if they did not. 
Shame was, therefore, inevitable unless they changed the meanings and expectations they held 
in their social worker identity so that what they were being asked to do was no longer conceived 
as personally shameful. Indeed, some social workers reported that doing child protection social 
work was changing them as a person, making them harder and less sensitive, making them more 
susceptible to identifying with the institutional representation. Thirdly, they were shamed and/or 
humiliated for not meeting expectations, even when it was not possible to meet the expectations. 
They, therefore, felt that they were not good enough, never being able to prove themselves as 
worthy of acceptance and belonging within the institution. Consequently, some social workers 
tried harder to gain acceptance by practising in a manner that attracted praise, increasing their 
susceptibility to identifying with the institutional representation. When a social worker felt able 
to verify their own identities and act in accordance with the institutional representation at the 
same time, not only did some social workers report feeling relief and pride but they also reported 
feeling ‘professional’, an embodiment of the institutional representation, as Amy recorded in her 
diary entry:  
“[Situation:]  I have completed all paperwork in relation to a particular case ready for 
court. This has been a case I have worked on for 8 years and solidly for 
the last 2 weeks completing this.  
[Thinking:]  Relief. Thank god I’ve finished! Proud of the quality of work that I have 
produced. Relieved that we will be able to get the children to a place of 
safety.  
[Bodily sensations:]  Relaxed, smiled, did a little dance. Less pressure on brain.  
[Description:]   Relief. Pride. Professional. Happy.  
[Categorised as:]   Pride” 
Despite the rich picture of emotional experiences presented by these data, much of these 
embedded, embodied experiences remained hidden from the senior management, the team 
managers, and even each other, as they did not often discuss their emotional experiences openly. 
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Yet, what is clear is that practice involved a range of self-conscious emotions, sometimes 
overwhelmingly so, which did indeed influence the way the social workers practised.  
HOW DO SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS INFLUENCE THE WAY SOCIAL WORKERS 
PRACTICE WITHIN THE COUNCIL AS REPRESENTED BY THE TWO TEAMS INVOLVED? 
Power (1997) argues that the mechanisms of auditing control organisations by pushing the 
priorities of the auditors into the organisation. This study has argued that self-conscious 
emotional experiences were central to this process within the Council. By knowing the conditions 
of being shamed and praised, the priorities of the auditors were pushed into the identity of the 
organisation, which were pushed into the identities of the social workers. The practical effect of 
inducing certain self-conscious emotions in the social workers was to foreground the needs of the 
auditors/organisation, irrespective of the needs of the family. Therefore, some social workers 
reported feeling proud of removing children, giving evidence in Court, writing reports, meeting 
timescales, and closing cases, not only because they knew that they would be praised for such 
action but also because they had come to believe that this is what it means to be a good 
safeguarding social worker. Some reported feeling ashamed for making administrative errors, of 
not completing reports on time, or not having the same opinion as their team manager, not only 
because they knew they would be shamed for such action but also because they had come to 
believe that this was legitimately shameful behaviour for a safeguarding social worker. Even for 
those who did not identify with the institutional representation so easily, the institutional 
processes of identity regulation were still effective. While some social workers felt ashamed of 
removing children, upsetting parents, or not living up to their own identity-standards, they still 
went against their own reservations because they believed they would be shamed or humiliated 
for not doing so. Despite feeling guilty about upsetting the children they worked with, some 
social workers still cancelled appointments to be able to complete paperwork on time because it 
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was believed that the organisation valued administrative work more than any direct work they 
could do with the child and family. 
Such practice could be considered to contradict the stated aims for social work practice within 
the Council, which had sought to embed a whole family approach, using family group 
conferencing and the Signs of Safety as practice methodologies, all supported by ongoing 
reflective supervision. Given the context, pressures, and expectations, however, it had become 
difficult for managers and social workers to be able to enact these ideals. Even though the social 
workers wanted to provide therapeutic support and practical help to families, they not only found 
it difficult to find the time to do this, they were also often unsure how to. Such work was 
considered the domain of other agencies or professionals. Rather than the practice of the social 
workers resembling professionalised social work practice, it seemed more akin to the pre-
professionalised practice of early social workers in the 1800s (Woodroofe, 1962; Young and 
Ashton, 1967; Roof, 1972). They gathered information about the family by asking very personal 
questions, produced a report to present to those who controlled the resources, and made 
referrals to the organisations who they considered could best address the issues they had 
identified. Their role was predominantly one of knowledge of available services, navigating the 
formal and informal structures of a multiplicity of state and non-state organisations, and 
coordinating the work of others. Indeed, considering the changes within the profession from the 
1970s to the 1990s, Parton (1996) argued that social work was being refashioned into a different 
profession, undertaking different work, in different ways to how it had traditionally been 
understood and practised. Twenty years on from his arguments, along with continued significant 
changes to how the profession is organised and evaluated, the social workers within the teams 
themselves were stating that what they were doing could not be considered social work. 
Arguably, their work could be more accurately described as social administration (Lohmann and 
Lohmann, 2001).  
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The consequence of this was, firstly, that the focus on administrative tasks ensured that there 
was a perception of effective management of the risks posed to the children. By organising the 
service in such a manner, the social workers produced the evidence the senior managers needed 
to present to Ofsted during an inspection, which provided organisational legitimacy. Such practice 
could, therefore, be considered a form of collective emotional work to create emotional safety by 
avoiding being shamed. Secondly, the focus on administrative tasks reduced the amount of time 
the social workers had to work with the children and families. Without this time and input, it was 
difficult to effect any change within the family. Occasionally the social workers would blame 
themselves, but as Satyamurti (1981) also found in her ethnographic study of social workers, 
more usually they would blame the family for their own painful feelings of inadequacy. Rather 
than simply a psychodynamic process of defending the self against feelings of inadequacy, 
however, this situation can be considered to have psychological, social, and structural 
components. Thirdly, therefore, by refocusing the social work role on to administrative tasks, the 
social workers capacity for empathy for the parents can be considered to have been reduced. 
Indeed, Larson argued in 1979 that where there is external pressure to perform non-client 
focused tasks professionals can develop an attitude of indifference towards their clients and even 
that “external imposition… may change indifference into unqualified hostility to the client” (p. 
188). Furthermore, by refocusing the social work role into one specifically for children, 
independent of their parents or wider family, it could be considered shameful to be seen to be 
focusing on the parents’ needs, arguably recasting them as undeserving of help and support, and 
legitimising attempts to control those who were seen as a threat to a child. With the social 
workers effectively being given personal responsibility for the safety and wellbeing of the children 
on their caseload, knowing they could be blamed, criticised, shamed, and humiliated for any 
mishaps or tragedies, it was common for a parent or carer to be perceived as a threat to their 
child. Parents could, therefore, be treated as untrustworthy unless they proved themselves to be 
worthy of trust by agreeing with the social worker’s conceptualisation of the situation and 
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complying with the social worker’s requests. Where a parent was seen as responsible for any 
harm to a child, however, there were many occasions where they were not only blamed but 
judged as an immoral person. The experience of the social workers by the parents could, 
therefore, be one of shame and humiliation, which echoes Garfinkel’s (1956) notion of a 
degradation ceremony, intended to make the parents more accepting of external control through 
the creation of a new acceptable parental identity.  
In the context of social administration being the dominant form of practice, what we might 
traditionally understand to be social work practice can be considered not only a minor activity of 
the social workers, but also an activity of resistance. To retain a level of personal integrity, 
resistance was a necessity. For the senior management, the attempts to design the system 
around traditional social work values and practice were in response to the threats to the identity 
of the organisation following the fallout from the death of Peter Connelly. The social workers 
were considered an “at risk” staff group and this new systems design was intended to resist the 
negative national reputation the social workers had attained. This, however, had to be 
implemented alongside a raft of administrative measures which would satisfy the inspectors. For 
the social workers, they attempted to practise what they understood to be social work, and 
thereby verify their identities, while seeking to avoid being shamed. This was a very 
unsatisfactory situation for the social workers and all of them, at some point during my time with 
them, expressed disillusionment and hopelessness that things could change. As Creed et al. 
(2014) theorised, some social workers had begun to reassess the value of the work they were 
doing and even the value of social work as a profession. In rare situations, therefore, a social 
worker would risk being shamed by defying the institution simply to avoid feeling ashamed of 
what they were being asked to do.  
 
211 
 
WHAT ROLE DO SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS PLAY IN CHILD PROTECTION SOCIAL 
WORK PRACTICE: A SUMMARY 
So what role do self-conscious emotional experiences play in child protection social work 
practice? Put simply, they can be considered to exert a controlling influence on what the social 
workers do and how they do it, which is why they can be used by some in their attempts to 
control the actions of others. There are, of course, many other factors which influence how social 
workers practice, but if self-conscious emotional experiences are at the heart of all of our 
interactions (e.g. Cooley, 1902; Goffman, 1959) then they are at the heart of any form of practice. 
Indeed, as these experiences were inherently linked to identities they not only provided the 
ability to shape and constrain the identities of the social workers but also to construct new 
identities and impose them on the social workers. It is possible that such emotional experiences 
do not have to be as prominent as they seemed to be within this Council. It may be that other 
Councils are organised differently resulting in a different experience for the social workers. 
However, national issues played a large part in setting the context for the emotional experiences 
of everyone within the Council. So while the leaders and senior managers provided a vital 
contextual force for the social workers, they could not be considered to act as heroic leaders, able 
to set the institutional prescriptions, meanings, and expectations as they saw fit. They occupied a 
particular position within, but were part of, a wider system that is continually changing. The 
snapshot provided in this thesis provides a window into the lives of those who were expected to 
implement the contextually embedded intentions of these leaders and senior managers. The 
resulting conceptual framework to explain the actions of the social workers was intended to 
convey the complexity of how they came to practise within this context, while ultimately 
providing the institution with the evidence it needed for external legitimacy. Further studies in 
this area would be able to provide a window into the worlds of others from this perspective and 
build and develop our theoretical understanding of the role of self-conscious emotions in social 
work practice. 
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION 
The main argument of this thesis has been that self-conscious emotions were an inherent part of 
practice within the teams under study, on both a micro and macro level, and significantly 
influenced the actions of all those within the organisation. They could be considered to be at the 
heart of the processes that (1) installed the logic of administration and auditing as a dominant 
feature of the service; (2) created and embedded the meanings and characteristics of an ideal 
typical professional identity; and (3) guided and shaped the acquiescence or resistance of the 
social workers to the institutional expectations. These processes, and the resulting emotional 
experiences, were complex, involving a range of bodily sensations, cognitions, social interactions, 
and cultural constructions, which everyone ‘felt’ but struggled to communicate. Their influence, 
therefore, remained unacknowledged. It was not that the social workers wanted to focus on 
administration or, at times, practise in a derogatory fashion, or that the leaders and managers 
wanted to design a system where such practice was encouraged. These were just the effects of 
unconsciously constructing the boundaries for shame and pride in this manner. Given this 
analysis, we might want to ask what this study contributes to research and practice. This 
concluding chapter, therefore, answers these questions by, firstly, locating this study within a 
wider body of literate and considering how it compliments and extends this work, and, secondly, 
considering the implications of this analysis in attempts to create a better system.  
SO WHAT DOES THIS STUDY CONTRIBUTE TO RESEARCH? 
This study contributes to the debates within emotion theory generally and self-conscious 
emotions more specifically. A constructionist account of emotions provided the most useful 
theoretical perspective to interpret these data. These emotions were an inherent part of the 
ongoing interactional sequences of the social workers, being constructed from a ‘complex’ of 
components (Burkitt, 2015), which they were able to label with one or more terms. Furthermore, 
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a prototype approach enabled the terms the social workers used to communicate their 
experience to be considered as meaningful, rather than reducing their experience to a single a 
priori concept, triggered under certain conditions, or constructing multiple concepts to explain 
the variety of experiences categorised with the same term. These data support the notion that 
shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment are terms to indicate qualitatively different 
experiences, which can be combined to provide more detailed descriptions of the lived emotional 
experience. They also support the notion, however, that acceptance and rejection should be 
considered as emotional experiences in their own right, which can be used in conjunction with 
other terms to provide more specificity to a person’s comprehension and communication of their 
emotional experience. This supports Tangney et al.’s (2007) argument that shame specifically 
relates to a sense that there is something wrong with the ‘self’, rather than because someone 
else has evaluated them negatively, and Gausel and Leach’s (2011) argument that shame and 
rejection are distinguishable emotional experiences. The implication of this perspective, however, 
is that Scheff’s conception of shame and pride is more usefully conceived as rejection and 
acceptance, rather than as shame and pride.  
While this has been a study of self-conscious emotions, the primary concern has been their role in 
child protection social work practice and this study contributes to the field of social work in four 
main ways. Firstly, it demonstrates that the experiences of pride, shame, guilt, and humiliation 
were prevalent and significant for both the social workers’ and team managers’ practice. This 
finding complements the work of others within the field concerned with improving the systems 
and practices within the institution of social work (e.g. Ruch et al., 2010; Featherstone et al., 
2014b). Indeed, it provides a hitherto underexplored dimension to practice and a language to 
describe these experiences. Furthermore, the theoretical perspective that I have built 
complements and expands the existing literature and current perspectives on the forces that are 
created by wider social mechanisms in response to social, political, and functional pressures and 
their effect on organisations and their actors (Parton, 2014; Warner, 2015). It suggests that, as an 
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embodied experience, self-conscious emotions are an inherent part of social workers’ experience 
and, therefore, guides and constrains the actions and interactions that underpin what they do 
and how to do it, extending the debates on naturalistic decision making in social work practice 
(Platt and Turney, 2014). It also highlights, as an embedded experience, the significant role of 
those who set the context for their practice and how this context specifically influences what the 
social workers do and how they do it (Featherstone et al., 2014; Ferguson, 2014). This study has 
provided a language to highlight their use as political tools and cultural-cognitive resources, which 
can be used to understand and influence these emotional, psychological, and social processes.  
Secondly, this study contributes to the field of social work by incorporating and extending the 
literature on institutional work. While there is a long history in studies on institutions and 
organisations, institutional work as a field and research agenda is comparatively recent (Lawrence 
and Suddaby, 2006) and the role of emotions in institutionalisation has only recently begun to be 
considered (Voronov and Vince, 2012; Creed et al., 2014; Moisander et al., 2016). This study 
integrates a range of these ideas to provide a conceptual framework to understand how the 
boundaries for shameful and praiseworthy behaviour were not only constructed within the 
institution of child protection social work but also through formal and informal regulatory 
mechanisms, which were then translated and enacted within the organisation. It is only within 
such a perspective that the actions of the social workers could be comprehended. These 
frameworks extend the existing literature on emotions in institutional work by demonstrating 
how emotions can be used as a resource for the exercise of episodic power (Moisander et al., 
2016). Indeed, it extends this literature beyond that of shame, or even pride, to include guilt and 
humiliation as important resources to be mobilised in the process of disrupting, creating, and 
maintaining institutional arrangements. This identifies a new area of research in the field of social 
work, which has yet to consider these processes and experiences in any depth (Gibson, 2016), 
and demonstrates their significance, at least within the organisation under investigation, in the 
processes of institutional reproduction and change.  
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Thirdly, this study contributes to the debates on what power is and how it is exercised in 
institutional processes (Lukes, 2005; Lawrence, 2008) and social work practice (Hasenfeld, 1987; 
Tew, 2006). Considering self-conscious emotions as a component of the micro-foundations of 
interpersonal dynamics, communication, and social and symbolic interaction provides new 
avenues for theorising and researching how certain actions can be deterred, constrained, and 
shaped, while others encouraged, maintained, and supported (Voronov and Vince, 2012). Indeed, 
by considering self-conscious emotions as both an effect and source of power, this study 
compliments the literature on how power opens up or closes off certain opportunities not only 
for the social workers but also the managers and the organisation as a whole (Tew, 2006). By 
constructing notions of legitimacy and standards to achieve legitimacy, both for organisations and 
professionals, self-conscious emotions can be considered the systemic force that achieves 
motivation and commitment to certain ways of acting and being within a given institution. Shame 
and pride can, therefore, be considered inherent components of the legitimising process, while 
humiliation may be a standard organisational product (Czarniawska, 2008) in the rituals of 
verification (Power, 1997). The findings of this study also contribute to the debates on power and 
resistance, however, as Hudson et al. (2015) argue, notions of legitimacy are always contested 
and, as this study has demonstrated, self-conscious emotions can be considered an essential 
component in attitudes and actions of resistance.  
Fourthly, the findings from this study can situate these processes of institutionalisation within the 
wider debates on social work, the professions, and the welfare state. A broad pattern of neo-
bureaucratic reorganisation of public services has been observed in recent decades. This has been 
argued to shift the mechanisms of control of organisations, and those within them, from a 
Weberian-type bureaucratic one, i.e. the ‘iron-cage’, to more of a Foucauldian one, i.e. the 
‘panoptic gaze’ (Power 1997; Reed, 1999). Some, however, have argued that such analyses 
provide a too broad a perspective, which limits the effectiveness of such analytical devices in 
empirical work (e.g. Hoggett, 1996; Farrell and Morris 2003; Exworthy, 2015). This study suggests 
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that instead of a move from one to the other, it could be seen more as a merger, creating new 
forms of “compliance structures, knowledge systems and surveillance technologies” (Reed, 1999, 
p. 17), which produces a more effective system of control by constructing and imposing new 
identities on institutional actors (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002). The move towards social workers 
being used as administrators of public policy, and at times as a form of moral and social policing, 
contributes to Wacquant's (2010) notion of the centaur state as a functional corollary of neo-
liberal capitalist policies, which creates liberal policies for those at the top and authoritarian 
policies for those at the bottom. While he argues such a phenomenon “arises from struggles over 
and within the bureaucratic field, aiming to redefine the perimeter, missions, priorities, and 
modalities of action of public authorities” (Wacquant, 2010, p.217), the findings from this study 
provide a detailed account of one area of struggle. Furthermore, it contributes to these debates 
by demonstrating how these authoritarian intentions towards those at the bottom were enacted 
by imposing authoritarian policies on those who delivered the services on behalf of the state 
through constructing and mobilising self-conscious emotions. This study, therefore, brings self-
conscious emotions into the heart of analysing social work and public administration, 
complementing the wider analyses of recent reforms (McDonald, 2006; Garrett, 2009; Parton, 
2014). 
SO WHAT DOES THIS STUDY CONTRIBUTE TO PRACTICE? 
In addition to these contributions to the existing literature, it is also important to consider what 
the implications of the analysis provided here are for the field of child protection social work 
generally and the Council involved in the study more specifically. The colonisation of the social 
work service within the Council by auditing priorities had created a system intended to provide 
organisational legitimacy which, as Power (2008) argues, results in an organisation’s aims and 
purpose being undermined. The general consensus within the teams was that social work practice 
was being done elsewhere, usually by non-social workers. The social workers and the managers 
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within the Council expressed a strong desire for this national situation to be changed and their 
daily lives improved. Given the interpretation provided here, there are perhaps two general 
target areas to help and support the changes that the children, parents, social workers, 
managers, and even politicians need. As Rorty (1998) states, with a pragmatic mind, “sociologists 
and psychologists might stop asking themselves whether they are following rigorous scientific 
procedures and start asking themselves whether they have any suggestions  to make to their 
fellow citizens about how our lives, our institutions, should be changed” (p.70).  
The first is a focus on changing the systemic shame and pride that supported and sustained the 
institutional arrangements. While the dominant discourse on shame and pride characterises 
shame as ‘bad’ and pride as ‘good’, this thesis has indicated how pride can have a dark side, 
potentially being used to promote practice that causes distress and pain in others, while shame 
could be used for good, deterring oppressive practice and nurturing ethical professional 
identities. It is the social context that provides the meaning and therefore the direction of the 
constraints. The reproduction and continuation of the systemic pressures should not be taken for 
granted, as the dominant discourses, beliefs, and shared rules require active maintenance over 
time and are, therefore, always open to reinterpretation.  
As the findings in this study demonstrate, there exists a range of views about the purpose and 
practices of social work that supports attitudes and actions of resistance. Such views resonate 
with the emerging dominant perspective within the English judiciary that has been challenging 
the taken-for-granted practices within child protection social work in relation to placing children 
in care and the use of Section 20 (Children Act 1989) powers (e.g. Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA 
Civ 1146; Re N (Children) (Adoption: Jurisdiction) [2015] EWCA Civ 1112). Furthermore, there 
exists a body of literature and ideas, both within the practice and academic spheres, which 
support and maintain attitudes, perspectives, and practices that resist the dominant systemic 
pressures (e.g. Power, 2008; Featherstone et al., 2014b; Warner, 2015). These can be brought 
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together, through coordinated effort across multiple individuals, organisations, and institutions, 
to disrupt the established boundaries for praiseworthy and shameful practices by disassociating 
the moral foundations and undermining the core assumptions and beliefs that hold them in place 
(Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). Indeed, the senior managers in the Council wanted to create a 
whole family, patch based, solution focused service, only they felt constrained in doing so. 
Coordinated efforts to undermine the logic of administration and auditing, while simultaneously 
making available alternative techniques and methods of monitoring and evaluation, may create 
sufficient space for institutional guardians to fulfil their vision and align their service as they 
intended. This offers the space for alternative expectations for shameful and praiseworthy 
behaviour, moving towards a service founded on professional values, empathy, and a pragmatic 
view on what is, and is not, achievable. There are indications that some authorities are moving in 
such a direction (e.g. Leeds City Council, 2014).  
The second is a focus on the boundaries for episodic shaming and praising within a Council, which 
are, of course, embedded within the systemic shame and pride for the field. By decoupling what 
is shameful and praiseworthy for social work from that of social administration, it is possible to 
create sufficient space for some institutional entrepreneurs to influence or force changes in the 
systemic shame and pride for their organisation. As Rorty (1989) argues, however, such action 
can only be achieved through language, and this decoupling requires our language to 
differentiate between administration and social work, which necessarily requires a definition of 
both. Conversations within the team rooms in the Council could have been very different if 
certain tasks were institutionally classified as administration rather than social work. Priorities 
may have been reformulated and support provided that helped improve practice. The leaders and 
senior managers certainly wanted practice to improve, yet with practice being conflated with 
administration following the colonisation of the service by auditing priorities, the leaders and 
senior managers were faced with mounting pressures and limited resources with no way of 
distinguishing one form of practice from another save for the threat of being shamed or praised. 
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As Wittgenstein (1922) argued, our language provides the limits of our world. New language, 
therefore, provides new opportunities. By better defining what professional practice is, together 
with the normative foundations for professional practice within the Council, the leaders and 
managers would be able to implement a system of policing, evaluation, and monitoring more 
consistent with their original intentions. Indeed, the organisation may seek to reduce the amount 
of administrative tasks, the team managers may see less value in desk work and greater value in 
observing practice, and social workers may be encouraged to talk about practice skills, theories, 
and methods, all because this makes children safer and families better supported. 
Furthermore, the language of emotions can be important tools in the construction of a new 
interpretive framework, as they can powerfully describe both the actions of the regulators and 
the experience of those being regulated. Through such powerful descriptions, cultural legitimacy 
for certain practices can be disrupted and new ones created. Indeed, the senior managers, team 
managers, and social workers did not want to see their actions as shaming or humiliating. The 
fact that they did not communicate to each other that this was indeed how they felt only enabled 
such action to continue, embedded in the belief that they were doing the ‘right’ thing. To 
perceive oneself as shaming and humiliating another, while painful and uncomfortable, can 
induce sufficient empathy and reflection to motivate change (Gausel and Leach, 2011). Talking 
about how we feel, and talking about how we imagine others may be feeling are, therefore, 
important components of being able to disrupt and create new institutional norms, rules, and 
practices. Speaking up about feeling shame and humiliation is, however, painful and difficult 
(Brown, 2007) requiring courage and self-compassion, yet this may be necessary to exert an 
episodic force that influences, challenges, and manipulates (Oliver, 1991) the actions of those 
involved in the regulation of the profession and the professionals.  
Changing the boundaries for shameful and praiseworthy behaviour for the social workers in any 
Council would, inevitably, heighten a sense of shame in the leaders and managers. Arguably, all 
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established arrangements can be considered a product of navigating and settling on a set of rules 
and practices intended to avoid being shamed and attract being praised. Leaders and managers 
would, therefore, require the courage to make changes to these in the knowledge that something 
could, at some point, attract unwanted attention on their service leaving them feeling vulnerable. 
Honesty about such feelings, with greater communication between individuals and organisations 
about such vulnerabilities, along with better coordination of practical and political support for 
leaders and managers that are shamed and humiliated may provide greater strength to stay true 
to their original vision (Shoesmith, 2016). Honesty about how we feel and courage to speak up 
about this can be considered to be a deliberate and crucial form of institutional work. It is 
through such action that political, and ultimately regulatory, support can be mobilised (Lawrence 
and Suddaby, 2006) in efforts to create a more humane system. As M.C.Richards (cited in Turnell 
and Essex, 2006, p.1) states “the world will change when you can imagine it differently”; to which 
we can add, when this is combined with sustained efforts at institutional change.  
 
 
  
221 
 
REFERENCES 
Abelson, R.P. (1981) Psychological status of the script concept. American Psychologist, 36(7): 
715. 
Adams, R. (1998) Quality Social Work. London: Macmillan. 
Albert, S. and Whetten, D.A. (1985) Organizational identity. Research in Organizational Behavior, 
7: 263-295.  
Alvesson, M. and Willmott, H. (2002) Identity regulation as organizational control: Producing the 
appropriate individual. Journal of Management Studies, 39(5): 619–644. 
Aristotle and Bywater, I. (1894) Ethica Nicomachea. Oxonii, E Typographeo Clarendoniano.  
Arluke, A. and Hafferty, F. (1996) From Apprehension to Fascination with “Dog Lab.” Journal of 
Contemporary Ethnography, 25(2): 201–225. 
Audit Commission (2002) Recruitment and Retention: A Public Service Workforce for the 
Twenty-first century. London: Audit Commission. 
Averill, J.R. (2012) The Future of Social Constructionism: Introduction to a Special Section of 
Emotion Review. Emotion Review, 4: 215-220. 
Baginsky, M., Moriarty, J., Manthorpe, J., Stevens, M., MacInnes, T. and Nagendran, T. (2010) 
Social Workers’ Workload Survey: Messages from the Frontline. London: DCSF. 
Baher, E., Hyman, C., Jones, C., Jones, R., Kerr, A. and Mitchell, R. (1976) At Risk: An Account of 
the Work of the Battered Child Research Department. London: Routledge & Paul. 
Bailey, F.G. (1977) Morality and Expediency. Oxford: Blackwell.  
222 
 
Balls, E. (2014) Interview. In: Baby P: The Untold Story. TV, BBC One, 2014, October 27. 2104hrs. 
Barclay Report (1982) Social Workers: Their Role and Tasks. London: Bedford Square Press.  
Bargh, J.A. and Ferguson, M.J. (2000) Beyond behaviorism: On the automaticity of higher mental 
processes. Psychological Bulletin, 126: 925–945. 
Baron-Cohen, S. (2011) Zero Degrees of Empathy: A New Theory of Human Cruelty. London: 
Penguin. 
Barrett, L.F. (2006a) Solving the emotion paradox: Categorization and the experience of 
emotion. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10: 20-46. 
Barrett, L.F. (2006b) Are emotions natural kinds? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1: 28-58. 
Barrett, L.F. (2006c) Valence is a basic building block of emotional life. Journal of Research in 
Personality, 40: 35-55. 
Barrett, L.F. and Russell, J.A. (Eds.)(2015) The psychological construction of emotion. London: 
Guilford Press. 
Barrett, L.F. and Wager, T.D. (2006) The structure of emotion evidence from neuroimaging 
studies. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 15: 79-83. 
Barrett, L.F., Wilson-Mendenhall, C.D. and Barsalou, L.W. (2014) “A psychological construction 
account of emotion regulation and dysregulation: The role of situated 
conceptualizations.” In Gross, J.J. (Ed.), The Handbook of Emotion Regulation. New 
York: Guilford. pp. 447–465 
Barsalou, L.W. (1999) Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22(4): 637-660. 
223 
 
Barsalou, L.W. (2009) Simulation, situated conceptualization, and prediction. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 364(1521): 1281-
1289. 
Battilana, J. and D’Aunno, T. (2009) “Institutional work and the paradox of embedded agency”. In 
Lawrence, T.B., Suddaby, R. and Leca, B. (Eds.), Institutional Work. Actors and Agency 
in Institutional Studies of Organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University. pp.31-58 
Baumeister, R.F. and Wotman, S.R. (1992) Breaking Hearts: The Two Sides of Unrequited Love. 
New York: Guilford Press.  
Baumeister, R.F., Stillwell, A.M. and Heatherton, T.F. (1994) Guilt: An interpersonal approach. 
Psychological Bulletin, 115(2): 243. 
Baumeister, R.F., Stillwell, A.M. and Heatherton, T.F. (1995) Personal narratives about guilt: Role 
in action control and interpersonal relationships. Basic and Applied Social 
Psychology, 17(1-2): 173-198. 
Baumeister, R.F., Vohs, K.D., DeWall, C.N. and Zhang, L. (2007) How emotion shapes behavior: 
feedback, anticipation, and reflection, rather than direct causation. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 11(2): 167–203 
Behrendt, H. and Ben-Ari, R. (2012) The Positive Side of Negative Emotion: The Role of Guilt and 
Shame in Coping with Interpersonal Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56(6): 
1116–1138. 
Berger, P.L. and Luckmann, T. (1967) The Social Construction of Reality: A Systematic Treatise in 
the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Anchor. 
Berndsen, M. and Gausel, N. (2015) When majority members exclude ethnic minorities: The 
impact of shame on the desire to object to immoral acts. European Journal of Social 
224 
 
Psychology, ‘Online First’ Published 14th July 2015 [Available from: doi:10. 
1002/ejsp.2127]. 
Biestek, F.P. (1961) The Casework Relationship. London: George Allen & Unwin.  
Blumer. H. (1969) Symbolic Interactionism. Englewood Cliffi, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Boiger, M. and Mesquita, B. (2012) The construction of emotion in interactions, relationships, and 
cultures. Emotion Review, 4(3): 221–229 
Bolger, N., Davis, A. and Rafaeli, E. (2003) Diary methods: capturing life as it is lived. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 54: 579–616.  
Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L.J.D. (1992) An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chicago: University 
of Chicago. 
Brandon, M., Belderson, P., Warren, C., Howe, D., Gardner, R., Dodsworth, J. and Black, J. (2008) 
Analysing Child Deaths and Serious Injury Through Abuse and Neglect: What Can We 
Learn? A Biennial Analysis of Serious Case Reviews 2003-2005. London: DCSF. 
Breakwell, G. (2001). “Social representational constraints upon identity development”. In Deaux, 
K. and Philogène, G. (Eds.), Representations of the Social: Bridging Theoretical 
Traditions. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 271-284 
Brewer, C. and Lait, J. (1980) Can Social Work Survive? London: Temple Smith. 
British Association of Social Workers (2012) The Code of Ethics for Social Work. Birmingham: 
BASW. 
Broadhurst, K., Hall, C., Wastell, D., White, S. and Pithouse, A. (2010) Risk, Instrumentalism and 
the Humane Project in Social Work: Identifying the Informal Logics of Risk Management 
in Children’s Statutory Services. British Journal of Social Work, 40: 1046–1064 
225 
 
Brown, B. (2006) Shame resilience theory: A grounded theory study on women and shame. 
Families in Society, 87: 43-52. 
Brown, B. (2007) I Thought It Was Just Me (But It Isn’t): Telling the Truth About Perfectionism, 
Inadequacy and Power. New York: Gotham.   
Brown, B. (2012) Daring Greatly: How the Courage to be Vulnerable Transforms the Way we 
Live, Love, Parent, and Lead. New York: Gotham Books.    
Bryant, A. (2009) Grounded Theory and pragmatism: The curious case of Anselm Strauss. Forum: 
Qualitative Social Research Sozialforschung, 10 (3): Art. 2 [online]. Available at: 
http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1358/2851 [Accessed 
on 28 March 2016] 
Bryman, A. (2012) Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Burke, P.J. (1980) The self: Measurement implications from a symbolic interactionist perspective. 
Social Psychology Quarterly, 43: 18-29  
Burke, P.J. and Stets, J.E. (2009) Identity Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Burkitt, I. (2014) Emotions and Social Relations. London: Sage. 
Buss, A.H. (1980) Self-Consciousness and Social Anxiety. San Francisco, CA: Freeman. 
Buss, A.H. (2001) Psychological Dimensions of the Self. London: Sage. 
Butler, P. (2014) Privatise child protection services, Department for Education proposes. The 
Guardian [online], Friday 16th May. Available from: 
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/may/16/privatise-child-protection-services-
department-for-education-proposes [Accessed 17 May 2015] 
226 
 
Butler-Sloss, E. (1988) Report of the Inquiry into Child Abuse in Cleveland 1987. Cm 412. London: 
HMSO.  
Carter, M.J. (2013) Advancing Identity Theory: Examining the relationship between activated 
identities and behavior in different social contexts. Social Psychology Quarterly, 76(3): 
203–223.  
Catherall, D.R. (2007) Emotional Safety: Viewing Couples Through the Lens of Affect. New York: 
Routledge. 
Charmaz, K. (2006) Constructing Grounded Theory. London: Sage 
Chase, E. and Walker, R. (2012) The co-construction of shame in the context of poverty: Beyond a 
threat to the social bond. Sociology, 47: 739-754. 
Cheney, G. (1991) Rhetoric in an Organizational Society: Managing Multiple Identities. 
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 
Children Act (1989) Chapter 41. London: The Stationery Office. 
Clark, A. and Chalmers, D. (1998) The extended mind. Analysis, 58: 10-23 
Combs, D.J.Y., Campbell, G., Jackson, M., and Smith, R.H. (2010) Exploring the consequences of 
humiliating a moral transgressor. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 32: 128–143. 
Cooley, C.H. (1902) Human Nature and the Social Order. New York: Scribner's Sons. 
Creed, W.E.D., Hudson, B.A., Okhuysen, G.A. and Smith-Crowe, K. (2014) Swimming in a sea of 
shame: Incorporating emotion into explanations of institutional reproduction and 
change. Academy of Management Review, 39(3): 275–301 
227 
 
Crowley, J. (1999) “The politics of belonging: some theoretical considerations”. In Geddes, A. and 
Favell, A. (Eds.), The Politics of Belonging: Migrants and Minorities in Contemporary 
Europe. Aldershot: Ashgate. pp. 15-41 
Crozier, W.R. (2014) Differentiating shame from embarrassment. Emotion Review, 6(3): 269–272.  
Csordas, T.J. (Ed.)(1994) Embodiment and Experience: The Existential Ground of Culture and 
Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Culpitt, I. (1999) Social Policy and Risk. London: Sage. 
Cutler, T. and Waine, B. (2003) Advancing public accountability? The social services ‘Star’ ratings. 
Public Money and Management, April, pp.125–8. 
Czarniawska, B. (2008) Humiliation: A standard organizational product? Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, 19 (7): 1034–1053. 
Dahlqvist, V., Soderberg, A. and Norberg, A. (2009) Facing inadequacy and being good enough: 
psychiatric care providers’ narratives about experiencing and coping with troubled 
conscience. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 16: 242–247 
Damasio, A. R. (1994) Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. London: 
Papermac. 
Darwin, C. (1872) The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. London: John Murray. 
de Hooge, I. E., Zeelenberg, M. and Breugelmans, S. M. (2010) Restore and protect motivations 
following shame. Cognition and Emotion, 24: 111–127. 
Deetz, S. (1995) Transforming Communication, Transforming Business: Building Responsive and 
Responsible Workplaces. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.  
Delamater, J. (Ed.)(2006) Handbook of Social Psychology. New York: Springer. 
228 
 
Department for Children, Schools and Families (2010) Working Together to Safeguard Children: A 
Guide to Inter-Agency Working to Safeguard and Promote the Welfare of Children. 
London: The Stationery Office. 
Department for Education (2014) Consultation on Powers to Delegate Social Care Functions: 
Government Response. London: DfE.  
Devine, L. and Parker, S. (2015) ESRC Evidence Briefing: Rethinking Child Protection Strategy: 
Child Protection and Assessment. Swindon: ESRC. 
Dewey, J. (1929a) Experience and Nature. London: George Allen and Unwin.  
Dewey, J. (1929b) The Quest for Certainty. New York: Minton, Balch & Co. 
Dewey, J. (1938) Experience and Education. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Dewey, J. and Tufts, J.H. (1909) Ethics. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 
Dey, I. (1999) Grounding Grounded Theory. San Diego: Academic Press. 
Dey, I. (2013) “Grounding categories”. In Bryant, A. and Charmaz, K. (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of 
Grounded Theory. London: Sage. pp.167-190 
Dezalay, Y. and Sugarman, D. (Eds.)(1995) Professional Competition and Professional Power: 
Lawyers, Accountants and the Social Construction of Markets. London: Routledge.  
Dimaggio, P. and Markus, H.R. (2010) Culture and social psychology converging 
perspectives. Social Psychology Quarterly, 73: 347-352. 
DiMaggio, P.J. and Powell, W.W. (1983) The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2): 147–
160. 
229 
 
DiMaggio, P.J. and Powell, W.W. (Eds.)(1991) The New Institutionalism in Organisational 
Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Dominelli, L. (1996) Deprofessionalizing social work: Anti-oppressive practice, competencies and 
postmodernism. The British Journal of Social Work, 26(2): 153-175 
Donnison, D.V. (1969) The Seebohm report and its implications. International Social Work, 12(2): 
11-17. 
Duveen, G. (2001) “Representations, identities, resistance”. In Deaux, K. and Philogène, G. (Eds.), 
Representations of the Social: Bridging Theoretical Traditions. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 
257-270 
Dwyer, J. G. (2010) Moral Status and Human Life: The Case for Children's Superiority. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Edmondson, A. (1999) Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 44(2): 350–383 
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989) Building theories from case study research. The Academy of 
Management Review, 14(4): 532–550 
Ekman, P. (2003) Sixteen enjoyable emotions. Emotion Researcher, 18(2): 6-7. 
Ekman, P. and Friesen, W.V. (1971) Constants across cultures in the face and emotion. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 17(2): 124-129 
Elias, N. (1978) The Civilizing Process. New York: Urizen. 
Elison, J. (2005) Shame and guilt: A hundred years of apples and oranges. New Ideas in 
Psychology, 23(1): 5–32.  
230 
 
Elison, J., and Harter, S. (2007) Humiliation: Causes, correlates, and consequences. In Tracy, J.L., 
Robins, R.W. and Tangney, J.P. (Eds.), The Self-Conscious Emotions. New York: Guilford. 
pp.310-329 
Emerson, R.M., Fretz, R.I. and Shaw, L.L. (2011) Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes. London: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Emirbayer, M. and Maynard, D.W. (2010) Pragmatism and ethnomethodology. Qualitative 
Sociology, 34(1): 221–261.  
Emirbayer, M. and Mische, A. (1998) What is agency? The American Journal of Sociology, 103(4): 
962–1023 
Exworthy, M. (2015) The iron cage and the gaze: Interpreting medical control in the English health 
system. Professions and Professionalism, 5(1). 
Eysenck, H. J. (1976) “Introduction”. In Eysenck, H.J. (Ed.), Case Studies in Behaviour Therapy. 
London: Routledge. pp. 1-15 
Fairweather, E. (2008) ‘I don't dream about murdered Victoria Climbié ... I live with her every day, 
says social worker who became a scapegoat’, The Daily Mail [online], Saturday 14th 
June, available from: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-1026441/I-dont-dream-
murdered-Victoria---I-live-day-says-social-worker-
scapegoat.html#ixzz2Dk3ShsJd [accessed 4 December 2015] 
Farrell, C. and Morris, J. (2003) The ‘Neo-Bureaucratic' state: Professionals, managers and 
professional managers in schools, general practices and social 
work. Organization, 10(1):129-156. 
Featherstone, B., Morris, K. and White, S. (2014a) A marriage made in hell: Early intervention 
meets child protection. British Journal of Social Work, 44(7): 1735-1749 
231 
 
Featherstone, B., White, S., and Morris, K. (2014b) Re-Imagining Child Protection: Towards 
Humane Social Work with Families. London: Policy Press. 
Ferguson, H. (2011) Child Protection Practice. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Ferguson, H. (2014) What social workers do in performing child protection work: evidence from 
research into face-to-face practice. Child and Family Social Work [online]. ‘Online First’ 
Published 21st March 2014 [Available from: DOI: 10.1111/cfs.12142]. 
Ferguson, T.J., Brugman, D., White, J. and Eyre, H.L. (2007) “Shame and guilt as morally warranted 
experiences.” In Tracy, J.L., Robins, R.W. and Tangney, J.P. (Eds.), The Self-Conscious 
Emotions. New York: Guilford.  pp. 330-348 
Ferguson, T.J., Stegge, H. and Damhuis, I. (1991) Children’s understanding of guilt and shame. 
Child Development, 62: 827-839 
Fernandez, S., Saguy, T. and Halperin, E. (2015) The paradox of humiliation: The acceptance of an 
unjust devaluation of the self. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(7): 976–
988.  
Fischer J. (1976) The Effectiveness of Social Casework. Springfield, IL: Charles Thomas. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2001) Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How it Can 
Succeed Again. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006) Five misunderstandings about case-study research. Qualitative Inquiry, 12(2): 
219–245 
Foucault, M. (1990) The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. New York: Vintage Books. 
Freedman, J.L., Wallington, S. and Bless, E. (1967) Compliance without pressure: The effect of 
guilt. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7: 117-124 
232 
 
Freidson, E. (1970) Professional Dominance: The Social Structure of Medical Care. Chicago, 
Illinois: Aldine.  
Freidson, E. (1988) Professional Powers: A Study of the Institutionalization of Formal 
Knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Freud, S. (1905/1962) Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, trans. James Strachey. New York: 
Basic Books. 
Garfinkel, H. (1956) Conditions of successful degradation ceremonies. American Journal of 
Sociology, 61:420–424. 
Garfinkel, H. (1974) “The origins of the term ‘ethnomethodology’”. In Turner, R. (Ed.), 
Ethnomethodology: Selected Readings. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Pp.15-18. 
Garrett, P. M. (2009) ‘Transforming' Children's Services: Social Work, Neoliberalism and the 
'Modern' World. Maidenhead: Open University. 
Gausel, N. and Brown, R. (2012) Shame and guilt—do they really differ in their focus of 
evaluation? Wanting to change the self and behaviour in response to ingroup 
immorality. The Journal of Social Psychology, 152: 1–20. 
Gausel, N. and Leach, C.W. (2011) Concern for self-image and social image in the management of 
moral failure: Rethinking shame. European Journal of Social Psychology, 41: 468–478 
Gergen, K.J. (1994) Realities and Relationships: Soundings in Social Construction. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Gibson, M. (2016) Social Worker Shame: A Scoping Review. British Journal of Social Work, 46: 
549-565. 
233 
 
Gilbert, P. (2007) “The evolution of shame as a marker for relationship security: A biopsychosocial 
approach.” In Tracy, J.L., Robins, R.W. and Tangney, J.P. (Eds.), The Self-Conscious 
Emotions. New York: Guilford. pp. 283-309 
Gilbert, P. and Andrews, B. (Eds.)(1998) Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology, and 
Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Gilroy, D. (2004) The Social Services Inspectorate: A History Origins, Impact and Legacy. London: 
Department of Health.  
Ginges, J. and Atran, S. (2008) Humiliation and the inertia effect: Implications for understanding 
violence and compromise in intractable intergroup conflicts. Journal of Cognition and 
Culture, 8: 281-294. 
Glaser, B.G. (1978) Theoretical Sensitivity. Mill Valley, CA: Sociology Press. 
Glaser, B.G. (1998) Doing Grounded Theory: Issues and Discussions. Mill Valley, CA: Sociology 
Press. 
Glaser, B.G. (2005) The Grounded Theory Perspective III: Theoretical Coding. Mill Valley, CA: 
Sociology Press. 
Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A.L. (1967) The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company. 
Goffman, E. (1956) Embarrassment and social organization. American Journal of Sociology, 62: 
264–71. 
Goffman, E. (1959) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Doubleday. 
Goffman, E. (1963) Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. 
234 
 
Goffman, E. (1971) Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Social Order. London: Allen Lane. 
Gold, R. (1958) Roles in sociological field observation. Social Forces, 36: 217-213 
Gordon, S., (1981) “The sociology of sentiments and emotion”. In Rosenberg, M. and Turner, R. 
(Eds.), Social Psychology: Sociological Approaches. New York: Basic Books. Pp. 562-592. 
Greenland, C. (1986) Inquiries into child abuse and neglect (C.A.N) deaths in the United Kingdom. 
British Journal of Criminology, 26(2): 164-72. 
Greiner, R. (2015) 1909: The Introduction of the Word ‘Empathy’ into English [online]. Available 
at: http://www.branchcollective.org/?ps_articles=rae-greiner-1909-the-introduction-of-
the-word-empathy-into-english [Accessed on 25th August 2015]. 
Gross, J.J. (2008) “Emotion Regulation.” In Lewis, M., Haviland-Jones, J.M. and Barrett, L.F. (Eds.), 
The Handbook of Emotions. New York: Guilford. pp. 497–512 
Harris, N. (1987) Defensive social work. British Journal of Social Work, 17: 61–69 
Hartling, L.M. and Luchetta, T. (1999) Humiliation: Assessing the impact of derision, degradation, 
and debasement. The Journal of Primary Prevention, 19(4): 259–278 
Hasenfeld, Y. (1987) Power in social work practice. The Social Service Review, 61(3): 469-483. 
Haslam, S.A., Reicher, S.D. and Platow, M.J. (2011) The New Psychology of Leadership: Identity, 
Influence and Power. Hove: Taylor & Francis.  
Haslam, S.A., Reicher, S.D., Millard, K. and McDonald, R. (2015) ‘Happy to have been of service’: 
The Yale archive as a window into the engaged followership of participants in Milgram’s 
‘obedience’ experiments. British Journal of Social Psychology, 54: 55–83 
Health and Care Professions Council (2012) Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics. 
London: HCPC. 
235 
 
Healy, K. and Meagher, G. (2004) The reprofessionalization of social work: Collaborative 
approaches for achieving professional recognition. British Journal of Social Work, 34(2): 
243-260. 
Hearn, B. (1991) Registration or protection? Community Care. Thursday 13th June, p.21 
Hébert, V. (2006) Disguised resistance? The story of Kurt Gerstein. Holocaust and Genocide 
Studies, 20(1): 1-33 
Henkel, M. (1991) Government, Evaluation and Change. London: Jessica Kingsley. 
HM Government (2006) Working Together to Safeguard Children: A Guide to Inter-Agency 
Working to Safeguard and Promote the Welfare of Children. London: The Stationery 
Office. 
HM Government (2013) Working Together to Safeguard Children: A Guide to Inter-Agency 
Working to Safeguard and Promote the Welfare of Children. London: DfE. 
HM Treasury (2010) Budget 2010. London: TSO. 
Hobbes, T. (1651/1969) Leviathan. Menston: Scolar Press. 
Hochschild, A.R. (1979) Emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure. American Journal of 
Sociology, 85(3): 551–575 
Hogg, M. and Abrams, D. (1988) Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup 
Relations and Group Processes. London: Routledge. 
Hoggett, P. (1996) New modes of control in the public service. Public Administration, 74(1): 9-32. 
Honneth, A. (1992) Integrity and disrespect: Principles of a conception of morality based on the 
theory of recognition. Political Theory, 20(2): 187-201 
236 
 
Honneth, A.  (1995) The Struggle for Recognition: The Grammar of Social Conflicts. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
Horton, L. and Gay, O. (2011) Public Sector Reform. Commons Briefing Papers SN06011. London: 
House of Commons Library. 
House, J.S. (1977) The three faces of social psychology. Sociometry, 40(2): 161–177 
Hudson, B.A., Okhuysen, G.A. and Creed, W.E.D. (2015) Power and institutions: Stones in the road 
and some yellow bricks. Journal of Management Inquiry, 24: 233–238. 
Hughes, E.C. (1958) Men and their Work. Glencoe: The Free Press.  
Humphries, B. (1997) Reading social work: Competing discourses in the rules and requirements 
for the diploma in social work. British Journal of Social Work, 27(5): 641–658 
Izard, C. E. (1971) The Face of Emotions. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
Jackson, M.A. (2000) Distinguishing shame and humiliation. Dissertation Abstracts International, 
61(04): 2272. (UMI No. 9968089) 
James, W. (1892) Psychology: Briefer Course. New York: Henry Holt.  
James, W. (1898) Philosophical conceptions and practical results. University Chronicle, 1(4): 287-
310 
James, W. (1907) Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. New York: 
Longmans, Green.  
Jenkins, R. (1996) Social Identity. New York: Routledge 
Jepperson, R.L. (1991) “Institutions, institutional effects, and institutionalism”. In Powell, W.W. 
and DiMaggio, P.J. (Eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. Pp. 143-63 
237 
 
Karlsson, G. and Sjöberg, L.G. (2009) The experiences of guilt and shame: A phenomenological–
psychological study. Human Studies, 32(3): 335–355.  
Kemper, T.D. (1978) Toward a sociology of emotions: Some problems and some solutions. The 
American Sociologist, 13: 30–41. 
Kemper, T.D. (1987) How many emotions are there? Wedding the social and the autonomic 
components. American Journal of Sociology, 93(2): 263–289 
Klein, D.C. (1991) The humiliation dynamic. Journal of Primary Prevention, 12(2): 93–121 
Knowles, G. and Sharpe, M. (2012) The IRO service: Still a work in progress? Part 2. Family Law, 
42: 1377-1381 
Kovecses, Z. (1990) Emotion Concepts. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Kraatz, M. and Block, E. (2008) “Organizational implications of institutional pluralism”. In 
Greenwoord, R., Oliver, C., Sahlin-Andresson, K. and Suddaby, R. (Eds.), Handbook of 
Organizational Institutionalism. London: Sage. Pp.243-275 
Kraatz, M.S. (2009) “Leadership as institutional work: a bridge to the other side”. In Lawrence, 
T.B., Suddaby, R. and Leca, B. (Eds.), Institutional Work. Actors and Agency in 
Institutional Studies of Organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University. Pp.59-91 
Laming, H. (2003) The Victoria Climbié Inquiry. London: The Stationery Office 
Larson, M.S. (1979) The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis. London: University of 
California Press. 
Lave, J. and Wenger, E. (1991) Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
238 
 
Lawler, E.J. (2001) An affect theory of social exchange. American Journal of Sociology, 107: 321–
352. 
Lawrence, T.B. (2008) “Power, Institutions and Organizations.” In Greenwoord, R., Oliver, C., 
Sahlin-Andresson, K. and Suddaby, R. (Eds.), Handbook of Organizational 
Institutionalism. London: Sage. Pp. 170–197 
Lawrence, T.B. and Suddaby, R. (2006) “Institutions and Institutional Work.” In Clegg, S.R., Hardy, 
C., Lawrence, T.B. and Nord, W.R. (Eds.) The SAGE Handbook of Organization Studies. 
2nd ed. London: Sage. Pp. 215–254.  
Lawrence, T.B., Suddaby, R. and Leca, B. (2009) “Introduction: Theorising and studying 
institutional work”. In Lawrence, T.B., Suddaby, R. and Leca, B. (Eds.), Institutional 
Work: Actors and Agency in Institutional Studies of Organisations. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. Pp. 1-27. 
LeCompte, M.D. and Goetz, J.P. (1982) Problems of reliability and validity in ethnographic 
research. Review of Educational Research, 52(1): 31–60.  
Leeds City Council (2014) Innovation Fund Bid: Executive Summary [online]. Available at: 
http://www.leeds.gov.uk/docs/Leeds%20Innovation%20Fund%20Bid%20Executive%20S
ummary.pdf [accessed on 6 May 2016]. 
Leeming, D. and Boyle, M. (2004) Shame as a social phenomenon: A critical analysis of the 
concept of dispositional shame. Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and 
Practice, 77: 375–396. 
Leith, K.P. and Baumeister, R.F. (1998) Empathy, shame, guilt, and narratives of interpersonal 
conflicts: Guilt-prone people are better at perspective taking. Journal of Personality, 
66(1): 1–37 
239 
 
Levin, S. (1967) Some metapsychological considerations of the differentiation between shame 
and guilt. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 48: 267-276 
Lewis, H.B. (1971) Shame and Guilt in Neurosis. New York: International Universities Press. 
Lewis, M. (1992) Shame: The Exposed Self. New York: Free Press. 
Lickel, B., Kushlev, K., Savalei, V., Matta, S. and Schmader, T. (2014) Shame and motivation to 
change the self. Emotion, 14: 1049–1061. 
Lickel, B., Schmader, T., Curtis, M., Scarnier, M. and Ames, D.R. (2005) Vicarious shame and guilt. 
Group processes and intergroup relations, 8: 145–157. 
Lindeman, E.C. (1924) Social Discovery. An Approach to the Study of Functional Groups. New 
York: Republic Publishing Co. 
Lizardo, O. and Collett, J.L. (2013) Embarrassment and social organization: A multiple identities 
model. Social Forces, 92(1): 353–375.  
Lohmann, R. A. and Lohmann, N. (2001) Social Administration. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Lukes, S. (2005) Power: A Radical View. 2nd Edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Lynd, H. (1958) On Shame and the Search for Identity. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. 
Macdonald, K. M. (1995) The Sociology of the Professions: SAGE Publications. London: Sage. 
Marx, D. (2001) Patient Safety and the “Just Culture”: A Primer for Health Care Executives. 
Columbia University, New York. 
Mascolo, M.F. and Fischer, K.W. (1995) “Developmental transformation in appraisals for pride, 
shame, and guilt”. In Tangney, J.P. and Fischer, K.W. (Eds.), Self-Conscious Emotions: 
240 
 
The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride. New York: Guilford. Pp. 
64–113 
McCall, G.J. and Simmons, J.L. (1978) Identities and Interactions. New York: Free Press.  
McDonald, C. (2006) Challenging Social Work: The Institutional Context of Practice. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Mead, G.H. (1908) The philosophical basis for ethics. International Journal of Ethics, 18: 311-323 
Mead, G.H. (1922) A behavioristic account of the significant symbol. Journal of Philosophy, 
19(1922): 157-163. 
Mead, G.H. (1934) Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Menzies, I.E.P. (1960) A case-study in the functioning of social systems as a defence against 
anxiety: A report on a study of the nursing service of a general hospital. Human 
Relations, 13(2): 95–121.  
Meyer, J.W. and Rowan, B. (1977) Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and 
ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83: 340-363 
Meyer, J.W. and Scott, W.R. (1983) Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality. Beverly 
Hills: Sage 
Milgram, S. (1974) Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View. New York: Harper and Row. 
Miller, R.S. and Tangney, J.P. (1994) Differentiating embarrassment and shame. Journal of Social 
and Clinical Psychology, 13(3): 273-287 
Miller, R.S. (1996) Embarrassment: Poise and Peril in Everyday Life. New York: Guilford. 
Miller, S.E. (2010) A conceptual framework for the professional socialization of social workers. 
Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment, 20(7): 924–938.  
241 
 
Mills, C.W. (1940) Situated actions and vocabularies of motive. American Sociological Review, 
5(6): 904-913. 
Mills, J., Bonner, A. and Francis, K. (2006) The development of constructivist grounded theory. 
International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 5(1): 1–10 
Moisander, J., Hirsto, H. and Fahy, K. (2016) Emotions in institutional work: a discursive 
perspective. Organization Studies [online]. ‘Online First’ Published 8th February 2016 
[Available at: DOI 10.1177/0170840615613377]. 
Moriarty, J., Baginsky, M. and Manthorpe, J. (2015) Literature Review of Roles and Issues within 
the Social Work Profession in England. London: Social Care Workforce Unit. 
Moscovici, S. (1961) La Psychoanalyse: Son Image et son Public. Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France 
Moscovici, S. (1963) Attitudes and opinions. Annual Review of Psychology, 14(1): 231-260 
Moscovici, S. (1981) “On social representation”. In Forgas, J. (Ed.), Social Cognition: Perspectives 
on Everyday Understanding. London: Academic Press. Pp. 181–209 
Moscovici, S. (2001) Why a theory of social representations? In Deaux, K. and Philogène, G. (Eds.), 
Representations of the Social. Oxford: Blackwell. Pp.8-36. 
Mulkay, M. (1988) On Humour: Its Nature and its Place in Modern Society. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Munro, E. (2004) The impact of audit on social work practice. British Journal of Social Work, 
34(8): 1075–1095.  
Munro, E. (2010) The Munro Review of Child Protection. Part One: A Systems Analysis. London: 
DfE. 
242 
 
Munro, E. (2011a) The Munro Review of Child Protection. Interim Report: The Child’s Journey. 
London: DfE.  
Munro, E. (2011b) The Munro Review of Child Protection: Final Report a Child-Centred System. 
London: DfE. 
Narey, M. (2011) The Narey Report on Adoption: Our Blueprint for Britain’s Lost Children. 
London: The Times.  
NSPCC (National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children)(1912) The Cruelty Man: Actual 
Experiences of an Inspector of the N.S.P.C.C. Graphically Told by Himself. London: 
NSPCC. 
Ofsted (2012) Framework for the Inspection of Local Authority Arrangements for the Protection 
of Children. London: Ofsted.  
Ofsted (2015) Inspection Handbook: Inspections of Services for Children in Need of Help and 
Protection, Children Looked After and Care Leavers. London: Ofsted. 
Oliver, C. (1991) Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of Management Review, 
16(1): 145–179 
Oliver, C. (1992) The antecedents of deinstitutionalization. Organization Studies, 13(4): 563–588 
Ortony, A. and Turner, T.J. (1990) What's basic about basic emotions? Psychological 
Review, 97(3): 315. 
Oveis, C., Horberg, E. and Keltner, D. (2010) Compassion, pride, and social intuitions of self–other 
similarity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98: 618–630. 
Page, R.M. (2010) The changing face of social administration. Social Policy and Administration, 
44(3): 326–342 
243 
 
Parkinson, B. (2012) Piecing together emotion: Sites and time-scales for social construction. 
Emotion Review, 4(3): 291–298.  
Parton, N. (1991) Governing the Family: Child Care, Child Protection and the State. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan.  
Parton, N. (1996) “Social theory, social change and social work: An introduction.” In Parton, N. 
(Ed.), Social Theory, Social Change and Social Work. London: Routledge. Pp. 4-18. 
Parton, N. (2014) The Politics of Child Protection: Contemporary Developments and Future 
Directions. London: Palgrave.  
Payne, M. (2005) The Origins of Social Work: Continuities and Change. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.   
Pearce, W.B. and Cronen, V.E. (1980) Communication, Action, and Meaning. New York: Praeger. 
Peirce, C.S. (1877) The fixation of belief. The Popular Science Monthly, 12: 1-15 
Peirce, C.S. (1878) How to make our ideas clear. Popular Science Monthly, 12: 286-302 
Peirce, C.S. (1903) Pragmatism as the logic of abduction. Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, 7: 
180-212  
Perryman, J. (2007) Inspection and emotion. Cambridge Journal of Education, 37(2): 173–190.  
Platt, D. and Turney, D. (2014) Making Threshold Decisions in Child Protection: A Conceptual 
Analysis. British Journal of Social Work, 44 (6): 1472–1490  
Power, M. (1997) The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Power, M. (2008) Organized Uncertainty: Designing A World of Risk Management. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
244 
 
Pratt, M.G. (1998) “To be or not to be: Central questions in organizational identification”. In 
Whetten, D.A. and Godfrey, P.C. (Eds.), Identity in Organisations. London: Sage. Pp. 
171-208. 
Pratt, M.G. and Foreman, P.O. (2000) Classifying managerial responses to multiple organzational 
identities. The Academy of Management Review, 25(1): 18–42 
Ragin, C.C. (1992). Introduction: Cases of “What is a case?” In Ragin, C.C. and Becker, H.S. (Eds.), 
What is a Case? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 1–18 
Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146 [online]. Available at: 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2013/1146.html [Accessed 14 April 2016] 
Re CA (A Baby) [2012] EWHC 2190 (Fam) [online]. Available at: 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2012/2190.html [Accessed on 9 October 
2015] 
Re N (Children) (Adoption: Jurisdiction) [2015] EWCA Civ 1112 [online]. Available at: 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2015/1112.html [Accessed on 28 March 
2016] 
Reed, M. (1999) From the cage to the gaze? The dynamics of organizational control in late 
modernity. In Morgan, G. and Engwall, L. (eds.), Regulation and Organizations: 
International Perspectives. London: Routledge. pp.17-49 
Reis, H.T. and Gable, S.L. (2000) “Event Sampling and other methods for studying everyday 
experience.” In Reis, H.T. and Judd, C.M. (Eds.), Handbook of Research Methods in 
Social And Personality Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 190–
222 
Roof, M. (1972) A Hundred Years of Family Welfare. London: Michael Joseph. 
245 
 
Rorty, R. (1979) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Rorty, R. (1989) Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Rorty, R. (1998) Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Rosaldo, M.Z. (1984) “Toward an anthropology of self and feeling”. In Shweder, R.A. and LeVine, 
R.A. (Eds.), Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. Pp. 137-157 
Rowlands, M. (2010) The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied 
Phenomenology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Ruch, G., Turney, D. and Ward, A. (eds.)(2010) Relationship-Based Social Work: Getting to the 
Heart of Practice. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers. 
Russell, J.A. (1991) In defense of a prototype approach to emotion concepts. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 60: 37-47. 
Russell, J.A. (2003) Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion. Psychological 
Review, 110(1): 145-172. 
Russell, J.A. and Barrett, L.F. (1999) Core affect, prototypical emotional episodes, and other things 
called emotion: dissecting the elephant. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 
76(5): 805–819 
Sabini, J. and Silver, M. (1997) In defense of shame: Shame in the context of guilt and 
embarrassment. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 27(1): 1-15. 
Satyamurti, C. (1981) Occupational Survival: The Case of the Local Authority Social Worker. 
Oxford: Blackwell.  
246 
 
Schatzki, T.R. (2001) “Introduction: Practice theory”. In Schatzki, T.R., Cetina, K.K. and Von 
Savigny, E. (Eds.), The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory. London: Routledge. Pp. 
10-23. 
Scheff, T.J. (1988) Shame and conformity: The deference-emotion system. American Sociological 
Review, 53(3): 395–406 
Scheff, T.J. (1990) “Socialization of emotions: Pride and shame as causal agents”. In Kemper, T.D. 
(Ed.), Research Agendas in the Sociology of Emotions. New York: State University of 
New York. Pp. 281-304. 
Scheff, T.J. (1997) Emotions, the Social Bond, and Human Reality: Part/Whole Analysis. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Scheff, T.J. (2000) Shame and the social bond: A sociological theory. Sociological Theory, 18(1): 
84–99 
Scheff, T.J. (2003) Shame in self and society. Symbolic Interaction, 26(2): 239–262 
Scheff, T.J. (2014) Goffman on emotions: The pride‐shame system. Symbolic Interaction, 37(1): 
108-121. 
Scherer, K.R. (2005) What are emotions? And how can they be measured? Social Science 
Information, 44(4): 695–729.  
Schwarz, N. and Clore, G.L. (1996) “Feelings and phenomenal experiences.” In Higgins, E.T. and 
Kruglanski, A. (Eds.), Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles. New York: 
Guilford. Pp. 433-465 
Scott, M. and Lyman, S. (1968) Accounts. American Sociological Review, 33: 46-62. 
247 
 
Scott, W.R. (2014) Institutions and Organisations: Ideas, Interests, and Identities. Fourth Edition. 
London: Sage.  
Searles, H. F. (1955) The informational value of the supervisor's emotional experience. Psychiatry, 
18: 135-146. 
Secretary of State (1993) A Report by the Secretary of State for Health and for Wales on the 
Children Act 1989 in Pursuance of their Duties Under Section 83(6) of the Act. London: 
HMSO.  
Seebohm Report (1968) Report of the Committee on Local Authority and Allied Personal Social 
Services. London: HMSO.  
Selznick, P. (1957) Leadership in Administration. New York: Harper & Row.  
Shaffer, D. (2009) Social and Personality Development. Belmont, CA: Wandsworth. 
Shafir, E. and Tversky, A. (1992) Thinking through uncertainty: Nonconsequential reasoning and 
choice. Cognitive Psychology, 24(4): 449-474 
Shalin, D.N. (1986) Pragmatism and social interactionism. American Sociological Review, 51(1): 
9–29.  
Shepherd, L., Spears, R. and Manstead, A.S. (2013) ‘This will bring shame on our nation’: The role 
of anticipated group-based emotions on collective action. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 49: 42–57.  
Shoesmith, S. (2016) Learning from Baby P: The Politics of Blame, Fear and Denial. London: 
Jessica Kingsley. 
Sieber, S.D. (1981) Fatal Remedies: The Ironies of Social Intervention. New York: Plenum Press. 
248 
 
Silfver, M. (2007) Coping with guilt and shame: a narrative approach. Journal of Moral Education, 
36(2): 169–183. 
Silver, M., Conte, R., Miceli, M. and Poggi, I. (1986) Humiliation: Feeling, social control and the 
construction of identity. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 16(3): 269–283 
Silverman, D. (1971) The Theory of Organisations: A Sociological Framework. London: 
Heinemann. 
Simons, H. (2009) Case Study Research in Practice. London: SAGE 
Skårderud, F. (2007) Shame and pride in anorexia nervosa: A qualitative descriptive study. 
European Eating Disorders Review, 15: 81–97. 
Smith, D. (2008) Globalization, degradation and the dynamics of humiliation. Current Sociology, 
56(3): 371–379.  
Social Work Task Force (2009) Building a Safe, Confident Future. London: DCSF. 
Specht, H. (1972) The deprofessionalization of social work. Social Work, 17(2): 3-15 
Spicker, P. (2004) An Introduction to Social Policy: Theory and Practice. Aberdeen: The Robert 
Gordon University. 
Stake R. E. (1995) The Art of Case Study Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Star, S. and Griesemer, J. (1989) Institutional ecology, 'translations' and boundary objects: 
Amateurs and professionals in Berkeley's museum of vertebrate zoology, 1907-
39. Social Studies of Science, 19(3): 387–420 
Strübing, J. (2013) “Research as pragmatic problem-solving: The pragmatist roots of empirically-
grounded theorizing.” In Bryant, A. and Charmaz, K. (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of 
Grounded Theory. London: Sage. Pp. 580-602 
249 
 
Stryker, S. (1980) Symbolic Interactionism: A Social Structural Version. Menlo Park: Benjamin 
Cummings. 
Sumner, W.G. (1906) Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, 
Customs, Mores, and Morals. Boston: The Athenæum Press.  
Tajfel, H. (1981) Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Tajfel, H. (1982) Social psychology of intergroup relations. Annual Review of Psychology, 33: 1-
39. 
Tangney, J. P., Stuewig, J. and Martinez, A. G. (2014) Two faces of shame: The roles of shame and 
guilt in predicting recidivism. Psychological Science, 25(3): 799-805 
Tangney, J.P. and Dearing, R. (2002) Shame and Guilt. New York: Guilford. 
Tangney, J.P., Miller, R.S., Flicker, L. and Barlow, D.H. (1996) Are shame, guilt, and embarrassment 
distinct emotions? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70: 1256-1269. 
Tangney, J.P., Stuewig, J. and Mashek, D.J. (2007) Moral emotions and moral behavior. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 58: 345–72.  
Tavuchis, N. (1991) Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press.  
Taylor, D. (2007) Diane Taylor tells social-worker Lisa Arthurworrey's story: 'Victoria is always 
there. She never goes away ...', The Guardian [online], Monday 19th February, available 
from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2007/feb/19/childrensservices.socialcare 
[accessed 4 December 2015] 
250 
 
Tew, J. (2006) Understanding Power and Powerlessness: Towards a Framework for Emancipatory 
Practice in Social Work. Journal of Social Work, 6 (1): 33–51.  
Thoits, P.A. (1983) ‘Multiple identities and psychological well-being: A reformulation and test of 
the social isolation hypothesis. American Sociological Review, 48: 174–87 
Thoits, P.A. (1989) The sociology of emotions. Annual Review of Sociology, 15(1): 317–342.  
Thoits, P.A. (2003) ‘‘Personal agency in the accumulation of multiple role-identities.’’ In Burke, 
P.J., Owens, T. J., Serpe, R. and Thoits, P.A. (Eds.), Advances in Identity Theory and 
Research. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum. Pp. 179–94 
Thoits, P.A. and Virshup, L.K. (1997) “Me’s and We's: Forms and functions of social identities.” In 
Ashmore, R.D. and Jussim, L.J. (Eds.), Self and Identity: Fundamental Issues. Rutgers 
Series on Self and Social Identity, Vol 1. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Pp. 
106–133 
Thomaes, S., Stegge, H., Olthof, T., Bushman, B. J. and Nezlek, J. B. (2011) Turning shame inside-
out: “Humiliated fury” in young adolescents. Emotion, 11: 786-793. 
Thomas, G. (2010) Doing case study: Abduction not induction, phronesis not theory. Qualitative 
Inquiry, 16(7): 575–582 
Thomas, G. (2011) A typology for the case study in social science following a review of definition, 
discourse, and structure. Qualitative Inquiry, 17(6): 511–521 
Thomas, G. (2016) How to do Your Case Study. 2nd edition. London: Sage. 
Tomkins, S.S. (1962) Affect Imagery Consciousness: Volume I, The Positive Affects. London: 
Tavistock. 
251 
 
Tomkins, S.S. (1963) Affect Imagery Consciousness: Volume II, The Negative Affects. London: 
Tavistock. 
Tomkins, S.S. (1987) "Script theory". In Arnoff, J., Rabin, A.I. and Zucker, R.A. (Eds.), The 
Emergence of Personality. New York: Springer Publishing Company. Pp. 147–216. 
Torres, W.J. and Bergner, R.M. (2010) Humiliation: Its nature and consequences. The Journal of 
the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 38(2): 195–204.  
Tracy, J.L. and Robins, R.W. (2004) Putting the self into self-conscious emotions: A theoretical 
model. Psychological Inquiry, 15(2): 103–125 
Tracy, J.L. and Robins, R.W. (2007) The psychological structure of pride: A tale of two facets. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(3): 506–25.  
Tracy, J.L., Robins, R.W. and Tangney, J.P. (Eds.)(2007) The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and 
Research. London: Guilford Press. 
Turnell, A. and Edwards, S. (1999) Signs of Safety: A Solution and Safety Oriented Approach to 
Child Protection. London: W. W. Norton  
Turnell, A. and Essex, S. (2006) Working With Denied Child Abuse: The Resolutions Approach. 
Maidenhead: Open University Press.  
Turner, J.E. and Husman, J. (2008) Emotional and cognitive self-regulation following academic 
shame. Journal of Advanced Academics, 20:138-173. 
Turner, J.H. (2009) The sociology of emotions: Basic theoretical arguments. Emotion Review, 1(4): 
340–354 
Turner, J.H. and Stets, J.E. (2006a) Sociological theories of human emotions. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 32(1): 25–52.  
252 
 
Turner, J.H. and Stets, J.E. (2006b) “Moral emotions”. In Stets, J.E. and Turner, J.H. (Eds.), 
Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions. New York: Springer. Pp. 544-568. 
Vickerstaff, J. (2014) Children Looked After in England (Including Adoption and Care Leavers) 
Year Ending 31 March 2014. London: Department for Education.  
Voronov, M. and Vince, R. (2012) Integrating emotions into the analysis of institutional work. 
Academy of Management Review, 37(1):58-81. 
Wacquant, L. (2010) Crafting the neoliberal state: Workfare, prisonfare, and social insecurity. 
Sociological Forum, Vol. 25(2): 197-220. 
Walker, J. (2011) The relevance of shame in child protection work. Journal of Social Work 
Practice, 25(4): 451–463 
Walker, R. (2014) The Shame of Poverty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wallace, M. (1993) Discourse of derision: the role of the mass media within the education policy 
process. Journal of Education Policy, 8(4): 321–337.  
Warner, J. (2015) The Emotional Politics of Social Work and Child Protection. Bristol: Policy 
Press. 
Wastell, D., White, S., Broadhurst, K., Peckover, S. and Pithouse, A. (2010) Children’s services in 
the iron cage of performance management: street-level bureaucracy and the spectre of 
Švejkism. International Journal of Social Welfare, 19(3):310–320  
Weber, M. (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. London: University 
of California Press. 
Wenger, E. (1999) Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning and Identity. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
253 
 
Whetten, D.A. and Mackey, A. (2002) A social actor conception of organizational identity and its 
implications for the study of organizational reputation. Business & Society, 41(4): 393–
414 
White, S. (2003) “Social worker as moral judge: Blame, responsibility and case formulation”. In 
Hall, C., Juhila, K., Parton, N. and Pösö, T. (Eds.), Constructing Clienthood in Social Work 
and Human Services: Interaction, Identities and Practices. London: Jessica Kingsley. 
Pp.177-192. 
White, S., Wastell, D., Broadhurst, K., Hall, C. (2010) When policy o’erleaps itself: The “tragic tale” 
of the Integrated Children’s System. Critical Social Policy, 30(3): 405–429.  
Wierzbicka, A. (1992) Defining emotion concepts. Cognitive Science, 16: 539–581 
Wieviorka, M. (1992) “Case studies: History or sociology?” In Ragin, C.C. and Becker, H.S. (Eds.) 
What is a Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. pp. 159–172 
Wilson, W. (1887) The study of administration. Political Science Quarterly, 2(2): 197-222 
Wittgenstein, L. (1922) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co. 
Wittgenstein, L. and Anscombe, G.E.M. (1958) Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Woodroofe, K. (1962) From charity to Social Work in England and the United States. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press. 
Wright Mills, C. (1959) The Sociological Imagination. New York. Oxford University Press. 
Yellolly, M. (1980) Social Work Theory and Psychoanalysis. London: Van Nostrand Reinhold. 
Young, A.F. and Ashton, E.T. (1967) British Social Work in the Nineteenth Century. Third Edition. 
London: Butler and Tanner 
254 
 
Yuval-Davis, N. (2006) Belonging and the politics of belonging. Patterns of Prejudice, 40(3): 197–
214.  
Zinck, A. (2008) Self-referential emotions. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2): 496–505.  
Zucker, L.G. (1977) The role of institutionalization in cultural persistence. American Sociological 
Review, 42: 726-743. 
Zwaan, R. A. (2004) The immersed experiencer: Toward an embodied theory of language 
comprehension. Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 44: 35-62 
 
 
  
255 
 
APPENDIX 1: DIARY SHEETS 
Diary Sheet    Name:      Date:  
Please describe any situation which made you feel good about yourself today: 
(include when it was, where you were, who was there, and what happened) 
 
 
 
Describe what you were thinking at the time:  
 
For example:  
What did you think of yourself? 
What do you think others thought of 
you? or would have had they been 
there?  
What did you think of the other 
person(s)?  
How did the other person(s) treat 
you? 
 
Describe the bodily sensations:  For example:  
Did you feel cold, warm or hot?  
Did you feel tense or relaxed? 
What happened in your body: Did 
your breathing change? Did you start 
to sweat? Was your heart racing? 
Did you smile or laugh?  
Did you feel it in a place in your body 
(e.g. stomach, throat, skin, head, all 
over)? 
Did it feel pleasurable or 
displeasurable? 
 
What word or words would you use to describe how you felt in this situation?  
Then tick which term(s) corresponds best to 
your experience (tick as many as you like or none): 
Acceptance  Rejection  
Pride  Shame  
Valued  Guilt    
Important  Humiliation  
Anxiety  Embarrassment  
Anger  Mortified  
How did these thoughts and feelings influence what you said or did at the time? How may this 
change things for you in the future?  
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Diary Sheet    Name:      Date:  
Please describe any situation which made you feel bad about yourself today: 
(include when it was, where you were, who was there, and what happened) 
 
 
 
 
Describe what you were thinking at the time:  
 
For example:  
What did you think of yourself? 
What do you think others thought of 
you? or would have had they been 
there?  
What did you think of the other 
person(s)?  
How did the other person(s) treat 
you? 
 
Describe the bodily sensations:  For example:  
Did you feel cold, warm or hot?  
Did you feel tense or relaxed? 
What happened in your body: Did 
your breathing change? Did you start 
to sweat? Was your heart racing? 
Did you smile or laugh?  
Did you feel it in a place in your body 
(e.g. stomach, throat, skin, head, all 
over)? 
Did it feel pleasurable or 
displeasurable? 
 
What word or words would you use to describe how you felt in this situation?  
Then tick which term(s) corresponds best to 
your experience (tick as many as you like or none): 
Acceptance  Rejection  
Pride  Shame  
Valued  Guilt    
Important  Humiliation  
Anxiety  Embarrassment  
Anger  Mortified  
How did these thoughts and feelings influence what you said or did at the time? How may this 
change things for you in the future?  
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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Introduction:  
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. As you know, I am undertaking a study 
into emotions in social work and I would like to ask you some questions about your experiences 
of social work to contribute to this study. I will ask the questions below along with further 
prompts or follow up questions which seem relevant throughout the interview. The interview 
should last about an hour. I will record this interview so that I am able to study what has been 
said. The recording will be securely stored at the University of Birmingham and only I will have 
access to it. Any reference to what has been said in my report, thesis, or academic papers will 
always be anonymous. You do not have to provide any information that you do not wish to and if 
you wish to end the interview at any point then just let me know and we will end it. Are you ok to 
continue? 
 
1. Practice 
1.1 Generally, what do you think of your social work practice? 
1.2 What do you think your team members | team manager | county manager | service users 
think of your practice?  
1.2.1 What influence do these opinions have on how you do your job? 
1.2.2 What influence do these opinions have on how you see yourself as a social 
worker? 
1.3 Do you feel able to practise in the way you want to in this team | organisation? 
1.3.1 If not, why not?  
1.3.2 If yes, what it is about this team that enables you to practise in this manner? 
 
2. Team | Organisation  
2.1 How do you know when you are doing a good job in this team | organisation? 
2.2 How do you know when you are not doing a good job in this team | organisation? 
2.3 What’s the best part of your work? 
2.4 What’s the worst part of your work? 
2.4.1 How do you cope with this? 
2.5 What’s your biggest fear in doing this work? 
 
3. Self-Conscious Emotional Experiences 
3.1 Can you think of a time when you thought a colleague, manager or other professional 
looked down on you or saw you as inadequate or incompetent in some way? 
3.1.1 Can you tell me about it?  
3.1.2 Can you describe how you felt?  
3.1.3 Can you explain the consequence of this feeling on your work? 
3.2 Can you think of a time when you thought a service user thought of you negatively or saw 
you as inadequate or incompetent in some way? 
3.2.1 Can you tell me about it?  
3.2.2 Can you describe how you felt?  
3.2.3 Can you explain the consequence of this feeling on your work? 
3.3 Can you think of a time when you have felt disappointed or frustrated with yourself in 
your work?  
3.3.1 Can you tell me about it?  
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3.3.2 Can you describe how you felt?  
3.3.3 Can you explain the consequence of this feeling on your work? 
3.4 Can you think of a time when you thought you were seen as a good social worker by a 
colleague, manager or other professional? 
3.4.1 Can you tell me about it?  
3.4.2 Can you describe how you felt?  
3.4.3 Can you explain the consequence of this feeling on your work? 
3.5 Can you think of a time when you thought you were seen as a good social worker by a 
service user? 
3.5.1 Can you tell me about it?  
3.5.2 Can you describe how you felt?  
3.5.3 Can you explain the consequence of this feeling on your work? 
3.6 Can you think of a time when you felt like a really good social worker? 
3.6.1 Can you tell me about it?  
3.6.2 Can you describe how you felt?  
3.6.3 Can you explain the consequence of this feeling on your work? 
 
4. General 
4.1  What is your name? 
4.2 How old are you? 
4.3 How would you describe your ethnicity? 
4.4 When did you qualify as a social worker? 
4.5 How long have you worked at this local authority? 
4.6 How long have you worked in this team? 
 
End:  
The interview has now finished. Thank you for taking the time to talk to me and being part of this 
study. Is there anything you would like to ask me or add to what you have said? There is a range 
of support available if you are feeling unsettled by anything we have discussed and I can help 
arrange this with you if you would like me to. Thank you again. 
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APPENDIX 3: THE DATA COLLECTION PROCESS 
 
Date Hours in the field No. of Diary Entries No. of Interviews 
13.6.14 3.5 hours - - 
17.6.14 1 hour - - 
18.6.14 9 hours 6 - 
21.6.14 9 hours - - 
25.6.14 9.5 hours - - 
1.7.14 9 hours 9 - 
4.7.14 8.5 hours 4 - 
7.7.14 9.5 hours 5 - 
8.7.14 9.5 hours 10 - 
18.7.14 8.5 hours 3 - 
21.7.14 9.5 hours 6 - 
7.8.14 9.5 hours 9 - 
8.8.14 8.5 hours 2 - 
11.8.14 9 hours - - 
15.8.14 8.5 hours 7 - 
19.8.14 8.5 hours 4 - 
20.8.14 8.5 hours 11 - 
12.9.14 9 hours 5 1 
18.9.14 9.5 hours 6 - 
1.10.14 9.5 hours - - 
2.10.14 9 hours 5 - 
9.10.14 9.5 hours 7 1 
17.10.14 9 hours - 1 
24.10.14 9.5 hours - 3 
30.10.14 9 hours - 4 
7.11.14 3.5 hours - 1 
11.11.14 8.5 hours - 2 
17.11.14 8.5 hours - 3 
27.11.14 7 hours - 2 
4.12.14 3 hours - 1 
9.12.14 3 hours - - 
Total 246.5 hours 99 19 
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APPENDIX 4: INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
  
Questions: 
 
Social Work Research Project 
Research focus: 
The proposed study seeks to investigate the 
emotional experience of social work practice. 
Emotions can be considered responsible for 
the highs and lows within social work, which 
may affect not only an individual’s job 
satisfaction and personal well-being, but also 
their ability to make wise decisions in critical 
moments. While much has been written 
about the importance of emotions within 
social work practice, very little research has 
investigated the specific role emotions may 
play in social work practice. This study is 
looking at social workers identities and 
relationships to see how they are developed 
and what social workers’ feel when these are 
threatened. This may involve ‘self-conscious’ 
emotions such as pride, shame, guilt, 
embarrassment and humiliation and their 
role in social work practice.  
What I would like to do: 
-Observe you undertaking computer/desk work and 
interacting with other colleagues/ managers. 
Sometimes I would like to ask you a few questions 
about what I see but I do not intend for this to be 
intrusive to your work 
-Observe your team meetings 
-Observe your direct work with families including home 
visits and meetings. I will talk to you to make sure it is 
appropriate for me to be there and I will have 
information for other professionals and service users so 
they can make a choice about me being there 
-Observe your supervision sessions with your, and your 
manager’s, consent 
-Ask you to complete a 1 page diary sheet about your 
experience of the day I have observed 
-Interview you about your experiences. Each interview 
would be about an hour and only if you agree to take 
part  
Are you judging my practice? 
No. This is not a study to make judgements about your practice. This is a 
study to get your experience of your work. Your views and opinions as 
well as how you feel is what this study wants to find out.  
Researcher: Matthew Gibson; Supervisors: Prof. Sue White & Dr Jerry Tew, University of Birmingham 
What do I get from it? 
You will be the essential part of a 
research study. I will consult you on 
any findings to get your opinion. I 
will provide you with a report of 
my findings. I can provide training 
to your team on what I find which 
may help your team.   
For further information: 
 
Matthew Gibson, Institute of Applied Social Studies, University of Birmingham, 
B15 2TT, Tel: 0121 4158028, Email: m.j.gibson.1@bham.ac.uk  
 
How will you use the information you get about me? 
The information I get will be used for my PhD thesis and potentially for 
publications in academic journals. You will not be identified. Nor will the 
local authority. Everything will be anonymised so no one will know where, 
or from whom, it has come from. 
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APPENDIX 5: RESEARCH STATEMENT FOR PARTICIPANTS 
Date:  
 
 
Full Project Title: The role of self-conscious emotions in child protection social work practice 
 
Student Researcher: Matthew Gibson, University of Birmingham 
 
Supervisors: Professor Sue White & Dr Jerry Tew, University of Birmingham 
 
 
This Research Statement and Consent Form is 5 pages long. Please make sure you have all the pages. 
1.         Your Consent 
 
You are invited to take part in this research project. This Research Statement contains detailed information 
about the research project. Its purpose is to explain to you as openly and clearly as possible all the 
procedures involved in this project so that you can make a fully informed decision whether you are going to 
participate. 
Please read this Statement carefully. Feel free to ask questions about any information in the document.  
Once you understand what the project is about and if you agree to take part in it, you will be asked to sign 
the Consent Form. By signing the Consent Form, you indicate that you understand the information and that 
you give your consent to participate in the research project. 
You will be given a copy of the Research Statement and Consent Form to keep as a record. 
2.         Purpose and Background 
Emotions can be considered responsible for the highs and lows within social work, which may affect not 
only an individual’s job satisfaction and personal well-being, but also their ability to make wise decisions in 
critical moments. While much has been written about the importance of emotions within social work 
practice, very little research has investigated the specific role emotions may play in the development of an 
individual’s social work identity. The purpose of this project is to investigate the emotional experience of 
social workers of social work practice. It will be looking at what supports, and what threatens, social 
workers identities and what strengthens, and what weakens, the social bonds of social workers in social 
work practice.  
You are invited to participate in this research project because you are considered a good social work team 
and your experience and practice will offer insights into the experience of social work and the influence of 
self-conscious emotions.  
3.          Funding 
 
This research is partially funded by the University of Birmingham 
4.         Procedures 
This project will involve a researcher being with the team for one day a week for six months. This will 
involve them observing you doing your work and taking notes. You are not expected to do anything 
different to what you would ordinarily do on these days. Participation in this project will involve being 
observed, being asked questions every now and again about what the researcher has observed, and having 
the researcher come out on visits or to meetings with you every now and again. It will also involve the 
researcher asking you to complete a 1 page diary sheet at the end of the day that has been observed to get 
your experience of the day.  
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You and your practice are not being judged. The study is interested in your experience of social work 
practice and so what happens, and what you think and feel about it, is the focus of the project.  
Participation in this project will also involve attending a semi-structured interview that will discuss issues 
related to your experience of your work. The interview will be conducted in English, take approximately an 
hour and will be held at a mutually convenient venue. You will be interviewed by Matthew Gibson. You will 
be provided with the questions prior to the interview so you can study them if you wish. With your 
permission, your interview will be audio-recorded and the content coded for analysis. To assist our 
understanding of the experience of social work your interview will be fully transcribed. At your request, a 
copy of your transcribed interview will be supplied to you. Any parts of your interview that you want 
removed will be deleted. You do not have to provide information that you do not wish to and you can stop 
the interview at any point without a reason and without any prejudice to you. 
5.         Possible Benefits 
By looking at social workers’ experience, the findings of this research will offer new insights into emotions in 
social work practice. The outcomes of this research may assist in providing social workers a voice to their 
experience of the work they do. You will be consulted in the drafting of the findings and you will be 
provided with a report of the findings at the end of the project. The researcher will also offer a training 
session to your team on the findings. We cannot guarantee or promise that you will receive any personal 
benefits from this project. 
6.         Possible Risks 
 
There are no predicted risks to you through participating in this project. It may feel uncomfortable to be 
observed at times and some of the conversations may be uncomfortable. However, you will decide what 
you want to disclose and what you do not and you will know what you will be asked in the interviews prior 
to the interview to consider the questions beforehand.  
7.         Privacy, Confidentiality and Disclosure of Information 
 
The information gathered in this study will be secured so that it is accessible only to Matthew Gibson. The 
analysis will be done in a way that prevents the identification of individuals in the publication of findings. 
Coded data will be securely stored for ten years after final publication of the collected data, as prescribed 
by University regulations. Any information obtained in connection with this project and that can identify 
you will remain confidential. It will only be disclosed with your permission, subject to legal requirements. If 
you give us your permission by signing the Consent Form, we plan to publish the results in academic 
journals. 
8.         Results of Project 
You will be asked to give your opinion on the draft findings. A report will be provided to you once the 
project has been completed.  
9.          Participation is Voluntary 
Participation is voluntary and confidential. If you do not wish to take part you are not obliged to. If you 
decide to take part you will be able to request that specific situations are not observed at any time during 
the research and will be able to stop taking part in the study at any time during the course of the research 
period.  You will be able to veto the use of material from observations or interviews with them, in any 
reports, other writing or presentations that result from the research. If you decide to take part and later 
change your mind, you are free to withdraw from the project at any stage and request that your data not be 
used in the project. However, after the information has been collected it will be used for analysis and it will 
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not be possible to withdraw the information at this point. Therefore, if you wish to withdraw your consent 
this must be done by the latest by 2 months after the end of the 6 month period of the information 
collection. 
Your decision whether to take part or not to take part, or to take part and then withdraw, will not affect any 
relationship you might have with the investigators or your relationship with The University of Birmingham. 
Before you make your decision, Matthew Gibson will be available to answer any questions you have about 
the research project. You can ask for any information you want. Sign the Consent Form only after you have 
had a chance to ask your questions and have received satisfactory answers.  
If you decide to withdraw from this project, please notify the researcher, Matthew Gibson. 
10.        Ethical Guidelines 
The ethics aspects of this research project have been approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the 
University of Birmingham. 
11.        Complaints 
 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being conducted or any questions 
about your rights as a research participant, then you may contact: 
Professor Sue White, Institute of Applied Social Studies, University of Birmingham, B15 2TT 
Tel: 0121 414 5714, Email: s.white.3@bham.ac.uk 
 
12.        Reimbursement for your costs 
 
You will not be paid for your participation in this project. 
13.        Further Information, Queries or Any Problems 
If you require further information, wish to withdraw your participation or if you have any problems 
concerning this project, you can contact the researcher:  
Matthew Gibson, IASS, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, B15 2TT, Tel: 0121 4158028, Email: 
m.j.gibson.1@bham.ac.uk 
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APPENDIX 6: CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
Full Project Title: The role of self-conscious emotions in child protection social work practice 
 
I confirm that I have read the Research Statement, have had the opportunity to ask questions 
about the research and have had any questions answered satisfactorily 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time from 
participating in the research 
I understand that the research involves observation of social work practice as it occurs both 
within and outside of the office including with services users and other professionals. In agreeing 
to take part, I understand that the researcher may make notes concerning observations of my 
social work practice 
I understand that I can ask that observation does not take place in any of these situations, if I feel 
that this is appropriate 
I understand that the research may also involve informal discussions between the researcher and 
participants.  The researcher may make written notes or use an audio recording device (in which 
case my permission will be sought).  The researcher will never make audio recordings except 
where everyone present has given their consent 
I understand that I may see any notes written about my practice or any transcripts of recorded 
conversations that I have had with the researcher 
I understand that the research findings may be made available in the following ways:  
 A report for the local authority and its staff 
 A PhD thesis which will be kept at Birmingham University library 
 Articles in relevant academic journals 
 Presentations at academic conferences 
I understand that these reports will anonymise any data so that research participants (or anyone 
whom they refer to) cannot be identified.  Material in the PhD thesis, journal articles and in 
conference presentations will not reveal any details about the local authority in which the 
research is taking place.  
I will be asked for additional consent to participate in an interview. 
 
Participant’s Name (printed) ……………………………………………………………………  
Signature ………………………………………………………           Date  ………………………… 
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APPENDIX 7: CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANT 
INTERVIEWS 
 
Date: 
Full Project Title: The role of self-conscious emotions in child protection social work practice 
 
 
I have read and I understand the Research Statement. 
I freely agree to participate in this semi-structured interview which will last about an hour 
The interview I give and the information it contains will be used solely for the purposes defined 
by the project.  
At any time, I can refuse to answer certain questions, discuss certain topics or even put an end to 
the interview without prejudice to myself.  
To facilitate the interviewer's job, you will be asked for the interview to be recorded. If you give 
permission, any recording will be securely stored on the University of Birmingham’s computer 
system and subsequently destroyed after it has been transcribed. 
All interview data will be handled so as to protect confidentiality. Therefore, no names will be 
mentioned in the transcripts and the information will be coded. 
The researcher has agreed not to reveal my identity and personal details, including where 
information about this project is published, or presented in any public form. 
 
 
 
Participant’s Name (printed) ……………………………………………………………………  
Signature ………………………………………………………           Date  ………………… 
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APPENDIX 8: RESEARCH INFORMATION SHEET FOR 
INDIRECT PARTICIPANTS 
  
Social Work Research Project 
Questions: 
 
All information about you will be anonymised so no one will know you 
have been involved in this research. 
You do not have to agree to me being here. 
If you do agree, you can change your mind later and any notes will be 
destroyed. 
For further information: 
 
Matthew Gibson, Institute of Applied Social Studies, University of 
Birmingham, B15 2TT, Tel: 0121 4158028, Email: m.j.gibson.1@bham.ac.uk  
 
What is this 
research about?  
This research project is looking at social workers’ experience. It is 
interested in finding out how to improve social work practice.  
What are you 
doing here? 
I am observing the social worker. I will be looking at what the social 
worker does and what they say. I will be taking notes about what I 
see and hear. 
Do I have to do 
anything? 
No. You do not have to do anything that you wouldn’t normally do 
when you see a social worker. 
Are you judging 
me? 
No. I am looking at what the social worker does and says and I will 
talk to them about this later. I am not making judgements about 
you. 
Are you writing 
things down about 
me? 
I will be making notes about what I see and hear so I can remember 
what was said and what I saw at the time. I might make notes about 
what you say so I can talk to the social worker about their 
experience later. I am not making notes for the social worker or for 
the local authority. The notes are for me to be able to do the 
research. 
What will you do 
with the notes? 
All my notes will be kept confidential and stored in a locked cabinet 
at the University of Birmingham. I will look at them to make 
conclusions and write a report for the University. I might also use 
them to write papers for academic journals.  
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APPENDIX 9: CONSENT FORM FOR PARENTS/CARERS 
 
SOCIAL WORK RESEARCH 
PROJECT  
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
 
 
 
I have been given and I understand the information sheet about this 
research project 
 
I agree to the researcher observing this visit/meeting and making notes  
 
I understand that any information about me or my family will not identify 
me 
 
I understand that I can ask for any information about me or my family not 
to be used in the study even if this is after the visit/meeting 
 
 
 
 
Name (printed) ……………………………………………………………  
 
Signature …………………………………           Date ………………… 
 
 
 
